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ABSTRACT
This dissertation deals with the tension between two seemingly divergent
approaches to morality. On the one hand, there are those who take the view that morality
concerns itself with the promotion of certain ends. This is a teleological or
consequentialist view of ethics. On the other hand, we see thinkers who take the view
that rationality or some other criteria provide us certain moral imperatives that may not
be violated, regardless of our desire to bring about a particular end. Kant is usually
depicted not only as a member of the latter camp, but indeed as the father of this
approach. Occasionally these approaches to morality seem to be put into direct conflict
with one another by cases in which one seems to face a choice between the promotion of
ends and the adherence to certain moral rules.
One example of the supposed conflict between teleological concerns and formal
requirements is famously depicted in the case of the murderer at the door. Many see
Kant‟s approach to this case as one that causes us to act in a way that jars against our
deep moral intuitions, and they take this to be a sign of a weakness in Kant‟s approach.
As a result, thinkers such as Christine Korsgaard have attempted to read Kant in a way
that sidesteps this conflict between teleology and form, arguing that the categorical
imperative can be read in a way that allows us to lie to the murderer at the door. A view
such as Korsgaard‟s is intriguing because it indicates a belief that we go wrong when we
value a formal requirement such as the adherence to the dictates of rationality above the
v

desire to prevent a great injustice from occurring. This view is powerful, and it seems
correct to me that, if our only reason to adhere to a conception of the moral law was to
cling to a view of rationality, that this goal seems to pale in comparison to the desire to
prevent great harms from occurring or to promote moral ends. Ultimately though, I think
Korsgaard‟s approach fails.
I argue instead that Kant‟s ethical thought shows a deep concern for both
teleological and formal considerations, and that a consideration of the relationship
between these two aspects of his thought will help us make sense of his approach to cases
such as the murderer at the door. It is the goal of my dissertation to present such an
analysis. In my proposed dissertation I take the view that, far from interfering with the
promotion of moral ends, Kant sees the formal requirements of morality as providing the
only possible path to the highest end, a moral world. On my view, Kant‟s formal ethics
and his teleology do not then represent stages in his thinking, or pieces of his thinking
that stand at odds with one another; they are instead to be seen as two inseparable pieces
of the same puzzle. A full understanding of each of these pieces of Kant‟s thought will
show us that neither piece can make sense without the other.
Human beings have two sorts of ends: moral ends, which we set for ourselves,
and natural ends, which aim at our happiness. Kant realized that obedience to the moral
law was not important simply because it allowed us to be rationally consistent. He also
saw such adherence to the moral law as the only sure path to the full realization of our
humanity. It is important to remember that for Kant the realization of our humanity
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involves a realization of the natural ends and rational ends for all human beings. So,
Kant‟s project is much more „cosmopolitan‟ than we often understand it to be.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation deals with the tension between two seemingly divergent
approaches to morality. On the one hand, there are those who take the view that morality
concerns itself with the promotion of certain ends. This is a teleological or
consequentialist view of ethics. On the other hand, we see thinkers who take the view
that rationality or some other criteria provide us certain moral imperatives that may not
be violated, regardless of our desire to bring about a particular end. Kant is usually
depicted not only as a member of the latter camp, but indeed as the father of this
approach. Occasionally these approaches to morality seem to be put into direct conflict
with one another by cases in which one seems to face a choice between the promotion of
ends and the adherence to certain moral rules.
This issue has become increasingly important in our modern world, especially as
a result of the relatively new „war on terror‟. Many have begun to argue that, for
example, torture may be justifiable in some cases, in the attempt to prevent harm from
occurring to others. There are of course many consequentialist arguments both for and
against the practice of torture. I find these kinds of arguments (regardless of the position
they are used to defend) largely unsatisfying. The following example may help explain
why. A couple of years ago I was at a conference and heard a panel discussion on the
issue of torture. One panelist was defending the use of torture, or at least extremely
1
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rigorous interrogation tactics, in at least some cases.1 He told the following story as an
example of his point.
A woman steps in to a store for a moment and leaves her car running with her
infant inside. As soon as she enters the store, the car is stolen. The thief drives several
miles and realizes that there is a young child in the car, panics, loots the car, and
abandons it. The police apprehend the suspect not long after he abandoned the car, and
are absolutely certain he is indeed the person who had taken the car. They interrogate
him in an attempt to get him to admit to taking the car, but also, more importantly, to get
him to reveal the whereabouts of the car so that they might save the child from dying due
to the extreme summer heat. The suspect refuses to admit his guilt and therefore will not
reveal the location of the car. After trying all other available methods (let‟s grant for the
sake of the argument that this is true), one officer proceeds to beat the suspect until he
gives up the location of the car and the child. The police get to the car and save the child,
knowing that, had they arrived just a few minutes later, the child would likely have
succumbed to the heat.
The panelist cited this example as the epitome of a case in which the actions of
the officer could be justified. The child was saved. The abusive techniques had worked.
It is important to remember that this case is largely immune from objections based on
consequentialist concerns. They knew they had the right suspect, knew he was aware of
the location of the car, and they did in fact save the child in jeopardy. However, I was
1

This panel discussion took place at the 2006 annual meeting for the Association for Practical and
Professional Ethics. I regret that I cannot remember the name of the panelist.
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troubled by one question, which I asked him: “Would the actions of the officer still have
been justified if they got to the car just after the child had succumbed to the heat?” To
my surprise, the panelist responded that, in his view, the police officer‟s actions would no
longer have been justified. It simply seemed wrong to me then, and still does now, that
the morality of a person‟s actions could hinge on the amount of air in a car at any given
time, which is something that is entirely out of the control of the person making the
decision to engage in tactics we would normally find objectionable. The Kantian
conclusion I kept coming back to was, either the act is wrong or it is not wrong; it cannot
depend on contingent states of affairs.
Another example may help us to see that our desire to prevent harms from
occurring, or to bring about certain good outcomes, might actually make a moral world
more difficult to attain. Doctors often face the following dilemma when dealing with a
patient who needs care but cannot afford it. The doctor might ask: should I lie on the
insurance form in order to help ensure the patient gets the care he or she needs? The
temptation is to say that we must „bend the rules‟ to bring about a good outcome.
However, one can see easily that, by engaging in such an act of deception, the doctor
plays a small role in making a flawed insurance system worse. Rather than hope for and
even work toward an improved system, the physician instead builds deception into the
system. While this may help bring about some benefits for individuals, it actually makes
improvement of the system more difficult2. Kant, I will argue, understood this problem;
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I take up this example in more depth in Chapter Four of this dissertation.
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this is one of the very reasons that we cannot let a consideration of consequences guide
our view of morality. Yet, this answer might seem trite to many. In the previous example
there is indeed a trade off. The physician forfeits the ability to help that particular patient
and is left only with the hope that he or she can work within moral means to make the
situation better in the future. I sympathize with those who would say that this is
unrealistic view in the world in which we now live.
One could imagine situations when the stakes were indeed so high that it seems
that anyone who still insists: “it‟s just wrong, no matter what,” has lost touch with
common sense. I actually agree with this judgment. If all we can say about the
importance of adherence to the moral law is that the categorical imperative tells me it is
wrong and therefore I may not do it, then we seem to abandon all concern for real
decisions in favor of stubborn headed adherence to a formula for its own sake.
However, this dissertation is an attempt to show that Kant did not see morality
this way. Adherence to the moral law is not only valuable for its own sake, but also
because it is a way of seeing that rationality and rational agency are valuable for their
own sake. Further, respect for the moral law and for rational agency is the only way to
make progress toward a moral world possible. Respect for the moral law goes hand in
hand with respect for persons and with the creation of a moral world. Only by seeing the
extent of these connections can we see the real power of Kant‟s approach to morality.
Kant himself took up the question of the alleged tension between teleological
concerns and formal requirements in the case of the murderer at the door. It is interesting
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to look at Kant‟s treatment of this situation in his essay, On a Supposed Right to Lie from
Philanthropy, in part because the critic to whom he is responding, Benjamin Constant,
bases his criticism of Kant‟s insistence that we may not lie to the murderer at the door on
the claim that such adherence to a principle of truthfulness would make society
untenable. (Right to Lie 425) This criticism reminds us of those who would say today
that strict adherence to some set of moral rules causes us to lose touch with reality and
allow unthinkable consequences. The nature of Kant‟s response to this criticism is
insightful as well. Kant‟s response to Constant can be best captured in the passage in
which he writes:
Truthfulness in statements that one cannot avoid is a human being‟s duty to
everyone, however great the disadvantage to him or to another that might result
from it; and although I do no wrong to him who unjustly compels me to make the
statement if I falsify it, I nevertheless do wrong in the most essential part of duty
in general by such falsification, which can therefore be called a lie … that is, I
bring it about, as far as I can, that statements (declarations) in general are not
believed, and so too that all rights which are based on contracts come to nothing
and lose their force; and this is a wrong inflicted upon humanity generally. (Right
to Lie 426)
Note that Kant does not appeal to any notion of treating a person as an end. He even says
that I “do no wrong to him who …compels me to make the statement.” Nor does Kant
here refer to the issue of being able to will the universal practice of our maxim. This may
seem startling to those who, even attempting to defend Kant‟s insistence that we may not
lie, primarily point either to the fact that we fail to treat the person to whom we lie as an
end or to the idea that lying entails some sort of contradictory or irrational willing. It
may be tempting therefore to think that Kant is just off his game a bit in this essay.
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(Indeed the whole example seems flawed by the fact that there is no such thing as a
statement one cannot avoid, since I can always elect to remain silent and face any
consequences that would result from this silence.) However, I would suggest that Kant
gives us an often over looked insight in the passage noted above.
Kant notes that our duty of truthfulness is instead based on the fact that, by lying,
I play a part in willing a world in which we can not know with certainty what is truth and
what is falsity, and therefore I undermine “rights which are based on contracts” and
therefore harm “humanity generally”. The goal of this dissertation will be to show that
this statement actually points to a central thought in Kant‟s ethical work. Kant
understood the connection between adherence to the moral law and the possibility of a
moral world.
My attempt to understand Kant in a way that shows that he understood the
connection between the moral law and progress toward a moral world differs in many
important regards from other authors who have tried to find a balance between teleology
and deontology in Kant. I will be talking at length about one author‟s approach in
particular, namely the approach taken by Christine Korsgaard in her book Creating the
Kingdom of Ends. While reading Korsgaard‟s text, I felt myself drawn to her project
because she attempts there to strike a balance between adhering to the commands of the
categorical imperative and making choices that help promote a Kingdom of Ends.
However, her approach is very different from the one I will take, and I will offer
arguments that her approach will not ultimately work.
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Korsgaard takes the approach of arguing that the various formulations of the
categorical imperative in fact lead to different results, and that the Formula of Universal
Law will allow us to lie to the murderer at the door while the Formula of Humanity and
the Formula of a Kingdom of Ends will not. This is critical for Korsgaard‟s argument
because she believes, as I do, that we ought to see the creation of a moral world, or a
Kingdom of Ends, as the ultimate goal of moral action. She thus argues that we will
sometimes have a choice between the less stringent Formula of Universal Law and the
other more demanding formulations. When we have such a choice, Korsgaard argues
that we ought to prefer the more lenient formulation, since adherence to the more
stringent Formula of Humanity may actually interfere with our ability to deal with evil
and to promote certain ends.
A view such as Korsgaard‟s is intriguing because it tries to remain true to a
Kantian approach to morality white it at the same time indicates a belief that we go
wrong when we value a formal requirement such as the adherence to the dictates of
rationality above the desire to prevent a great injustice from occurring. This view is
powerful and it seems that, if our only reason to adhere to a conception of the moral law
was to cling to a view of rationality, Korsgaard would be right to suggest that this goal
seems to pale in comparison to the desire to prevent great harms from occurring or to
promote moral ends. Korsgaard tries to make room within Kant‟s thought to loosen the
requirements put on us by the categorical imperative, and she further argues that this is
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critical if we are to preserve our goal of creating a Kingdom of Ends when it seems as if
the very requirements of the categorical imperative threaten to make this more difficult.
I will argue that Korsgaard is incorrect when she argues that the formulations of
the categorical imperative give different results in practice and that we are thus free to
choose which formulation to follow when they conflict. I will further argue that, if our
choice really is one between following the strict commands of the categorical imperative
and promoting certain ends, Kant was right to insist that the dictates of duty must take
precedence if moral action is to retain any meaning. I will further attempt to show that
Kant indeed saw the adherence to the commands of the categorical imperative as a
necessary condition for the attainment of a Kingdom of Ends. However, in order to
appreciate the difference between my approach and the one taken by Korsgaard, it may
be useful to look briefly at her approach to the case of the murderer at the door.
Korsgaard, the Categorical Imperative, and the Case of the Murderer at the Door
Korsgaard treats the case of the murderer at the door as part of her book Creating
the Kingdom of Ends, and it plays an important role in her argument that the formulations
of the categorical imperative are indeed distinct and that we ought to follow the less
stringent Formula of Universal Law rather than the more restrictive Formula of
Humanity.
Kant insists that a lie is always wrong, even in a case in which we are asked to
choose between being truthful to a murderer at our door and lying to the murderer in an
attempt to save a life. Christine Korsgaard points out the paradox caused by such a case

9
when she notes that Kant‟s insistence that a lie is always wrong implies that, “morality
itself sometimes allows or even requires us to do something that from an ideal
perspective is wrong” (Korsgaard 135). Simply put, it seems as if Kant‟s approach to
morality forces us to act immorally.
Readers of Kant have reacted to his treatment of the case of the murderer at the
door in various ways. Korsgaard does a nice job articulating the approaches taken both
by those who are sympathetic to Kant and those that are unsympathetic to him. Of the
unsympathetic readers, Korsgaard writes,
Unsympathetic readers are inclined to take [Kant‟s claims that we cannot lie to
the murderer at he door] as evidence of the horrifying conclusions to which Kant
was led by his notion that the necessity in duty is a rational necessity – as if Kant
was clinging to a logical point in the teeth of moral decency. Such readers take
these conclusions as a defeat for Kant‟s ethics…. (Korsgaard 134)
Korsgaard then contrasts this view with the one taken by readers who are sympathetic to
Kant‟s overall approach to morality. She notes:
Sympathetic readers are likely to argue that Kant mistook the implications of his
own theory, and to try to show that by careful construction and accurate testing of
the maxim on which this liar acts, Kant‟s conclusions can be blocked by his own
procedures. (Korsgaard 134)
It seems then, that the case of the murderer at the door tempts readers to either take the
view that Kant is committed to his claim that such lies are impermissible, and thus to use
this as a reason to dismiss his whole approach to ethics as impractical, or to take the view
that the categorical imperative is properly interpreted as allowing such lies, and that Kant
misunderstood the implications of his own claims. The common feature of both these
approaches is that they both treat the categorical imperative as one moral principle with
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one set of results. However, Korsgaard attempts to take a third approach to cases such as
the murderer at the door. She does this by arguing that:
when the case is treated under the Formula of Universal Law, this particular lie
can be shown to be permissible ….[However]when the case is treated from the
perspective of the Formulas of Humanity and the Kingdom of Ends, it becomes
clear why Kant is committed to the view that lying is wrong in every case
(Korsgaard 134-5).
For Korsgaard then, when it comes to the case of the murderer at the door, “the Formula
of Universal Law and the Formula of Humanity give us different results” (Korsgaard
144). Korsgaard takes the view that we go wrong when we say that there is only one
answer to the question: Does the categorical imperative allow us to lie to a murderer at
the door? In order to understand the importance of this claim, that the formulations of the
categorical imperative yield different results, we must first understand Korsgaard‟s
motivation for making the claim.
Korsgaard‟s Concern: The Confrontation with Evil
In the conclusion of Chapter Five of Creating the Kingdom of Ends Korsgaard
makes it clear why it is that she argues that the formulas of the categorical imperative
yield different results in practice. She urges us to see the Formula of Humanity as
providing a standard that best serves as an ideal toward which to strive but which can be
unrealistically demanding in some cases. Yet, we need not give up the moral guidance of
the categorical imperative entirely, since we could still refer to the less strenuous Formula
of Universal Law. She writes:
The Formula of Humanity and its corollary, the vision of a Kingdom of Ends,
provide an ideal to live up to in daily life as well as a long-term political and
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moral goal for humanity. But it is not feasible always to live up to this ideal, and
where attempts to live up to it would make you a tool for evil, you should not do
so. In evil circumstances, and only then, the Kingdom of Ends can become a goal
to seek rather than an ideal to live up to. … And even in the worst circumstances
there is always the Formula of Universal Law, telling us what we must not in any
case do. … The Formula of Universal Law provides the point at which morality
becomes uncompromising. (Korsgaard 153 – 154)
Korsgaard thus intends to use the Formula of Universal Law as the limit of our actions,
and so maintains an approach to morality that she can comfortably say is truly Kantian.
However, she argues that we should consider the Formula of Humanity as an ideal that
we may depart from when dealing with evil. She claims that, “[i]n such cases, we can
say that the Formula of Humanity is inapplicable because it is not designed for use when
dealing with evil” (Korsgaard 151). This approach amounts to what Korsgaard calls a
“Kantian double-level theory” (Korsgaard 151). She bases this double-level theory off
of a Rawlsian distinction between ideal and non-Ideal theories.
Korsgaard explains that in Rawls‟ A Theory of Justice, he had proposed a
distinction between Ideal and non-Ideal theories (Korsgaard 147). Michael Phillips
describes Rawls‟ distinction in the following way:
Very roughly, Ideal Theory attempts to describe those principles for the design of
institutions and the conduct of persons that would be appropriate to a morally and
politically ideal order, while non-Ideal Theory concerns itself with the principles
that would be appropriate for these purposes under less perfect conditions.
(Phillips, 551)
Korsgaard uses this distinction to explain the difference between Rawls‟ general
conception of justice and his special conception of justice.
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According to Korsgaard, Rawls‟ special conception of justice involves the equal
distribution of liberty and opportunity, while the general conception of justice allows an
unequal distribution if it is to the advantage of everyone, especially those most
disadvantaged (Korsgaard 147). She continues on to say that, given specific non-Ideal
conditions, “the special conception becomes a goal, rather than an ideal to live up to, we
are to work toward conditions in which it is feasible” (Korsgaard 148). Note however
that even when we leave the special conception of justice, we still have some guidance
from the less strict general conception. Korsgaard puts it this way: “Rawls‟ special
conception of justice is a stricter version of the egalitarian idea embodied in his general
conception” (Korsgaard 151). This sort of double-level approach, in which we can
abandon a more strict principle yet still remain bound by a less strict principle that still
expresses the same idea, is what Korsgaard attempts to apply to Kant‟s approach to
morality when she argues that we can treat the Formula of Humanity as a goal while still
making sure to keep within the bounds of the Formula of Universal Law.
Korsgaard notes that for Kant, “we are always to act as if we are living in a
Kingdom of Ends, regardless of possible disastrous results” (Korsgaard 149). The
problem, of course, is that we do not live in such a world. Human beings often act in
opposition to the creation of the Kingdom of Ends, and nature sometimes seems to do so
as well. Korsgaard finds this standard unrealistic. She even goes further and calls it
“grotesque simply to say that I have done my part by telling the truth and the bad results
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are not my responsibility” (Korsgaard 150). Korsgaard is not here accusing Kant of coldheartedness. She notes that:
Kant is by no means dismissive toward the distressing problems caused by the
evil conduct of other human beings and the unfriendliness of nature to human
ideals. … He finds in [these problems] grounds for a morally motivated belief in
God. Our rational motive for belief in a moral author of the world derives from a
rational need for grounds for hope that these problems will be resolved.
(Korsgaard 149)
Korsgaard is correct to say that Kant believes that a rational belief in God is a necessary
component for our faith in the eventual attainment of the Highest Good. However, she is
incorrect when she says that this is Kant‟s sole solution to the problems of evil doers and
injustices in the world. Kant‟s view of morality commits him to the view instead that we
must hold fast to the belief that our commitment to morality is a large part of making the
Kingdom of Ends possible. His entire approach is an argument against letting empirical
considerations or desired outcomes serve as the criteria by which we determine what is
right.
I wish not only to suggest that Kant would reject Korsgaard‟s adjustment to his
thought, but that he is right to do so. Korsgaard presents us with an interesting dilemma:
can Kant present a satisfactory way to deal with evil? However, her solution is
untenable. I wish to show that an emphasis instead on the unity (but not identity) of the
formulations is a better solution to the alleged tension between our desire to promote a
more ideal world and a real commitment to the demands of the categorical imperative.
The first step in this process is to examine the claim that the formulas of the categorical
imperative are indeed non-equivalent.

CHAPTER TWO
KORSGAARD’S CASE FOR THE NON-EQUIVALENCE OF THE
FORMULATIONS OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
Korsgaard‟s argument that the formulas of the categorical imperative are nonequivalent raises several important issues. In this chapter I will begin by looking at some
preliminary reasons why it may be wise to assume that the burden of proof rests on those
who would argue that the formulas are nonequivalent. Then I will examine Korsgaard‟s
casuistry in the case of the murderer at the door in order to see if it works as an argument
that the formulas indeed yield different results. Finally, I will examine Korsgaard‟s
notion of what sort of contradiction is involved in willing unacceptable maxims in Kant‟s
Formula of Universal Law. This last issue affects one‟s casuistry in cases such as the
murderer at the door, but it is also important for another reason. It is a critical issue
because it introduces the question of just what is involved in rational willing. Once we
come to an understanding of what it is that a rational agent can and cannot will, we will
begin to see the nature of the relationship between the sort of formalism that seems to
appear in the Formula of Universal Law and the teleological considerations that appear
elsewhere in Kant‟s thought.
The Case for the Presumption of Equivalence between the Formulas
As I have already said, Korsgaard argues that the formulations of the categorical
imperative are nonequivalent because they yield different results, particularly in the case
14
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of the murderer at the door. John E. Atwell however expresses the concern that critics
often argue for the nonequivalence of the formulations of the categorical imperative by
offering their own interpretation of one of the formulas. Atwell then suggests that such
critics “may have shown only that Kant misapplied or misunderstood one of the
principles, rather than that the principles themselves are nonequivalent” (Atwell 275).
Atwell continues on to give a few examples, noting for instance that Marcus Singer, in
his work Generalization in Ethics, “gives his own interpretation of the first principle and
shows … that it does not imply that lying is always wrong. But then, noting that Kant
regarded every case of lying as treating someone merely as a means … concludes that the
two principles are not equivalent” (Atwell 276). We must then make sure that Korsgaard
is not engaging in this same sort of discussion which would amount to the claim that Kant
ought to have seen the principles as nonequivalent even if he did see them as equivalent.
On the other hand, Onora O‟Neill cautions against the temptation too arrive too
quickly at the belief that the formulations are equivalent. She notes that there is a
distinction between „extensional equivalence‟ and „intensional equivalence‟ and that true
equivalence requires that both of these standards be met (O‟Neill 364). She explains the
distinction in the following way:
The two formulations might be equivalent in that both classify maxims, and
derivatively the acts that conform to or violate those maxims in the same ways:
they might be simply extensionally equivalent.… Alternatively … [the
formulations] might be intensionally equivalent, if it could be shown not merely
that they in fact yield the same results, but that this follows from the nature of the
formulations. (O‟Neill 346)
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O‟Neill is here making the point that the overlap in results between two formulations
cannot be a matter of serendipity. The formulas must in fact logically entail identical
outcomes when applied as criteria for action. This is because, “if we want insight into
why these formulations are both versions of the supreme principle of morality we will
need [it] to be shown not merely that they yield the same results, but why they do so”
(O‟Neill 346). This comment is extremely important, as it suggests that there is good
reason to be hopeful that the formulations are indeed equivalent. O‟Neill‟s comment
points to the fact that the formulations of the categorical imperative are not a series of
guides to action, but are allegedly expressions of the same principle of morality.
O‟Neill elaborates on the issue of the importance of belief that the formulas are
equivalent. She notes that nonequivalence between the Formula of Universal Law and
the Formula of Humanity1 would jeopardize the legitimacy of the appeals to the Formula
of Humanity by those who see this formula as more fruitful. She makes this point when
she writes:
Most of the arguments or argument sketches that he [Kant] provides for the
supreme principle of morality lead us to (at least towards) …[the Formula of
Universal Law]; yet much that he and many of his admirers (and even of his
critics) find attractive and significant in guiding moral reflection derives from the
…[Formula of Humanity]. It is the ideal of treating people as ends and avoiding
using them as means, not the ideal of acting on universalizable principles, that has
become part of our culture. If the attractive idea of treating people as ends and
never as means may not be groundable by Kantian arguments, while the charges
of rigourism and formalism which are perennially leveled against …[the Formula
of Universal Law] may lead us to conclude that even if Kantian arguments show
that this is the supreme principle of morality, still we have not discovered a
principle that can help us lead our lives. (O‟Neill 342)
1

O‟Neill uses “Formula of Ends in Themselves” but I am using Korsgaard‟s language here, as my
argument in this chapter deals primarily with Korsgaard‟s treatment of the formulations.
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It might seems as if O‟Neill‟s worry that we place the Formula of Humanity in jeopardy
if we accept the conclusion that the formulas are nonequivalent would not be a concern to
Korsgaard, since it is after all the Formula of Humanity that she advises us to give up
when it overly confines our actions in the face of evil. However, O‟Neill‟s remark is
important for the reason that it shows that any attempt to argue for the nonequivalence of
the formulations comes at a price. This affects Korsgaard‟s view because, while it may
be helpful to see the formulas as separate so that we have some latitude in our actions
when confronting evil, we would have to at the same time surrender all the benefits that
come from seeing the formulas as equivalent. O‟Neill‟s comments point to the fact that
Kant‟s argument in the Groundwork only makes sense “if there is some reading of the
formulations under which the claimed equivalences hold” (O‟Neill 353). This serves by
itself as a prima facie reason to put the burden of proof on those who would interpret the
formulas as nonequivalent.
We can also add another reason to take the view that the default position should
be one of seeing the formulas as equivalent. This reason comes in the form of Kant‟s
own language. Kant notes that the various formulations represent “only so many
formulae of the very same law, and any one of them unites the other two in it” (Gr 436).
This quote is admittedly frustrating, since Kant then goes on the say: “There is
nevertheless, a difference among them” (Gr 436).2 If we take Kant‟s words together with

2

O‟Neill makes this same point on page 342 of “Universal Laws and Ends-in-Themselves” and attempts to
explain this tension in the remainder of her article. I will take up this point again later on, and will make
use of some of her points in doing so. Suffice to say, I agree with O‟Neill that it is possible to have
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the above considerations about the importance of an equivalence between the
formulations to Kant‟s project we are able to see that any reading sustaining the
equivalence of the formulations “gains some support from the fact that Kant claims they
are equivalent and that it is vital to his argument that they be so” (O‟Neill 343).
So, as we turn to look at Korsgaard‟s argument that the formulations are not
equivalent, we must keep the forgoing considerations in mind. We must ask, with
Atwell, whether Korsgaard is giving Kant‟s view of each formulation or whether she is
offering a new interpretation of one or more of the formulations. If she is doing the
latter, then it seems that this would be insufficient to truly show nonequivalence.
Additionally, we must ask, with O‟Neill, whether the arguments for the nonequivalence
are sufficient to trump considerations in favor of the view that the formulations are
equivalent.
Finally, it is important to point out one more consideration regarding the
importance of the move of leaving the Formula of Universal Law intact as a guide for our
actions. Let us assume for now that Korsgaard is correct that the Formula of Humanity is
too strict and is indeed unfit for dealing with evil. If the formulas of the categorical
imperative were equivalent, or, even if non-equivalent, if Korsgaard had advised us to
abandon the categorical imperative entirely as a guide for actions, we would be left
without real guidance when it comes to the issue of how we are to deal with evil. It is
dangerous and incorrect to view Korsgaard as saying that, when dealing with evil, we are
equivalence in terms of the implications for ethical evaluation without having a complete identity between
the formulations. Indeed my argument will try to show the importance of the view that the formulations
can be complementary even if they are functionally equivalent.
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beyond the scope of the categorical imperative and must do whatever we believe will be
most effective for ultimately defeating evil and promoting a kingdom of ends. It does not
take much to realize that such a position would be hardly worth considering, at least not
for anyone who calls themselves a Kantian. Currently, in the United States, much
deception, coercion and cruelty have been excused in the name of dealing with the evils
of terrorism. If Korsgaard had argued that we ought to sometimes abandon the
categorical imperative altogether because it is too strict, this would amount to a view that
we ought to follow a Kantian conception of morality, but only to a point, and that we
should abandon it when the going gets tough3.
However, by separating the formulations, Korsgaard takes a step that weakens the
force of the categorical imperative and begins to allow our ends to determine our duty.
Heiner Bielefeldt explains why the view that the formulations of the categorical
imperative are non-equivalent in fact undermines the concept of a categorical imperative.
He writes, “In such a conceptualization, the very uniqueness – and thus – also the
strictness – of the categorical imperative would actually be lost” (Bielefeldt 56). So, if
we were to follow Korsgaard, the categorical imperative would be replaced by a set of
different (or even antagonistic) moral principles, none of which would any longer have
the unconditioned status of the categorical imperative. Positively speaking, the

3

One must wonder however what Korsgaard would have us do if in fact the formulas were equivalent. If
so, and if her avenue was closed to her, should we prioritize the goal of a kingdom of ends and abandon
Kant‟s very tool for making that kingdom a reality, or should we stay true to Kant‟s vision of the
categorical imperative and risk the feeling that we have let evil get the better of us due to our allegiance to
rationalist principles? I take this issue up in the final chapter.
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categorical imperative must be a single imperative in order to have its categorical
authority (Bielefeldt 56).
Even though Korsgaard maintains that the formulations still express the same
idea, even though they yield different results, the fact is that they do in fact yield different
results in her account and thus compete with one another. Bielefeldt‟s comments lead to
an important point. When formulations compete, how are we to decide which formula to
follow? Korsgaard has given her reasons to choose the Formula of Universal Law, but it
is clear that she is here no longer interpreting Kant but suggesting a revision to his
thinking. However, we must ask whether this revision is for the best.
Korsgaard puts the creation of a Kingdom of Ends as the goal of moral action and
argues that we ought to view the Formula of Humanity and the Formula of the Kingdom
of Ends as too unrealistic (in that they are too demanding) when they seem to make the
very realization of the Kingdom of Ends less possible. I believe that this amounts to a
sort of lack of faith in Kant‟s view of morality.
I have attempted to argue that there are several reasons we ought not to follow
Korsgaard‟s claim that the formulas of the categorical imperative are nonequivalent.
However, all of my arguments so far have pointed solely to the repercussions of such a
view and not to a consideration of the actual use of the formulas as guides to action. With
that in mind, let‟s now look at her treatment of this case.
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Korsgaard‟s Casuistry in the Case of the Murderer at the Door
Korsgaard argues that the Formula of Universal Law would allow us to lie to the
murderer at the door while the Formula of Humanity would not allow such a lie. I
consider her claim that the Formula of Humanity would not permit the lie to be noncontroversial and will focus my attention here on her claim that the Formula of Universal
Law would permit lying in the case of the murderer at the door. Korsgaard‟s claim that
the Formula of Universal Law would permit such a lie rests on her casuistry of the case,
and her casuistry rests on a further assumption regarding the nature of a contradiction
involved in willing untenable maxims. I will treat her casuistry here and then go on to
deal in depth with her discussion of the contradictions involved in willing unacceptable
maxims. However, her discussion of the nature of such contradictions needs to be briefly
mentioned here, as it fuels her casuistry.
Korsgaard begins her analysis by noting that Kant‟s formula of universal law puts
us in the position of having to figure out “what you can will without contradiction”
(Korsgaard 77). Korsgaard then notices that there are various views about the ways in
which a maxim might be said to come into contradiction with itself (Korsgaard 80), and
she adopts what she refers to as a „practical contradiction interpretation‟ and goes on to
assess the case of the murderer at the door under this interpretation.4 Although I believe
that there are problems with Korsgaard‟s view, that the sort of contradiction involved in a
maxim that cannot be universalized is what she calls a practical contradiction, I will
4

Korsgaard‟s argument for the practical contradiction interpretation is in Chapter Three of Creating the
Kingdom of Ends. She then treats the case of the murderer at the door, using this interpretation, in Chapter
Five of the same work.
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postpone that question for now and instead will begin simply by examining the casuistry
of Korsgaard‟s analysis and application of the practical contradiction interpretation.
Korsgaard summarizes her view, that the contradiction we are to avoid when we
will a maxim as a universal law of nature is a practical one, when she writes: “The
universalized maxim contradicts itself when the efficacy of the action as a means for
achieving its purpose would be undermined by its universal practice” (Korsgaard 135).
Korsgaard then applies this to the case of lying, saying that “lies are usually efficacious in
achieving their purposes because they deceive, but if they were universally practiced they
would not deceive” (Korsgaard 136). It seems that, so far, Korsgaard does not deviate
from the conclusion that any maxim that would involve willing a lie would seem to be
forbidden by the formula of universal law. However, she then presents the case of the
murderer at the door in such a way that lying seems to become permissible.
Korsgaard begins her depiction by stating that, “there is probably already
deception in the case” (Korsgaard 136). Korsgaard claims that this deception exists
because a potential murderer would not be honest about his intentions, “in any event, this
is not how I [Korsgaard] shall imagine the case” (Korsgaard 136). It is important to
understand that Korsgaard is not arguing that it is the immorality of the murderer‟s
deception that makes our lie permissible. She is not making the same argument to which
Kant is responding in, On A Supposed Right to Lie From Philanthropy. In that work he
criticizes those who hold the view that our duty to tell the truth only applies to those who
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have a right to it.5 It is obvious of course, that Korsgaard must be taking a different
approach. For, if her claim were that we could be exempted from our moral obligations
by the evil of others, then his deception would be irrelevant, for he already had
murderous intentions. Although Korsgaard believes that the murderer has, “placed
himself in a morally unprotected position by his own deception,” (Korsgaard 137) this is
not because morality no longer binds us at all.6 Rather, Korsgaard‟s claim is that the
murderer‟s deception makes it possible for us to universalize a maxim of lying without
entangling ourselves in a contradiction. However, this claim depends on another nuance
Korsgaard adds to her depiction of the situation.
Korsgaard has already stipulated that she will treat the case of the murderer at the
door as one in which the murderer is himself engaging in deception. She then goes on to
specify that, “A murderer who expects to conduct his business by asking questions must
suppose that you do not know who he is or what he has in mind” (Korsgaard 136). Given
the qualifications Korsgaard has made to the case, the lie then becomes permissible
because:
The lie will be efficacious even if universally practiced. But the reason it will be
efficacious is rather odd: it is because the murderer supposes you do not know the
circumstances you are in – that is, that you do not know that you are addressing a
murderer – and so does not conclude from the fact that people in those
circumstances always lie that you will lie. (Korsgaard 136)

5

Kant‟s response is to an essay by Benjamin Constant. Kant summarizes Constant‟s claim in section 426
of the Supposed Right to Lie From Philanthropy.
6

This should be clear from the fact that Korsgaard holds the view that the formula of the Kingdom of Ends
and the Formula of Humanity would not permit our lie, despite the murderer‟s deception.
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The situation then, as Korsgaard depicts it, is as follows: First, the murderer at the door
engages in an act of deception by keeping his intentions secret. Second, you are
somehow aware of his intentions anyway. Third, the murderer does not know that you
are on to him. For Korsgaard then, I am able to will my maxim as a universal law
(assuming Korsgaard‟s interpretation of the reasons why a maxim cannot be
universalized) because even if everyone lied in the circumstance she describes, the lies
would never cease to be efficacious.
The lie would be efficacious because of the subtleties Korsgaard builds into the
case. Because the murderer is unaware that I know of his murderous intentions, he will
not expect that I will lie. So, even if this situation were to be repeated time and again, the
murderer would never have any reason to assume that he has been told a lie. Lies are
efficacious until they cause others to doubt our veracity, and on Korsgaard‟s account of
the case, the murderer would never have any reason to doubt our responses to his
questions.
Marcus Singer also takes this approach in his essay “The Categorical Imperative”
which deals with one of the issues with the question of whether Kant‟s categorical
imperative really implies the sort of absolutism that is normally attributed to him. Singer
comments: “the view that certain moral rules hold absolutely or in all circumstances,
simply does not follow from Kant‟s first moral principle” (Singer 583). He then uses the
example of the murderer at the door to support this claim.
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Singer, like Korsgaard, supposes that the reason a maxim of lying (or any maxim)
would allegedly be rejected by Kant‟s formula of universal law is because the universal
practice of the lie would be self-defeating. He then argues, as does Korsgaard, that the
case of the murderer at the door presents a circumstance wherein the maxim would not be
self defeating if made universal. He makes this point when he says: “the lie would be
self-defeating – the murderer would fail to believe it – only if he knew what the
circumstances were, that is to say only if he knew that his victim was in the house”
(Singer 587). Korsgaard and Singer thus seem to have found an interesting „loophole‟ in
Kant‟s prohibition against lying. However, if we examine their reasoning more closely,
we will see that it has some troubling implications.
If the wrongness of lying rests on the fact that the universal practice of lying
would undermine itself, Kant‟s entire moral project begins to look suspect. Ignoring the
criticism that such a view seems to open Kant up to the charges that he is in fact a closet
rule-utilitarian, there are other concerns that are prompted by Korsgaard‟s interpretation.
On her explication, Kant‟s example of the wrongness of making a lying promise rests not
on the fact that a lie has been told but that a false promise has been made. (Of course all
false promises are also lies, but it‟s important to remember that not all lies are false
promises.) If we realize that the lie specifically involves a promise we can see important
ramifications. A false promise becomes wrong because it will inevitably become
uncovered. I can‟t make false promises without the person to whom I have made the
promise discovering my lie. So, clearly, such false promises cannot be universally
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practiced because such a practice would indeed undermine itself. However, the situation
is different with any lie that will not be uncovered. Korsgaard acknowledges one unusual
outcome of this interpretation. She notes that her analysis allows us to lie not just to
potential murderers but also to “liars whose purposes are good” (Korsgaard 145).
Korsgaard presents the following case, which I quote below at length:
Here is a case: suppose someone comes to your door and pretends to be taking a
survey of some sort. In fact, the person is a philanthropist who wants to give his
money to people who meet certain criteria, and this is his way of discovering
appropriate objects for his beneficence. As it happens, you know what is up. By
lying you could get some money, although you do not in fact meet his criteria….
By my argument it is permissible to lie in this case. The philanthropist, like the
murderer, has put himself in a morally unprotected position by his own deception.
(Korsgaard 145)
Korsgaard‟s analysis thus ironically suggests a supposed right to lie in order to receive
philanthropy. Beyond this, as I have said already, any lie that would remain uncovered
would be permissible under the interpretation offered by Singer and Korsgaard. What is
oddest about Korsgaard‟s conclusion, that her analysis of the Formula of Universal Law
commits us to the view that we may lie even when our own intentions are less than
honorable, is that she does not see any problem with this view. It is important to
remember that Korsgaard is not claiming to be offering an adjustment to Kant‟s thought.
She is claiming instead that Kant‟s own thinking necessitates the conclusions she reaches.
But, to put the matter simply, it seems preposterous to suggest that Kant would endorse
the view that we may lie for our own gain. In fact I can envision no counter-example that
would more clearly show that Korsgaard‟s analysis must have gone wrong somewhere.
In the end, Korsgaard twists Kant‟s own thinking in order to try to save him from a
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conclusion she believes is unacceptable: that we cannot lie to prevent evil from occurring.
However, in her attempt to do so, she has led us to an even more absurd conclusion: that
we may lie for our own benefit.
It might be said here that the objections I have raised against the view offered by
Korsgaard and Singer hold regardless of one‟s view of the content of maxims. Singer
argues that maxims are not general rules intended to guide actions independently of
context, and thus stands in some opposition to authors who have argued that maxims are
indeed far more general. He writes that the categorical imperative “must always be
applied to an action considered as taking place in certain circumstances, or for a certain
purpose. The proof of this is that a reference to the circumstances and purpose of an
action is necessarily involved in the “maxim” of the action” (Singer 590). He goes on to
say that “Kant overlooked the fact that lying merely for one‟s own personal convenience
and lying in order to save the life of some innocent person are two different sorts of
actions, actions whose maxims are quite different” (Singer 590). Singer‟s point is
appealing, but it does not amount to an argument that the categorical imperative would
allow us to lie if our intentions were altruistic. Indeed his only argument offered that we
may lie to the murderer at the door under the Formula of Universal Law hinges not on
our ends but on the fact that the lie would be believed. As I have already shown, if this is
the reason the lie is permissible, then it leads us to several unacceptable and counterintuitive conclusions.
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However, Singer does raise an important issue. Kant does include a purpose in
some of the maxims he uses in the Groundwork. He indeed does say that the maxim in
the false promising example is the following: “when I believe myself to be in need of
money I shall borrow money and promise to repay it, even though I know that this will
never happen” (Gr 422). It does not seem that Kant needs to stipulate the reason for the
false promise is that the person considering making the maxim would be in need of
money, for the very act of making false promises seems contradictory, without mention
of the reason why the promise was made. I will argue later on that Kant‟s mention of
purposes or ends is indeed important for understanding his ethical thought as a whole.
However, as we have seen above, Singer‟s claim, that the mention of the ends in view is
important to the casuistry in the case of the murderer at the door, cannot be supported.
I have argued that there ought to be a presumption toward the view that the
formulations of the categorical imperative are equivalent, and I have further argued that
Korsgaard‟s casuistry leads to counter-intuitive results. However, I believe that her
approach cannot ultimately work primarily because her casuistry is based on a view of
rational willing that is incorrect. Our view of what is to count as rational willing impacts
our understanding of why it is that maxims cannot be successfully willed as universal
laws, and it is our view of what causes maxims to fail that will always guide our casuistry
when treating cases under the Formula of Universal Law. So, it is important to now look
at Korsgaard‟s understanding of the sort of contradiction involved in willing maxims that
cannot be universalized.
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Korsgaard‟s „Practical Contradiction‟ Interpretation
Any attempt to use the categorical imperative‟s Formula of Universal Law as a
principle for evaluating the morality of actions depends on a particular conception of
what it is that renders a maxim contradictory when one attempts to will it as a universal
law. Kant tells us that there are indeed two tests maxims may be subjected to when we
ask whether they can be willed as universal laws. Kant explains the difference between
the two when he writes:
Some actions are so constituted that their maxims cannot even be thought without
contradiction as a universal law of nature, far less could one will as what should
become such. In the case of others this internal impossibility is indeed not to be
found, but it is still impossible to will that their maxim should be raised to the
universality of a law of nature because such a will would contradict itself. (Gr
424)
These two tests mentioned by Kant have since come to be known as the contradiction in
conception test and the contradiction in the will test, respectively.
Kant associates contradictions in conception with “strict or narrower
(unremitting) duty” (Gr 424) and contradictions in the will with “wide (meritorious)
duty” (Gr 424). Kant gives four examples of the Formula of Universal Law in action: a
person contemplating suicide, a person considering making a false promise, a person
contemplating neglecting his or her own talents, and a person contemplating the
withholding of aid to others. These examples are intended to respectively represent
perfect duties to ourselves, perfect duties to others, wide or meritorious duties to
ourselves, and wide or meritorious duties to others. This delineation thus puts a case
such as lying (even to a would-be murderer at the door) in the category of perfect duties
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to others, and as such, as a duty to be treated under the contradiction in conception test.
It would thus seem as if we have a simple criterion to decide whether or not the Formula
of Universal Law would permit us to lie to the murderer at the door. If we can will such
a maxim as a universal law without causing a contradiction in conception, then it seems
like the maxim would be permissible. However, this all depends on what we mean when
we say “contradiction in conception”.
Korsgaard offers her view of just what is involved in such contradictions when
she writes:
On this interpretation, the contradiction is that your maxim would be selfdefeating if universalized: your action would become ineffectual for the
achievement of your purpose if everyone (tried to) use it for that purpose. Since
you propose to use that action for that purpose at the same time as you propose to
universalize the maxim, you in effect will the thwarting of your own purpose.
(Korsgaard 78)
The important feature of Korsgaard‟s interpretation is that it focuses on the impact the
universalization of one‟s maxim has on the efficacy of one‟s own purpose. This sits in
contrast to authors who focus instead on the logical impossibility of willing one‟s maxim
to be a universal law.
Korsgaard counts authors such as Dietrichson, Kemp and Wood 7 among those
who see “something like a logical impossibility in the universalization of the maxim, or
in the system of nature in which the maxim is a natural law: if the maxim were
universalized, the action or policy it proposes would be inconceivable” (Korsgaard 78).
Korsgaard refers to this view as a “Logical Contradiction Interpretation” (Korsgaard 78).
7

See page 81, and the footnote for Korsgaard‟s exact references to these authors.
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She then offers a summary of how such an approach would handle the case of false
promising when she writes, “we are imagining a world in which the agent and everyone
with his purpose is making a certain sort of promise, but also a world in which there is no
such thing” (Korsgaard 82). Indeed Kant‟s language in his example of a maxim of false
promising makes it very difficult to determine whether he sees a practical contradiction
or a logical contradiction at work. The language that causes the confusion occurs when
Kant writes:
For, the universality of a law that everyone, when he believes himself to be in
need, could promise whatever he pleases with the intention of not keeping it
would make the promise and the end one might have in it impossible, since no
one would believe what was promised him but would laugh at all such
expressions as vain pretenses. (Gr 422)
When Kant refers to the promise itself becoming impossible, this seems to suggest a
logical contradiction in which the practice of promising becomes nonsense. However,
when, in the same sentence, he refers to the end contained in the promise becoming
impossible, we see a possible reason to think in terms of a practical contradiction in
which the end of the person making the false promise is thwarted by the fact that such
false promises have been universalized. It thus seems that this issue cannot be settled by
reference to the textual evidence in Kant‟s own writing.
The difference between these two views is, however, critical. This is because
Korsgaard uses her Practical Contradiction Interpretation (Korsgaard 78) as the
foundation for her casuistry in the case of the murderer at the door, and thus it is only
using that particular interpretation that she was able to argue that the Formula of
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Universal Law would permit such a lie and that it is thus non-equivalent to the Formula
of Humanity (since the lie would clearly be prohibited under that formulation). In
contrast, I will show that a view that looked for a logical contradiction in the
contradiction in conception test would find the maxim of lying to a murderer at the door
unacceptable. Further, I will suggest that Korsgaard‟s interpretation that the type of
contradiction involved in willing an unacceptable maxim is a practical one, is an
untenable view.
Korsgaard‟s view implies a specific notion of rational willing, one which I believe
is incorrect. In this section, I will try to offer reasons to reject her view, and in the next
chapter I will offer my own interpretations as to Kant‟s view of rational willing. Our
understanding of what is and what is not rational to will is crucial for my larger project.
This is because such an understanding will help us see the connection between the
Formula of Universal Law and the other formulations of the categorical imperative and to
see the tie between the moral law and teleology in Kant‟s ethical thought. It is clear
however, that we will need to appeal to criteria beyond Kant‟s own work to determine
which interpretation seems to most accurately capture Kant‟s thinking. I will focus now
on the view of rationality present in each interpretation as well as the impact this view of
rationality has on the distinction between the contradiction in conception test and the
contradiction in the will test.
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One Contradiction or Two?
Korsgaard notes as an advantage of her Practical Contradiction Interpretation that
it “should enable us to employ the same sense of contradiction in interpreting the two
contradiction tests, and yet still to distinguish between them” (Korsgaard 96). Korsgaard
notes that the Logical Contradiction Interpretation cannot deal with the contradiction in
the will test (Korsgaard 96). Of course, it remains an open question whether the ability to
deal with both tests is reason to prefer one interpretation over another.
Korsgaard is of course completely correct to say that we cannot look for a logical
contradiction in maxims that involve a contradiction in the will rather than a
contradiction in conception. This is the case by definition. Kant notes, of contradictions
in the will, “inner impossibility is indeed not to be found” (Gr 424). It is for this reason
that Korsgaard notes that “proponents of the Logical Contradiction Interpretation for the
contradictions in conception end up with something like a utilitarian or a teleological
view about contradictions in the will” (Korsgaard 96). It is no doubt true that, when it
comes to contradictions in the will, no appeal can be made to a logical contradiction and
another sort of contradiction must indeed be sought. However, Korsgaard takes this as a
reason to abandon the Logical Contradiction Interpretation altogether. It is this step that
seems questionable. It seems that Korsgaard takes it as understood that, when it comes to
dealing with the distinction between contradictions in conception and contradictions in
the will, we are to prefer an interpretation that can account for both sorts of
contradictions. This seems to be a dubious assumption.
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Korsgaard‟s claim, that we ought to employ one sort of interpretation to deal with
both contradictions in conception and contradictions in the will, does however have an
attractiveness to it. This is because a common, coherent view of rationality must be
shared by both tests for contradictory maxims, while allowing for a distinction between
the two tests. (This same desire for a cohesive view of rationality also fuels our
interpretations of the relationship between the formulations of the categorical
imperative.) However, since there are in fact two different tests for the acceptability of
maxims, it is also reasonable to think that there could be two different sorts of
contradictions in place. Korsgaard‟s claim is, however, that the gap between the
contradiction in conception test and the contradiction in the will test is too large under the
Logical Contradiction Interpretation. So, let us turn to examine this view.
While it is true that the Logical Contradiction Interpretation forces us to turn to
another sort of interpretation for contradictions in the will, this may not mean that there is
not a common underlying notion of rationality. Korsgaard notes that “proponents of the
Logical Contradiction Interpretation … end up with something like a utilitarian or
teleological view about contradictions in the will” (Korsgaard 96). She goes on to
suggest that it is not possible to use such a conception to deal with the contradictions in
the will because it “presupposes a morality–laden conception of rationality” (Korsgaard
96). If true, this would be problematic because the categorical imperative is intended to
be the principle of morality and so cannot rest on any prior suppositions about the good.
However, Korsgaard‟s objection only holds if we think of a teleological view as one that
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holds that the restrictions on what we can and cannot will come from a view of what is
good to will. The objection does not work if we think of a teleological conception in
terms of ends that are or are not rational to will. In the next chapter, I will argue that this
is exactly what Kant has in mind. But first, let‟s look at Korsgaard‟s argument that the
Practical Contradiction Interpretation does a better job.
Korsgaard describes the way that the Practical Contradiction Interpretation deals
with the distinction between contradictions in conception and contradictions in the will in
the following way:
The purpose thwarted in the case of a maxim that fails the contradiction in
conception test is the one in the maxim itself, and so the contradiction can be said
to be in the universalized maxim. The purpose thwarted in the case of the
contradiction in the will test is not one that is in the maxim, but one that is
essential to the will. (Korsgaard 97)
So, in the contradiction in conception test the purpose put forward in my maxim would be
thwarted by its universalization. In the contradiction in the will test, on the other hand,
there are “essential purposes” (Korsgaard 96) that all rational beings must have, “and in
the world where maxims that fail these tests are universal law, these essential purposes
will be thwarted, because the means of achieving them will be unavailable” (Korsgaard
96). Korsgaard goes on to give examples of these sorts of essential purposes when she
says: “Examples of purposes that might be thought to be essential to the will are its
general effectiveness in the pursuit of its ends, and the freedom to adopt and pursue new
ends” (Korsgaard 96). I agree with Korsgaard‟s view that Kant may have in mind some
„essential ends‟. Indeed I will try to develop this view in the next chapter as part of a

36
discussion of what it is that counts as rational willing. However, Korsgaard fails to
notice an important difference that her interpretation would create between the thwarting
of purposes involved in the contradiction in conception test and the thwarting of purposes
involved in the contradiction in the will test.
Under Korsgaard‟s analysis, the thwarting of purposes in the contradiction in
conception test is the “thwarting of the agent‟s own purpose” (Korsgaard 92). So the
ends that are being frustrated are subjective. But, in the contradiction in the will test the
ends being frustrated are ends that are essential to any rational agent. They are objective
ends. It is Korsgaard‟s view regarding the contradiction in conception test that seems
suspect to me. I dispute the view that Kant‟s test for ruling out maxims can be one that
essentially involves the frustration of an agent‟s subjective ends. Such an interpretation
seems to rest on what I believe is a mistaken view of what is entailed in rational willing,
so it is to this question that we now turn.
Korsgaard on Rational Willing
Korsgaard writes that, “Kant‟s ethics is based on the idea that there is a
specifically practical employment of reason, which is not the same as an application of
theoretical reason. It includes a specifically practical kind of „contradiction.‟ The
argument that shows this seems to me to be an almost decisive one in favor of this [the
Practical Contradiction] interpretation” (Korsgaard 93). While it is true that Kant‟s ethics
is based on a practical employment of reason, this does not mean the “practical sense of
contradiction” which Korsgaard mentions necessarily follows. Korsgaard argues for the
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connection between the two by appealing to an analogy to Kant‟s discussion of
hypothetical imperatives.
Korsgaard begins by noting Kant‟s view that hypothetical imperatives are
analytic. She quotes the following passage from the Groundwork:
Whoever wills the end , so far as reason has decisive influence on his action, wills
also the indispensably necessary means to it that lie in his power. This
proposition, in what concerns the will, is analytical; for in willing the object as my
effect, my causality as an acting cause, i.e., the use of means, is already thought,
and the imperative derives the concept of necessary actions to this end from the
concept of willing this end. (Gr 417)
It is easy to see how a violation of a hypothetical imperative would be incoherent and
irrational. Elijah Millgram offers some humorous examples of this sort of irrationality
such as “when you decide to go to New York but tear up the ticket that will get you
there” (Millgram 527). Korsgaard then goes on to suggest: “Since this is the sort of
contradiction implied in the analyticity of hypothetical imperatives, it is reasonable to
think that this will be the sort of contradiction employed in the categorical imperative
tests” (Korsgaard 94). Korsgaard then continues to think of the false promising example
in terms of the analogue to hypothetical imperatives. She writes:
In the world of the universalized maxim, the hypothetical imperative from which
the false promiser constructs his maxim is no longer true. It was „If you want
some ready cash, you ought to make a false promise.‟ But at the same time that
he employs this hypothetical imperative in constructing his maxim, he wills its
falsification, by willing a state of affairs (the world of the universalized maxim) in
which it will be false. In that world, false promising is not a means to getting
ready cash. (Korsgaard 94)
The idea here is that the sort of contradiction is analogous to one in which I will the ends
but do not will the means, which would be a sort of irrational willing. The only
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difference is that here I do not refuse to will the means to my proposed end, but instead
will the undermining of my means when I attempt to universalize my maxim. However,
Korsgaard‟s analysis misses an important point in the false promising example. It is not
the fact that I have a particular end that makes it contradictory to make a false promise.
False promises undermine themselves regardless of our motivations for making them.
People do not cease to believe false promises because of the reasons they are made, but
rather because they turned out to be false. I would not need to have any end in view for
false promising to still be contradictory if practiced universally. (Of course I would have
to will some sort of end, that my false promise be believed, in order for universal false
promising to show me that the maxim contains a contradiction. However, this is not an
end in the truest sense. We do not wish to be believed for its own sake but only for some
further end.)
If we consider Kant‟s distinction between hypothetical and categorical
imperatives, we might better see why Korsgaard‟s argument that they are analogous will
not work. Marcus Singer notes that “when Kant first speaks of a categorical imperative,
he says it is not conditioned by, or conditional upon, any purpose of the agent, and he
distinguishes it from a hypothetical imperative precisely on the ground that the latter in
conditional upon the purpose of the agent” (Singer 581). Singer is pointing to the fact
that any categorical imperative must be able to hold regardless of an agent‟s purpose.
This seems to be uncontroversial, but the importance of this claim will become clear in a
moment. First, let‟s look at a few places in the Groundwork, where Kant makes it clear
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that Singer is right to say that categorical imperatives do not take regard of the ends of
the agent.
Kant begins by analyzing the concept of a good will. The good will, of course “is
not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some
proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself…” (Gr 394). He
then suggests that we ought to “explicate the concept of a will that is to be esteemed in
itself and that is good apart from any further purpose…. In order to do so, we shall set
before ourselves the concept of duty, which contains that of a good will…” (Gr 397).
Kant of course goes on to say that only those actions done from duty constitute actions
reflective of the good will. After this, Kant then reminds us that “an action from duty has
its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it…and therefore does not depend on
the realization of the object of the action but merely upon the principle of volition in
accordance with which the action is done without regard for any object of the faculty of
desire” (Gr 400). Finally, Kant makes the following remark immediately prior to setting
down his categorical imperative for the first time: “Since I have deprived the will of
every impulse that could arise from it from obeying some law, nothing is left but the
conformity of actions as such with universal law, which alone is to serve the will as its
principle…” (Gr 402). All of the preceding passages, familiar to any scholar of Kant‟s
ethical thought, point to the idea that the morality of my maxim absolutely cannot be
derived from any consideration of the goals I hope to achieve through my action.
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Nelson Potter, in his article, “Maxims in Kant‟s Moral Philosophy,” suggests that
this focus on the moral goodness of our motives is one of the elements that is left out of
the “standard account” of maxims in Kant‟s ethics. (Potter 62-63) He suggests that this is
likely the case because many interpreters were chiefly concerned with maxims for the
purpose of “finding criteria for arriving at unique correct descriptions of actions for the
purposes of moral evaluation” (Potter 60).8 Potter‟s claim that our motive is relevant
seems important because Kant actually comes to the categorical imperative through such
an analysis of what needs to be true in order for an action to express the good will. He
does not simply derive the categorical imperative as a measure of right and wrong,
independent of such a consideration of the moral worth of actions. If this is true, then it
seems reasonable that any interpretation of what it is that makes proposed maxims
acceptable or unacceptable must also be able to show that acceptable maxims (those that
can be willed to be universal without contradiction) can also be seen as reflecting the
good will. That is, acceptable maxims should be able to be seen as those done from a
respect for the law as such.
The problem then with Korsgaard‟s analysis is that, if my maxim is immoral if its
universalization thwarts the purpose I hope to achieve by my action, it is not immoral if
my purpose is not thwarted by such a universalization. Remember the earlier discussion
of Korsgaard‟s treatment of the case of the murderer at the door. Under her analysis I
may lie to the murderer (and to anyone else who is lying to me and is unaware of the fact
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that I am on to him) because my lie will be efficacious even if universally practiced.
Korsgaard‟s analogy between unfit maxims and hypothetical imperatives thus turns out to
be an argument against her view instead of one that supports it. This is because a maxim
that can be willed to be universal looks too much like a hypothetical imperative.
Kant‟s example of the trustee in On the Common Saying: ”That May Be Correct
in Theory, But It Is of No Use in Practice,” shows well that the acceptability of a maxim
cannot possibly be linked to the purpose to be achieved by it. I will quote it at length:
Take for the case, for example, that someone is holding in trust something
belonging to another (depositum), the owner of which has died, and that the
owners heirs know nothing about it and can never come to know of it. We submit
this case to even a child some eight or nine years old, and add that the holder of
this deposit suffers at this very time (through no fault of his own) a complete
reversal of his fortune and sees around him a miserable wife and children
oppressed by want that he could relieve in a moment by appropriating this
deposit; we add further that he is philanthropic and beneficent whereas those heirs
are wealthy, hard-hearted and, besides, so thoroughly given to luxury and
wastefulness that adding anything to their resources would be equivalent to
throwing it into the sea. And now we ask whether, under such circumstances, it
can be considered permissible for him to put this deposit to his own use. The one
being questioned will undoubtedly answer, No! and, in place of any grounds, will
be able to say only, It is wrong! – that is, it conflicts with duty. (Theory and
Practice 286)
The most important part of the passage for our purposes is the fact that Kant makes it
clear that the appropriation will never be discovered. It is important to see that
undiscovered theft of goods entrusted to us could in fact be willed to be a universal
practice, because given the conditions mentioned in the case, no amount of abuse will
cause people to cease to use trustees in situations similar to the one mentioned in the
example. Thus the agent‟s end of providing for his family and putting the money to
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„better use‟ would never be undermined, even if universally practiced.9 The maxim
would pass on Korsgaard‟s analysis, yet Kant says that even an eight year old could see
the obvious immorality of the action.10 The Logical Contradiction Interpretation, by
contrast, does not suffer from this shortcoming, because it looks not at the ends of the
agent but instead at the logical possibility of whether the proposed action could be
conceived of as a law.
It thus seems to me that, at least in dealing with the contradiction in conception
test, we ought to reject the Practical Contradiction Interpretation. My reasons for saying
so rest on the above argument that the view of rationality that underlies such a
contradiction seems incorrect. I would suggest instead that the Logical Contradiction
Interpretation underlies that contradiction in conception test. However, as discussed
earlier, Korsgaard rightly points out the fact that the Logical Contradiction Interpretation
cannot deal with the contradictions in the will. This is of course true by definition, since
the Logical Contradiction Interpretation is based on the impossibility of the universal
performance of an action and Kant explicitly tells us that the contradiction in the will test
deals with actions where “this internal impossibility is indeed not found…” (Gr 424).
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We will therefore need to find a different sort of contradiction for maxims that fail the
contradiction in the will test.
I will argue that there is a sort of teleological contradiction present under the
contradictions in the will test and that we will be able to see that there is indeed a
common view of rationality that underlies both the Logical Contradiction Interpretation,
as it is applied to contradictions in conception, and the teleological contradiction I will
argue for, which can be found in contradictions in the will. The common thread of
rationality involves what it is that a rational agent can and can not will. A rational agent
cannot will a logical contradiction (which is why maxims fail the contradiction in
conception test). In addition, there are ends that a rational agent cannot will (and failure
to will such ends is what causes maxims to fail the contradictions in the will test). I will
defend this view in the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE
KANT AND OBJECTIVE ENDS
If the analysis in the first chapter is correct, we seem to be, in some sense, back at
our starting point. It is frequently the case that the desire to produce a certain outcome or
to prevent a very bad outcome comes into conflict with ethical standards we normally
hold dear. Examples such as the doctor tempted to lie on an insurance form to help a
patient, or the police officer tempted to torture a suspect to save a life, help us to
remember the reality of this tension. It is only fair to demand of Kant that, if we are to
choose a diligent adherence to our moral duties over the attempt to promote or prevent
certain ends, that this choice can be defended and that we can be shown that such a
choice is „worth it‟ somehow. I am attempting to argue that Kant indeed gives us reason
to believe that such a choice is indeed „worth it.‟ For Kant, adherence to the dictates of
the moral law is valuable not only because it is the source of our dignity as human beings
but also because such adherence to the moral law is seen by Kant as the only possible
way to allow us to hope for a more moral world.
In order to show that Kant saw the moral law as a path towards at least the
possibility of a moral world, and not as an obstacle in the way of such moral progress, we
first must show that Kant saw his formalist ethics as one simultaneously concerned with
ends. I will argue that Kant‟s discussion of the categorical imperative and his discussion
of ends that are at the same time duties are cases in which the moral law commands us to
44
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promote, or at least forbids us from acting against, certain ends. This will help us to see
that it is possible to conceive of a formalist ethics such as Kant‟s as having teleological
concerns without also conceding to critics of Kant‟s that he is a closet consequentialist.
In Chapter One, I examined Christine Korsgaard‟s treatment of the Formula of
Universal Law (or Law of Nature). I argued there that her view of what it is that causes
maxims to fail Kant‟s tests for universalizability (the contradiction in conception test and
the contradiction in the will test) blurred the line between hypothetical imperatives and
categorical imperatives in a way that Kant would not admit. Korsgaard had suggested
that we cannot will maxims to become universal when their universal practice would
undermine our ability to accomplish the end of our action. This however turns into a
question of whether it would be possible for me to accomplish my goals if my method of
accomplishing those goals were to be universally practiced. Seen this way, the
accomplishment of my goals (given the hypothetical universal practice of my methods for
achieving them) is the determining factor for the acceptability of my maxim. This
however seems to put a consideration of my subjective ends in the forefront of moral
deliberation, and I have tried to show that this is not in keeping with Kant‟s idea of
morality. However it is one thing to criticize another‟s approach to the idea of rational
willing found in Kant‟s Formula of Universal Law; it is another to put forth one‟s own
idea of the sort of view of rationality Kant had in mind. So, I intend to do so here.
My criticism of Korsgaard‟s interpretation of the view of rationality implied in the
Formula of Universal Law was its focus on our subjective ends of action. However, this
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does not mean that there are not objective ends of actions, valid for all rational beings.
Yet, Kant‟s discussion of objective ends is, of course, controversial for several reasons.
First, Kant must be able to show that rational nature actually does entail the willing of
certain ends, or at least that it prohibits us from acting contrary to certain ends. This is
because there must be at least one objective end, valid for all rational beings, if the
categorical imperative is to have material content. Second, Kant has to avoid the trap of
claiming that it is the value of these ends that make them obligatory, if he is to retain the
formalist nature of his ethics.
Kant says over and again that morality cannot be grounded in an understanding of
human nature or anything else empirical. For instance, he writes:
[A]ll moral philosophy is based entirely on its pure part; and when it is applied to
the human being it does not borrow the least thing from acquaintance with him
(from anthropology), but gives to him, as a rational being, laws a priori…. For,
that there must be such a philosophy is clear of itself from the common idea of
duty and of moral laws. Everyone must grant that a law, if it is to hold morally,
that is, as a ground of obligation, must carry with it absolute necessity…. (Gr
389)
Kant emphasizes this point several times in the Groundwork. The above quote appears in
the preface, but Kant returns to this theme in the second section of the work. There he
writes:
[W]e cannot dispute that its law is so extensive in its import that it must hold not
only for human beings but for all rational beings as such, not merely under
contingent conditions and with exceptions, but with absolute necessity, then it is
clear that no experience could give occasion to infer even the possibility of such
apodictic laws. For, by what right could we bring into unlimited respect, as a
universal precept for every rational nature, what is perhaps valid only under the
contingent conditions of humanity? (Gr 408)
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He even criticizes “attempts at morality in the popular taste” (Gr 410) for appealing to
such features of human nature as their basis. Yet, despite all of these words of caution,
Kant‟s derivation of the four examples of duties given to us by the categorical imperative
seems to appeal to features unique to our human situation.
Three of Kant‟s four examples of duties that are derived from the categorical
imperative make some sort of reference to teleology. The first example, of the
prohibition against a maxim of taking one‟s life out of self-love seems to refer to a
teleology that focuses on natural purposes. There Kant tells us that “a nature whose law it
would be to destroy life itself by means of the same feeling whose destination
(Bestimmung) is to impel toward the furtherance of life would contradict itself and would
therefore not subsist as nature…” (Gr 422). This seems to indicate that Kant is claiming
that there is some impulse within the human being that is purposively designed to “impel
toward the furtherance of life.” However, a richer use of teleology appears with Kant‟s
third and fourth examples, of a person considering maxims of refusing to develop his or
her talents and of refusing to offer aid to others, respectively. Regarding developing
one‟s talents, Kant writes, “he cannot possibly will that this become a universal law or be
put in us as such by means of natural instinct. For, as a rational being he necessarily wills
that all the capacities in him be developed, since they serve him and are given to him for
all sorts of possible purposes” (Gr 423). Here we get explicit reference to the fact that a
rational being must will a certain end. More accurately, Kant seems to be saying that a
rational being cannot coherently will a certain end, since that would involve the
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undermining of his or her own capacity to effect other possible ends. Kant again makes
explicit reference to ends a rational being cannot coherently will when he addresses the
refusal to provide aid to others. There he writes, “For a will that decided this would
conflict with itself, since many cases could occur in which one would need the love and
sympathy of others and in which, by such a law of nature arisen from his own will, he
would rob himself of all hope of the assistance he wishes for himself” (Gr 423).
These three examples all seem then to make reference to features not of rational
beings as such but instead to features unique to human beings. The first example only
applies to mortal beings and further only to beings that have an inherent interest in the
furtherance of their own life, regardless of the happiness contained within it. The third
example makes reference to the fact that we are beings that necessarily desire the
accomplishment of our ends, and the fourth example trades on the fact that we are
dependent beings, who need the help of others to accomplish our ends. Still further,
some commentators, such as William Frankena, claim that Kant mistakenly imagines
these features to be true of human beings universally. For example, Frankena writes of
the example of refusing aid to others, “it is not hard to imagine a man whose fortune is
fairly sure or one who is willing to be consistent and to take the consequences of his
maxim‟s being universally acted on; if there are such people, Kant‟s test would not
suffice to establish benevolence as a duty” (Frankena, 32).
Frankena‟s specific comment seems to miss the point, because it suggests that the
way to see whether a rational being can will a particular maxim is to imagine whether or
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not there are people who actually will that maxim and would be willing to live with it as a
universal law. But this takes the empirical approach that Kant warns against. Kant, it
would seem, would argue that we are not discussing what it is that people do will, but
rather what a rational being ought to will. However, this does not touch on the larger
criticism, that Kant is making vast assumptions about human nature when he lays out
these duties.
The answer to this criticism can be found, I think, when one is able to see that
Kant is trying to at once find the grounds of the moral law and also to begin to ask how
such a law applies to human beings. As we will soon see, it is tempting to read him as
grounding the moral law in appeals to features unique to human beings when in fact he is
doing nothing of the sort. Instead, as I will argue, he attempts to ground the moral law in
rational nature as such, but then also applies this moral law to human beings. The
difficulty rests in the fact that Kant moves back and forth between these two tasks
throughout the Groundwork. One of his tasks in the first two sections of the Groundwork
is to try to give the basic features of the moral law, should it exist1. But, Kant also often
speaks of the ways the categorical imperative applies to human beings. This occurs
primarily in two places. It can be seen during Kant‟s treatment of the question of how it
is that various types of imperatives are possible, and it can also be seen during his
discussions of the four examples of duties derived from the categorical imperative. In the
first two sections of the Groundwork, Kant lays out the „groundwork‟ for grounding the
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moral law in features of rational nature: in the form of universality, in the material of an
end in itself, and in the will of an autonomous agent. Meanwhile, since these first two
sections of the Groundwork are also concerned with distinguishing his project from
popular philosophy, Kant is also occupied with other questions. These include the
practical importance of finding a ground for the moral law and the application of the
moral law to human beings. In order then to fully understand the way that Kant connects
rationality to ends, it is important to distinguish carefully between the places in which
Kant is discussing the grounding of the moral law and places in which he is attempting to
show how such a law relates to the will of human beings.
The Ground vs. the Application of the Moral Law
It may sound obvious, but one cannot understate the importance of the concept of
duty to Kant‟s ethical project. This is the case because Kant conceives duty as an action
we conceive of as necessary. And of course, the action must be necessary in itself and
not as a means to some other end (in which case it would only be necessary as long as we
desired the other end). So, Kant‟s project deals with the question of whether and how it
is possible for a being to conceive of an action as necessary of itself and to freely act
according to such a conception. However, the project begins as largely a negative one,
by which I mean that Kant initially discusses a morality based on reason alone in contrast
to attempts at morality that attempt to derive their foundations based on empirical
considerations.
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Kant‟s contrast between his approach and past „popular‟ approaches to morality is
important because Kant is trying to show that the concept of duty, or of an action
necessary in itself, is impossible if we base our notions of morality on empirical
considerations. This claim is true, of course, because empirical considerations are
themselves not necessary and can therefore never generate the concept of an action that is
necessary in itself. I point this consideration out because it is important for us to realize
that Kant‟s insistence that “all moral philosophy is based entirely on its pure part; and
when it is applied to the human being it does not borrow the least thing from
acquaintance with him…but gives to him, as a rational being, laws a priori…” (Gr 389),
does not refer not to the application of the categorical imperative to human actions.
Instead it is speaking of the grounds of moral obligation as based on a concept of a
rational being, which is contrasted with attempts to base them on empirical
considerations of the nature of human beings. This distinction will become important
later, as it will help us understand how it is that Kant comes up with the specific duties he
enumerates in the four examples he uses to illustrate the categorical imperative.
Kant has so far been discussing the need to find a ground for the moral law
independent of empirical considerations. However, he soon moves on to a new task.
When Kant tells us that “[o]nly a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with
the representation of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a will,” (Gr 412)
he is now beginning to speak not of the possibility of the moral law but of our “capacity
to act in accordance with” such a law.

Kant is concerned with our ability to give
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ourselves the law and to follow it, and so must be concerned with our will. He echoes
this sentiment again when he writes: “Practical good, however, is that which determines
the will by means of representations of reason…that is, from grounds that are valid for
every rational being as such” (Gr 413). Here again, the grounds of the moral law must be
valid for all rational beings, but Kant is not only concerned with the grounds of the moral
law, but also with how one‟s will can be determined to act according to this law. So
again, we see a dual purpose; claims that refer to the need to ground the moral law in
rational nature as such are coupled with concerns for determining a will according to such
a law.
It should be clear at this point that, while Kant is discussing the fact that the moral
law must be valid for all rational beings, he is also concerned with the issue of how such
a law takes the form of commands. He notes that “the determination of such a will in
conformity with objective laws is necessitation….The representation of an objective
principle, insofar as it necessitating for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the
formula of the command is called an imperative” (Gr 413). This signals a point in Kant‟s
discussion in which he is asking a new question: “In what ways does the moral law speak
to humans as a command of reason?” And this is, of course, different from asking how
the moral law is possible. This difference is in fact crucial because, while the moral law
must be valid for all rational beings, imperatives are different. Kant tells us:
Hence no imperatives hold for the divine will and in general for a holy will: the
“ought” is out of place here, because volition is of itself necessarily in accord with
the law. Therefore imperatives are only formulae expressing the relation of
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objective laws of volition in general to the subjective will of this or that rational
being, for example, of the human will. (Gr 414)
Imperfect beings have wills that are subject to inclinations which prevent us from acting
in accordance with reason, so any talk of an imperative or command only makes sense in
reference to such an imperfect being. Therefore, it should not be surprising that Kant
appeals to features of human existence when he applies the categorical imperative to his
four examples, nor is such an application an overreaching on his part. The categorical
imperative deals with the fact that “the relation of objective laws to a will that is not
thoroughly good is represented as the determination of the will of a rational being
through grounds of reason, indeed, but grounds to which this will is not by its nature
necessarily obedient” (Gr 413).
Kant is concerned with the various ways in which the will can be determined by
reason. Kant tells us that “every practical law represents a possible action as good and
thus as necessary for a subject practically determinable by reason…” (Gr 414). Of
course, there are various notions of „necessary‟. On one hand there are actions that are
seen as necessary only if we use them to attain some other purpose, and on the other hand
there are actions that are seen as necessary because they are seen as being in themselves
good (Gr 414). This is of course the basis for Kant‟s distinction between hypothetical
and categorical imperatives. In hypothetical imperatives, actions are seen as necessary
because “[w]ho[m]ever wills the end also wills (insofar as reason has decisive influence
on his actions) the indispensably necessary means that are within his power” (Gr 417).
But actions are only necessary in the truest sense, that is, objectively necessary, if an end
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is conceived of as necessary. But, these ends are all “discretionary” (Gr 415), that is,
except one; Kant tells us that happiness is an odd exception. With happiness, the end is
conceived of as one that is actual rather than contingent and as one that is necessary for
human beings rather than arbitrary. Kant writes:
There is, however, one end that can be presupposed as actual in the case of all
rational beings (insofar as imperatives apply to them, namely as dependent
beings), and therefore one purpose that they not merely could have but that we
can safely presuppose they all actually do have by a natural necessity, and that
purpose is happiness…. It may be set forth not merely as necessary to some
uncertain end, merely possible purpose, but to a purpose that can be presupposed
surely and a priori in the case of every human being, because it belongs to his
essence. (Gr 416)
This passage is intriguing because it may be tempting to read Kant‟s contrast between
hypothetical imperatives and categorical imperatives as a distinction between arbitrary
and necessary ends, but this depiction is not quite complete. The problem with happiness
is not that the end is arbitrary. Kant conceives it not only as actual but necessary, and as
applying to all rational beings to which imperatives apply. Rather, happiness cannot
serve as a ground for morality because there is no way to derive a link between the
necessity of the end and the necessity of any action toward that end. As Kant tells us,
“the problem of determining surely and universally which action would promote the
happiness of a rational being is completely insoluble…” (Gr 418). This is because
happiness is an indeterminate concept, so reason can‟t tell us that any action is necessary
as a means to the end of happiness. Additionally, although happiness is an actual end of
all human beings and is thus also a natural and necessary end of human beings, it is not a
necessary end of all rational beings. And, although the categorical imperative relates to
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human beings or imperfect beings generally in its application, this imperative still must
be grounded in an end valid for all rational beings as such.
So far the distinguishing feature of Kant‟s approach is that the categorical
imperative presents an action as necessary of itself and so does not appeal to some further
end. He has deprived morality of all empirical concerns and thus any concern for ends to
be acquired. He tells us that “the worth of any object to be acquired by our action is
always conditional” (Gr 428). So, we are left without an end for our actions, and are only
left with the form of our willing. Kant writes:
[W]hen I think of a categorical imperative I know at once what it contains. For,
since, the imperative contains, beyond the law, only the necessity of that the
maxim be in conformity with this law… nothing is left with which the maxim of
action is to conform but the universality of law as such; and this conformity alone
is what the imperative properly represents as necessary. (Gr 421)
So, hypothetical imperatives present ends of action to us; most are merely possible ends,
while happiness is an actual end that Kant says can be legitimately assumed in all human
beings, since they are rational beings to whom imperatives apply. In contrast, the
categorical imperative has been deprived of ends and we are left merely with the
command that our maxims take lawfulness as their form. But, this is clearly not the
complete story. All actions contain some end. We cannot use the end of happiness, or the
arbitrary ends that are only subjectively determined, so Kant must go on to find a
different kind of end. This end must be an objective end, that is, one valid for rational
beings as such. Just as our will must take the form of universality and necessity, because
it must be valid for all rational beings in order to serve as a ground of the moral law, there
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must also be an end that is also necessary and given by rational nature as such. So, we
turn now to Kant‟s discussion of this end, humanity as an end-in-itself.
Subjective Ends vs. the Objective End of Humanity as an End-In-Itself
Kant‟s discussion of humanity as an end-in-itself represents an important turning
point in the Groundwork. Prior to that point Kant‟s discussion of duty has focused on the
form of our willing, namely, the conformity to law as such. Indeed Kant spends much of
the Groundwork prior to his discussion of humanity as an end in itself trying to steer clear
of any discussion of ends because he takes great pains to separate his approach from an
approach that takes empirical considerations as grounds for the moral worth of actions.
Kant has stripped his moral calculus of such empirical considerations and has thus left
only the form of willing as a guide for the morality of our actions. However, Kant makes
it clear that maxims must not only have the form of universality but that they also must
have an end (Gr 436). Indeed Kant indicates that without some sort of end in itself a
categorical imperative would not be possible when he writes:
If then there is to be a supreme practical principle and, with respect to the human
will, a categorical imperative, it must be one such that, from the representation of
what is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, it constitutes
an objective principle of the will and thus can serve as a universal practical law.
(Gr 428-29)
Since Kant has so far taken care to avoid talk of ends, and now he is claiming that an end
is absolutely necessary in order for a categorical imperative to be possible, it is critical to
understand the way in which Kant distinguishes this end in itself from any other end.
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It is not immediately clear what sort of end could be conceived as objectively
necessary, so Kant instead begins his discussion by contrasting such ends with ends of
action, or subjective ends (Gr 428). Subjective ends, are “ends that a rational being
proposes at his discretion as effects of his actions” (Gr 428), and these “are all always
relative” (Gr 428). This is because such ends derive their worth simply from the fact that
they are desired, and since desires are all contingent, such ends “can therefore furnish no
universal principles, no principles valid and necessary for all rational beings…”(Gr 428).
Kant makes it clear that, in contrast to such ends of action, “[O]bjective ends… hold for
every rational being” (Gr 427). We thus have the primary distinction between objective
and subjective ends: subjective ends are contingent or relative, whereas the objective end
Kant seeks must be seen as a necessary end, valid for all rational beings. And, this
distinction gives rise to a further, related, contrast between objective and subjective ends.
Subjective ends, or “objects of the inclinations” (Gr 428) are not unconditionally
valuable. Instead they “have only conditional worth” (Gr 428). So, an objective end
cannot be an end of action or an “object to be acquired by our action” at all (Gr 428).
Kant then has set himself a difficult task. He must present us with an end that is
necessary and unconditionally good, but that is also an independently existing end.
Kant puts forward this independently existing end at first merely as a postulate,
arguing simply that such an end in itself must exist. For, “without it nothing of absolute
worth would be found anywhere; but if all worth were conditional and therefore
contingent, then no supreme practical principle for reason could be found anywhere” (Gr
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429). So, his first words about this end in itself are cautious. He tells us to “suppose
there were something the existence of which in itself has an absolute worth, something
which as an end in itself could be a ground of determinate laws; then in it, and in it alone,
would lie the ground of a possible categorical imperative, that is, of a practical law” (Gr
428). Immediately, Kant proposes that rational nature is this end in itself. He says
simply, “Now I say that the human being and in general every rational being exists as an
end in itself…” (Gr 428). Kant does not provide much argument for this claim, at least
not at this point. He instead only offers a few enigmatic phrases. He first notes, “rational
beings are called persons because their nature already marks them out as an end itself”
(Gr 428). Later he tells us that the “human being necessarily represents his own
existence in this way…. But every other rational being also represents his existence in
this way consequent on just the same rational ground that holds for me…” (Gr 429). But,
even there Kant notes (in a footnote) that this assertion is only a “postulate,” to be
defended later. However, his defense of this postulate is not critical for our current
purposes. I wish to consider instead how Kant conceives of this end in itself, assuming it
exists.
Kant has taken pains to distinguish objective ends from ends that are to be
attained through our action. Kant clearly sees humanity differently. When Kant speaks of
humanity as an objective end, he tells us that it is “an objective end that, whatever ends
we may have, ought as law to constitute the supreme limiting condition of all subjective
ends…” (Gr 431). He thus seems to conceive of humanity as an end that may not be
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acted against, a constraint on our action, rather than an end to be promoted2. This point
gets made most clearly when he writes:
But since… abstraction must be made altogether from every end to be effected …
the end must here be thought not as an end to be effected but as an independently
existing end, and hence thought only negatively, that is, as that which must never
be acted against and which must therefore in every volition be estimated never
merely as a means but always at the same time as an end. (Gr 437)
The matter however becomes further complicated when the possibility is introduced that
humanity is not just a limiting condition, but a positive end to be realized, embodied in
the duty to promote the happiness of others and to promote our own moral development
(Atwell 92). Here it is not that we are trying to bring humanity into existence but rather
that there is a positive duty to further it or develop it, either in our own person or that of
another. And this, of course, is a source of controversy in Kant, because any talk of ends
to be promoted seems to blur (if not step over) the line between subjective and objective
ends.
Any duties we have must ultimately be able to be traced back to grounds that are
valid for all rational beings, namely that our maxims are able to take the form of
universality and that our actions have as their end an unconditioned and self-existing
end.3 However, the notion of an end that is nonetheless not an end of action is one that is
not immediately clear. So, we must now investigate what Kant meant by „humanity‟.
Further, we need to see how Kant connects his conception of „humanity‟ as the end in

2

Christine Korsgaard and John Atwell both come to the same conclusion. See Korsgaard‟s Creating the
Kingdom of Ends, p. 108, and Atwell‟s Ends and Principles in Kant’s Moral Thought, chapter 5.
3
This does not, of course, mean that our duties are duties that hold for every rational being, but only that
the ground of obligation is valid for rational beings as such.
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itself and thus as the material ground for the moral law to two other features of his view
of morality. We need to see how his view of humanity connects to his discussion of what
it is rational to will, so that we can see the connection between the various formulations
of the categorical imperative. Additionally, we need to see how it is that Kant connects
his idea of humanity to his discussion of ends that are also duties. Once we do so we will
be able to see the tie between the formalist and teleological elements of Kant‟s ethical
thought. These connections begin to become clear when we consider Kant‟s four
examples of duties derived from the categorical imperative.
However, I would first like to differentiate the sort of discussion I will be putting
forth from a different sort of discussion of teleology in Kant. The way that Kant
discusses the Formula of Universal Law has led some commentators, with Paton chief
among them, to suggest that Kant sees the Formula of Universal Law as appealing to
natural purposes; this is a view I do not share. In order to examine the difference
between my approach and that taken by Paton, let us briefly look at his view and some
criticisms of it.
Paton‟s View
In his essay, “Paton on the Application of the Categorical Imperative,” Nelson
Potter remarks that:
Paton‟s views concerning the application of the categorical imperative emerge in
his discussion of Kant‟s famous four examples in relation to the “law of nature”
formulation. The most novel and interesting of those views is his claim that when
maxims are morally tested by being regarded as laws of nature, they are to be
regarded as teleological laws. (Potter 414)
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Paton indeed writes: “In every case [Kant] appeals to teleological considerations; and
there is no possibility of even beginning to understand his doctrine, unless we realize that
the laws of nature he has in mind are …teleological” (Paton 149). 4 The reason that
Potter calls such a view “novel and interesting” can be seen when we take a look at what
he thinks are some of the possible advantages of Paton‟s view.
Potter ascribes two main benefits to Paton‟s view. First, “If there are elements of
teleological law involved in all moral arguments, there is no special problem about that
(relatively small but important) class of arguments that involve an explicit and clear use
of teleological conceptions of nature” (Potter 416). Indeed at least two of Kant‟s
examples of the application of the categorical imperative in the Formula of Universal
Law explicitly use teleological language. In the suicide example Kant writes, “a nature
whose law it would be to destroy life itself by means of the same feeling whose
destination is to impel toward the furtherance of life would contradict itself and would
therefore not subsist as nature” (Gr 422). And, in the case of developing one‟s talents,
Kant again uses teleological language when he writes that, “as a rational being he
necessarily wills that all the capacities in him be developed, since they serve him and are
given to him for all sorts of purposes” (Gr 423). In both examples Kant makes reference
to natural purposes. These examples provide problems for commentators looking for one
4

Paton takes it as an assumption that, in taking our maxims as laws of nature, we must either regard them
as causal laws or as teleological laws. He rejects the possibility that our maxims are to be treated as causal
laws and argues that they are to instead be considered teleological laws. This argument appears on pages
148 and 149 of The Categorical Imperative. The argument concerning whether laws of nature are to be
thought of as causal or teleological is a separate issue from an analysis of the type of teleology Paton sees
as present in the Formula of the Law of Nature. It is the solely the latter issue with which I will be
concerned.
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cohesive interpretation of the sort of contradiction involved in willing unacceptable
maxims. Whereas the case of lying, for example, can be handled well by both the
Logical Contradiction Interpretation and the Practical Contradiction Interpretation which
I discussed earlier, the explicit use of teleological language seems to challenge the view
that either the Practical or the Logical Contradiction Interpretations can treat all of Kant‟s
examples in a satisfactory way. If instead Paton is correct that there are teleological
dimensions to all moral arguments, then we may be able to rescue our hope of finding a
unified interpretation of the nature of the contradictions involved in the Formula of
Universal Law.5
The second advantage Potter sees of Paton‟s approach is that “it calls attention to
the importance of the end of action in Kant‟s moral philosophy” (Potter 416). Potter
notes that Kant‟s later work shows an increasing focus on the ends of action. Of the
Metaphysics of Morals, Potter goes so far as to say that “[t]he interpreter of Kant who
reads this work realizes the importance of the conception of “objective ends” in the
application of the categorical imperative” (Potter 416-417). Potter goes on to say of
Paton‟s view:
The interpretation of the “law of nature” formulation according to which nature is
to be viewed as a teleological system and the universalized maxim is to be treated
as a teleological law … seems to fulfill the need for justification for the “objective
ends” Kant speaks of. Thus, given Paton‟s interpretation of maxims and his desire
to be a defender of Kant‟s ethics, the “teleological law” theory of the application
5

Although Korsgaard raises the possibility (which she rejects) that there may be one type of contradiction
involved in the examples using perfect duties and another in the examples involving imperfect duties, it is
interesting to note that Kant‟s language favors a different division. Kant uses explicitly teleological
language in the two cases that involve duties to oneself, while it is absent from the examples of duties to
others. I will return to this consideration later.
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of the categorical imperative may seem to be the most satisfactory one available.
(Potter 417)
Potter is on to something here. A thorough discussion of the categorical imperative must
be able to show connections to Kant‟s discussions of objective ends, and teleological
considerations are best suited to such a task. However, this does not mean that Paton‟s
approach, of asking us to treat our universalized maxims as teleological laws, is correct.
Both Potter and Korsgaard reject Paton‟s view, and I believe that they are right to do so.
Yet, as I hope to show a bit later on, while Paton‟s treatment may be wrong, we may still
be able to find that teleology nonetheless plays an important role in the application of the
categorical imperative. Let us now take a closer look at Paton‟s view and some reasons
for rejecting it.
Paton focuses his discussion around his view that “on Kant‟s view to conceive
human nature as governed by teleological law is to suppose a complete harmony of ends
both within the race and within the individual” (Paton 150). He then goes on to explain
how this view would get fleshed out in the application of the categorical imperative.
Paton writes:
We can consider human nature as if there were such a systematic harmony of ends
in accordance with a law of nature; and we can ask whether any proposed maxim,
if it were made a law of nature, would fit into such a systematic harmony. Some
maxims would destroy such a systematic harmony, while others would merely fail
to foster it, and this seems to be the basis of the distinction between perfect and
imperfect duties. (Paton 150)
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One might ask how it is that Paton feels so certain of the claim that we ought to think of
human nature as governed by teleological law, to be thought of in terms of a harmony of
ends.
In his attempt to show that the “laws of nature” Kant has in mind when we
attempt to universalize a maxim are teleological in nature, Paton notes that both action
and human nature are essentially purposive and thus that conceiving of maxims (which
necessarily refer to actions) as laws of (human) nature entails teleology (Paton 151).
However, Potter points out the fact that there seems to be a flaw in Paton‟s thinking here.
Potter writes:
One of Paton‟s arguments is as follows: He notes, as we have, that for Kant
actions are essentially purposive and that all maxims mention an end. He then
directly concludes that, therefore, a maxim when regarded as a law of nature is a
teleological law. But this is a non sequitur. If Paton thinks that the conclusion
follows directly, then it seems that he is confusing “conscious purposes” and
“natural purposes”. It is the latter that are involved in teleological laws; it is the
former that are involved in actions. (Potter 420)
Potter‟s criticism appears to be a valid one. It is not necessarily the case that because we
see ourselves as aiming at particular ends that human actions do indeed aim at systematic
harmony of purposes.
Yet Christine Korsgaard finds reason to defend Paton, at least on this point.
While Paton may be wrong to leap from purposiveness to teleological laws, Korsgaard
points out that there is indeed evidence in Kant that reason does aim at a harmony of
purposes. She suggests that Paton could have indeed cited comments in the Critique of
Pure Reason, in which Kant specifically says that the highest formal unity of reason is in
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fact a harmony of purposes, to support his view (Korsgaard 91). If then reason aims at a
harmony of purposes and a rational agent as such must be committed to such a harmony
of purposes, “we may take it that when a maxim universalized as a law of nature could
lead to such a harmony of human purpose, that maxim is fit to be adopted also as a moral
law” (Paton 151). Thus for Paton, “the order of nature is a typic for the systematic
harmony of human purposes” (Korsgaard 91).
However, Korsgaard goes on to point out that, while it might be true that “Kant
thinks rationality commits us to a harmony of purposes…. this conclusion does not
necessarily imply that when we reason morally we reason from such a harmony”
(Korsgaard 91). Korsgaard‟s point is an important one. There is much in Kant that
suggests that rationality and indeed morality ultimately aim for a harmony of purposes.
(One thinks of Kant‟s treatment of the highest good as an example of this.) However,
this does not mean that we can imagine what such a unity of purposes would look like
and reason back toward a derivation of duties. The only way this would be possible
would be if we could “somehow establish that the proposed natural purpose of the action
type is one needed for the systematic harmony of purposes and therefore is one the agent
must will” (Korsgaard 91).
If we turn to the issue of actually attempting to see how various actions contribute
to the systematic harmony of ends, both Potter and Korsgaard are able to see several
obvious problems with Paton‟s view. First, as Potter points out, there is no empirical
evidence that there are any teleological laws at all, and if there were, there is no way of
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knowing what they are (Potter 417). However, it is clear upon reading Paton‟s analysis
that he does not claim that there actually are teleological laws of nature but only that, for
Kant, we are to act as if there were.6 But Potter is willing to grant Paton as much and
goes on to consider the implications. Potter notes of the approach of acting „as if‟ there
were teleological laws of nature: “there are a good many problems with any such
conception: (i) It is not clear how one ascertains whether a given proposed “as if”
principle holds, pertains, or is “valid” or not” (Potter 418). Potter goes on to say that this
problem leads to another issue. It is possible for us to come up with many possible ideas
concerning the possible purpose(s) of a supposed action type. He uses the example of
sexual organs, which could be alternatively conceived of as having the purpose of
pleasure or of reproduction (Potter 418). Potter‟s criticism is correct, as far as it goes.
We cannot know the natural purpose of organs (even if there were one). However,
Christine Korsgaard makes it clear that the view Potter is criticizing is not identical with
Paton‟s actual view.
Potter‟s example of sexual organs is not ideal, for it confuses what Christine
Korsgaard calls the „simple view‟ of teleology with a more complex view, which she sees
in Paton (Korsgaard 87). Korsgaard describes the „simple view‟ of the sort of
contradiction involved in a failure to universalize a maxim as “usually understood in this
way: the contradiction emerges when an action or instinct is used in a way that is
inconsistent with its natural purpose, or is not used in a way that its natural purpose calls
6

Paton actually puts the phrase „as if‟ in italics himself to stress this point. (See both p. 149 and p. 150 of
The Categorical Imperative)
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for” (Korsgaard 87). Potter is thus criticizing the „simple view‟ when he talks about our
inability to really know what that natural purpose of a given action, instinct, or organ.
But, as we have already seen, Paton is treating teleological laws as aiming not at natural
purposes but a systematic harmony of purposes. The confusion is created because Kant‟s
own language, in the examples of suicide and developing one‟s talents refer to natural
purposes. Further, as Korsgaard points out, Paton refers to this language to support his
own interpretation (Korsgaard 88). It is when we turn to Paton‟s treatment of the
examples of providing assistance to others and of promising to repay loans that we get a
better sense of his view that actions and practices aim at a systematic harmony of
purposes.
Paton takes the view that, in treating our maxims as teleological laws, “we assume
empirical knowledge of nature (particularly of human nature)” (Paton 146-147). Paton
takes the view that Kant must have had such assumptions about human nature in mind in
his treatment of his four examples. Of the case of the duty to provide assistance to those
in need, Paton claims: “The argument turns on the fact that human beings are in need of
mutual help, and that only by means of mutual help can the systematic harmony of
purposes be attained” (Paton 152). In support of this interpretation Paton refers to a
passage in the Metaphysics of Morals that reads:
Consequently the maxim of common interest, of beneficence toward those in
need, is a universal duty of human beings, just because they are to be considered
fellow human beings, that is, rational beings with needs, united by nature in one
dwelling place so that they can help one another. (MM 453)
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The above passage supports the first half of Paton‟s claim that the argument turns on the
fact that human beings are beings in need of mutual help, but it makes no reference to the
second part of his claim, that the purpose of this mutual aid is to promote a systematic
harmony of ends. It is at least as plausible to argue that, as a being in need of aid, I
cannot will the non-existence of aid (in the form of my refusal to provide it for others)
while I must, as a rational agent in need of such aid (a human being), simultaneously will
the existence of such aid.
The view that the purpose of a given practice must be to promote a systematic
harmony of purposes is more apparent in Paton‟s treatment of the example of the promise
to repay loans. However, Paton is on even less firm ground here. Paton claims that
“Kant assumes empirical knowledge that the purpose of such promises is to produce trust
and so to get out of financial difficulties” (Paton 152). He also goes on to say:
What Kant says is true enough so far as it goes, but it does not offer a satisfactory
basis for moral judgment unless we make the further assumption that the keeping
of such promises and the mutual confidence thereby aroused are essential factors
in the systematic harmony of human purposes. (Paton 153)
The problem with this is to be found in the assumption Paton tells us we must make. It is
difficult to see how one would show that a systematic harmony of purposes would be
rendered impossible without the „mutual confidence‟ produced by keeping promises.
Korsgaard makes the same point when she writes:
[T]he idea that a rational being is committed to a harmony of purposes will only
help us with the Formula of Universal Law if we can somehow establish that the
proposed natural purpose of the action-type is one needed for the systematic
harmony of all human purposes and therefore is one that the agent must will.
(Korsgaard 91)
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It is important to make clear that I am not denying that morality aims at a systematic
harmony of purposes. What does seem implausible however is the view that we can
simply assume that we know beforehand which actions promote this systematic harmony
and that we can then use this knowledge to test our maxims. Paton seems to have the
equation backwards. We first need to be able to find out what purposes a rational agent
must will. It may be that a rational agent must will various objective ends and that
among these we should include the promotion of a systematic harmony of purposes. It
may even be that the other objective ends a rational agent must will all help to promote
such a systematic harmony. However, we cannot simply imagine that they do, assume
we know how it is that they do so, and then use this as our basis for ascertaining specific
duties. We must first find the necessary ends of a rational agent, and only then can we
ask how it is that they might further the systematic harmony of human purposes.
In order to see how Kant ties his understanding of rational willing to a
consideration of ends we must either not act against or must promote, we need to return
to a careful examination of the four examples he gives of duties derived from the
categorical imperative. The examples of duties derived from the categorical imperative
collectively are examples of what it is that either cannot be rationally conceived or
rationally willed without contradiction. I would suggest that, rather than using Kant‟s
first formulation of the categorical imperative to make sense of these examples (the
difficulty of which we saw in chapter one), we work in the other direction, using the
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examples to make sense of both the first and second formulations of the categorical
imperative. This in turn will also help us see the connection between these two formulae.
Kant‟s Four Examples and the Connection between the Formula of Universal Law and
the Formula of Humanity
Kant‟s first two examples are supposedly of examples of maxims which cannot
even be thought without contradiction. The example of the lying promise seems fairly
straightforward whether we approach it from the Formula of Universal Law or the
Formula of Humanity. The Formula of Universal Law tells us: “act only in accordance
with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal
law” (Gr 421). Kant uses this to test the maxim: “when I believe myself to be in need of
money I shall borrow money and promise to repay it, even though I know that this will
never happen” (Gr 422). Kant says that such a maxim fails because, “the universality of
a law that everyone, when he believes himself in need, could promise whatever he
pleases with the intention of not keeping it would make the promise and the end one
might have in it impossible…” (Gr 422). While it is true that the contradiction Kant has
in mind may be taken in various ways,7 one way to take this is simply that it is a flat
logical contradiction to both will some thing and will its opposite simultaneously. In
willing the universal adoption of lying promises a person on one hand wills that people
make lying promises. (Of course, „people‟ here refers simply to him or herself). On the
other hand this same person wills that people (everyone else) do not make lying
promises, since if they did, “no one would believe what was promised him and would
7

See the discussion in chapter one.
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laugh at all such expressions as vain pretenses” (Gr 422). A rational being cannot
coherently will (or even conceive) a logical contradiction.
Turning to the Formula of Humanity, this same example again seems to be the
easiest to handle. Here Kant says, “he who has it in mind to make a false promise to
others sees at once that he wants to make use of another human being merely as a
means…” (Gr 430). So far, the problem with the false promise is that, in making such a
promise, we simply fail to realize that persons, as “rational beings…are always to be
valued at the same time as ends” (Gr 430). Here Kant is relying simply on the notion that
rational beings as ends in themselves are unconditionally valuable, which, as we have
seen above, is one of the ways he differentiates the end in itself from subjective ends. So,
of course, when I use a person for my own benefit I clearly treat them as only
conditionally valuable and as something whose value can be subordinated to some other
end. And, Kant has just finished arguing that, if the moral law is to have legitimacy at
all, there must be an unconditionally valuable end. Yet, Kant‟s language in this example
also lets us see an additional reason why the false promise treats a person merely as a
means, and this begins to help us see how exactly Kant conceives of the notion of
humanity as an end in itself.
Kant tells us that the person to whom we would lie cannot “cannot possibly agree
to my way of behaving toward him, and so himself contain the end of this action” (Gr
430). Kant‟s language here can be confusing, since it seems obvious that a person can in
fact contain the end on behalf of which the lie was told. For example, a doctor might lie
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to a patient in order to make sure the patient stays on a proper course of treatment, and
the patient of course could approve of the end the doctor has in mind: the patient‟s health.
So, Kant must mean something else when he says that the person to whom we would lie
cannot possibly agree to our behavior. Any person to whom we would lie cannot
“contain the end of the action” because the lie denies the possibility that he or she could
choose the end we have chosen. Here we get our first hint of Kant‟s view of exactly what
it is that comprises humanity. Humanity begins to emerge as the ability to set ends for
one‟s self. This is why, when Kant tells us that rational beings are to be valued at the
same time as ends, he finishes the sentence by saying, “that is, only as beings who must
also be able to contain in themselves the end of the very same action” (Gr 430). Kant
even includes a footnote in which he takes pains to separate his notion of treating persons
as ends from the idea that we ought to treat others as we would have them treat us, so as
to avoid just the sort of interpretation depicted in the above example of the doctor and
patient.
So, both formulae of the categorical imperative can be used in a relatively
straightforward way to derive the conclusion that we may not make a false promise.
However, if we constrain ourselves to this example alone, there is much that is lacking.
First, the connection between the two justifications of this duty, given by the two
formulations, is not clear. And, since this is the case, there is nothing in the derivation of
the duty to refrain from making lying promises under the Formula of Humanity that helps
to better understand the notion of rational willing present in the derivation of the same
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duty under the Formula of Universal Law. Instead, we must look at Kant‟s other three
examples to better see the relationship between rationality and ends.
The suicide example is particularly frustrating when approached from the
perspective of the Formula of Universal Law. This example seems radically different
from the lying promise example in that a person could very well will both that he or she
end his or her own life when continuing to live “threatens more trouble than it promises
agreeableness…” (Gr 422), and also allow that the maxim holds for all others as well.
So, we don‟t seem to have the same sort of logical contradiction that is present in the
example of false promising. Additionally, Christine Korsgaard tells us frankly that her
“Practical Contradiction Interpretation” of the Formula of Universal Law cannot handle
this example either. She tells us, “On the Practical Contradiction Interpretation we
cannot get an analysis of that case, for the suicide‟s purpose, if it is release from his own
misery, will not be thwarted by universal practice” (Korsgaard 100). Indeed it is the
overtly teleological language in this example that could best support Paton‟s view that
Kant is making use of an appeal to natural purposes.8 However, I have already argued
that Paton‟s view must ultimately be rejected. This then seems to leave us without a clear
understanding of how it is that a maxim of suicide is contradictory under Kant‟s
conception of rationality. Kant‟s treatment of the same duty from the perspective of the
Formula of Humanity takes a more helpful approach.

8

Kant‟s defense of the duty to refrain from suicide under the Formula of Universal Law runs as follows: “a
nature whose law it would be to destroy life itself by means of the same feeling whose destination
(Bestimmung) is to impel toward the furtherance of life would contradict itself and would therefore not
subsist as nature…” (Gr 422).
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The suicide example is in some sense the clearest example of the command that
we ought always treat humanity as an end in itself. Kant tells us that, if a person
“destroys himself in order to escape from a trying condition he makes use of a person
merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life” (Gr 430). Since
the very concept of the end in itself is that humanity cannot be made to be subservient to
any other end, even happiness, then suicide is clearly impermissible. We can however
supplement this interpretation in light of the understanding of humanity we have taken
from the example of the lying promise. The examples are clearly very different in some
sense. In the case of the false promise we know that the person to whom we would lie
cannot “himself contain the end of this action” (Gr 430) because the lie denies the
possibility of acting on full information and thus of freely choosing one‟s own end. We
have no such problem in the suicide example, which seems to be an end we can freely
choose. Yet, if humanity consists of the ability to set ends for one self, as the lying
promise example suggests it does, then suicide is impermissible because it cuts off this
possibility permanently. In choosing suicide we give up our ability to set ends, just as we
would if we voluntarily gave ourselves up to slavery. This analysis allows us to begin to
see a connection between the Formula of Humanity and what Kant sees as rational
willing. If the false promise example shows us that it is irrational to will a logical
contradiction, then the suicide example as seen from the point of view of the Formula of
Humanity offers us the possibility that it is also irrational to will that we give up our
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ability to set ends. In order to see if this is correct, we shall now consider the last two of
Kant‟s examples.
Kant‟s final two examples present challenges for us when they are approached
from the perspective of the Formula of Humanity. This is because Kant has already told
us that humanity as an end in itself is to be thought only negatively, as a limit of what we
may do to our selves and others, and that it is not an end to be attained. Yet, these two
examples seem to present cases where humanity is conceived as something to be
promoted rather than as something we cannot act against. The problem that arises is that,
if there are ends that it is our duty to promote, Kant must establish the grounds of these
duties without lapsing into consequentialism. We must show that the duties to be
beneficent and to develop one‟s own talents can be linked to Kant‟s notion of what is
entailed by his notion of rational willing. This is because, if there are in fact duties to
promote certain ends, it is vital to show that their status as duties is independent from any
value they have.
In order to show the continuity between the Formula of Universal Law and the
Formula of Humanity, we will also need to try to show that the duties of beneficence and
of developing one‟s talents do not present us with a notion of humanity as something that
ought to be promoted. This is the approach taken by John Atwell. I agree with Atwell
that the duties of beneficence and of developing one‟s talents can be seen in a way so that
they do not necessarily imply a view of humanity itself as an end to be promoted (and I
will discuss this view briefly). But, I would also suggest that these duties can be
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grounded in Kant‟s idea of rational willing. This is important because Kant will go on to
develop his discussion of these duties in his discussion of ends that are also duties in the
Doctrine of Virtue, and there the question of what they imply about humanity is not
enough to address the issue of how the duties themselves are derived. We begin with
Atwell‟s approach.
Atwell‟s approach is to suggest that, “Kant never espoused a „positive‟ conception
of the objective end (humanity, man, or persons) in the first place” (Atwell 92). He
points out the fact that one can have positive duties without having a „positive‟ notion of
the end that grounds said duties. Atwell writes, “There is surely no inconsistency in
claiming that (1) the end-in-itself can be conceived only negatively, and (2) our actions
can agree or harmonize with the end-in-itself both negatively and positively” (Atwell 94).
Atwell gives the example of freedom as an analogy. He notes that, “human freedom can
be conceived only negatively (e.g., as the absence of hindrances) yet conduct regarding
human freedom can „agree‟ with it negatively (e.g., by never creating hindrances for
yourself or others) as well as positively (e.g., by removing hindrances)” (Atwell 94). He
even goes so far as to point out that we could call the removing of hindrances as a
„promotion‟ of freedom in the sense it is helpful, but this does not change the fact that
freedom is just the absence of hindrances and so is not something that is an end to be
attained (Atwell 94-95).

Christine Korsgaard also takes this approach. When she

discusses the case of the duty to develop one‟s talents, as addressed from the perspective
of the Formula of Humanity, she writes, “This, indeed, is as close as Kant comes to
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assigning a positive function to humanity as an end. What makes this possible is the fact
that rational nature is a sort of capacity….not an end to be effected…” (Korsgaard 127).
If Kant indeed conceives of humanity as the capacity to set ends, then both Atwell and
Korsgaard‟s reasoning is sound. And as the first two examples have already suggested,
this is exactly what Kant conceives of as humanity. Later, in the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant
clearly identifies humanity this way when he writes, “The capacity to set oneself an end –
any end whatsoever – is what characterizes humanity (as distinguished from
animality)…” (MM 392).
Kant‟s language also suggests that the duties of beneficence and of developing
one‟s talents are duties that agree with humanity, and he stays away from language that
would instead imply that in these duties we see a view of humanity as itself an end to be
achieved. Regarding the duty to develop one‟s talents Kant tells us that “it is not enough
that the action does not conflict with humanity in our person as an end in itself; it must
also harmonize with it” (Gr 430). Regarding the duty of beneficence Kant uses similar
language. He notes that “there is still only a negative and not a positive agreement with
humanity as an end in itself unless everyone also tries…to further the ends of others” (Gr
430). Here again, Kant is careful to use the phrase „positive agreement with,‟ which is in
keeping with Atwell and Korsgaard‟s interpretation. So, Atwell and Korsgaard are
correct to say that the existence of positive duties does not imply a positive conception of
humanity, since, as we have already seen, humanity is a self-existing end.
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If humanity is indeed to be thought as the ability to set ends, this understanding
helps us to make sense of Kant‟s third and fourth examples, the duties to develop one‟s
talents and to be beneficent respectively. In fact, without this understanding of humanity,
Kant‟s discussion of these examples, at least from the perspective of the Formula of
Humanity, would be incomplete. Kant says very little about each of these duties when
discussing the Formula of Humanity. Of the duty to develop our talents Kant‟s only
guidance comes in the passage cited above, in which he tells us that our actions must do
more than avoid conflicts with humanity but must also have a positive agreement with
humanity as an end in itself (Gr 430). But this does little to tell us either about what it is
that Kant sees as comprising humanity or about how this specific duty can be derived.
The same holds true with the duty of beneficence, where Kant again primarily confines
himself to the reminder that beneficence is a duty implied by a positive agreement with
humanity as an end.
However, Kant does offer us one important additional insight in his discussion
here of the duty of beneficence. He tells us that “the natural end that all human beings
have is their own happiness” (Gr 430) and that “the ends of a subject who is an end in
itself must as far as possible also be my ends…” (Gr 430). This passage does give us
some insight into the notion of humanity Kant has in mind. Earlier I suggested,
following others, that Kant‟s idea of humanity is that it consists in our capacity to set
ends. We might refine this a little to say make it clear that to set an end is to will the
attainment of that end, and thus the means to its attainment. So beneficence seems to be
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required of us because, to deny a person of the means to happiness is to deny them of
means to an end that is a necessary end of human beings. This is important because it
cannot be the case that we act against humanity as an end in itself every time we thwart
any end whatsoever. Instead, we violate humanity when we do one of two things. Such
violations occur when we undermine a person‟s ability to set and realize ends in general,
or when we deprive persons of the means to an end that is considered a necessary end of
human beings, and one such end is of course happiness. However, in order to develop
our understanding further, we should turn to Kant‟s treatment of these same examples
under the Formula of Universal Law.
Kant‟s examples of the duties to develop one‟s talents and to be beneficent are the
examples that present the most difficulty in interpretation. Not only do these examples
tempt us to misinterpret Kant as espousing a positive conception of humanity as an end to
be promoted or attained, they also seem to be the two examples that make appeals to
contingent features of human existence rather than to features of rationality as such. But
both of these apparent problems can easily be overcome. We have already seen that it is
possible to conceive of something only negatively but to also suggest that there are ways
that our duties can “harmonize” with such a conception positively and that Kant‟s
treatment of the third and fourth examples from the perspective of the Formula of
Humanity makes just such a distinction. Regarding the accusation that Kant appeals to
features of the human condition and not to features of rationality per se when he is
deriving his examples of duties, I have already argued that, although it is true that Kant
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does make reference to features specific to the human condition, there is nothing
problematic with his doing so. This is because, as Barbara Herman suggests:
When Kant speaks of excluding empirical considerations from morality he has
two related things in mind. First, that the foundation of morality is to be nonempirical….Second, that each of us is subject to moral requirements independent
of any contingent, empirical ends we happen to have….Kant does not need to
argue (nor does he) that the content of morality is to be determined without regard
to the empirical nature of things. (Herman 590)
Earlier in this chapter I have tried to flesh out the point here made by Herman. I have
tried to show the distinction between grounding the moral law and its application and I
have also tried to give a brief summary of Kant‟s contrast between subjective and
objective ends. However, we still need to return to an examination of Kant‟s third and
fourth examples, as seen from the perspective of the Formula of Universal Law, because
we need to show convincingly that these duties are derived from a coherent view of what
it is or is not rational to will. In doing so, we should simply remember that we are asking
what it is rational or irrational for a dependent and imperfect yet rational being to will.
When discussing the duty to develop one‟s talents, as seen from the perspective of
the Formula of Universal Law, Kant tells us that we have such a duty because a person
cannot will the maxim of refusing such development. Kant writes that this is so because,
“as a rational being he necessarily wills that all the capacities in him be developed, since
they serve him and are given to him for all sorts of possible purposes” (Gr 423). The
claim here seems to be that it is irrational to undermine one‟s capacity not to set ends but
to realize them. All rational beings set ends, and the willing of an end entails the willing
of the necessary means to that end. This in no way is tantamount to Kant claiming that
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we ought to will certain ends. We simply cannot deprive ourselves of the means
necessary to attain whatever ends we do set. Since our talents are one of the tools we
have at our disposal that assist us in the realization of our ends, we cannot will a maxim
of ridding ourselves of such a tool. Herman makes the point this way when she writes
that “the ends that are necessary to sustain oneself as a rational being cannot (on rational
grounds) be given up. Insofar as one has ends at all, one has already willed the continued
exercise of one‟s agency as a rational being” (Herman 586). Willing the maxim of
refusing to develop one‟s talents is irrational because it entails willing a maxim of
undermining our very “agency as a rational being.” This same point is made even more
powerfully in the example of the duty to be beneficent.
When Kant presents his claim that there is a duty to be beneficent for the first
time, under the Formula of Universal Law, his language is admittedly such that it opens
Kant up easily to criticism. Kant says that we cannot will a maxim of refusing aid to
others because:
For a will that decided this would conflict with itself, since many cases could
occur in which one would need the love and sympathy of others and in which, by
such a law of nature arisen from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of
the assistance he wishes for himself. (Gr 423)
This passage lends itself to a view of the Formula of Universal Law such as the one
espoused by Korsgaard, and against which I argued in Chapter One, that the reason a
maxim of non-beneficence cannot be willed without contradiction is that such a maxim,
when universalized, would undercut my own particular goals. But, as Herman reminds
us: “To center moral deliberation on a strategy for even hypothetical self-protection
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provides a lesson one would not have expected Kant to endorse” (Herman 582).9

So,

Kant cannot be appealing to a claim that we will want the help of others and so, out of
self-interest, ought to extend the same help to others that we would expect for ourselves.
We need to instead realize that rational dependent beings, by definition, need the
help of others to attain our various ends, and so cannot will that we forgo such aid.
Herman puts the matter this way: “The argument to a contradiction in the will asks, in
effect, whether it could be rational for a human being to renounce irrevocably the
resource (means) of the help of others” (Herman 585). We can see that indeed we cannot
renounce such means because we would be willing to make the attainment of certain ends
impossible. We cannot know which ends would or would not be possible without the aid
of others, but we can be sure that there will indeed be at least some ends that are
impossible without such aid. This is true simply because we are imperfect and dependent
beings, with “natural limitations of our powers as agents” (Herman 587). The difference
between this approach and Korsgaard‟s is indeed a subtle one but it might be summarized
the following way. A given person can indeed be content to refuse aid from others, so
such a person could indeed will a maxim of non-beneficence if his or her only concern
was whether or not the kindness would be repaid. In such a case, the concern is with the
aid itself. However, since the lack of aid also deprives us of the ability to attain what
Herman calls our “true needs,” (Herman 587) what we cannot rationally will is the
abandonment of the means to the attainment of ends we cannot achieve on our own.
9

In “Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons” Herman gives an excellent account of the ways that a view such
as Korsgaard‟s opens Kant up to various casuistry concerns.
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Here the concern is not with whether or not we want assistance, but with the fact that, as
dependent beings, we, by definition, need it.
We can now see that, in all four of the examples of duties derived from the
categorical imperative Kant avoids two possible problems. It was important to be able to
show that Kant is able to clearly link all four of these duties to a coherent view of
rationality. This became possible once we began to understand humanity as the capacity
to set and realize our ends and to use this conception to help us make sense of Kant‟s
derivations of the four examples from both the perspective of the Formula of Humanity
and the Formula of Universal Law. Second, since Kant has to make sure to separate
humanity, as an end in itself, from subjective ends, we also needed to show that Kant
does not treat humanity as an end to be achieved but rather as a limiting condition on our
subjective ends. Understanding humanity as the capacity to set and attain ends, allows us
to see how it is that, in the four examples, Kant can consistently conceive of humanity as
an end that is not to be acted against rather than as one that ought to be promoted.
Ends that Are At the Same Time Duties
We have so far established that Kant is able to derive, from both the perspective
of the Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of Humanity, a series of ends we
cannot rationally will (and in some cases cannot even conceive). But Kant‟s discussion
becomes more complicated when he begins to deal with ends that are at the same time
duties. Even if humanity is not an end to be promoted, we still need to determine
whether he claims there are such duties. We must turn now to Kant‟s discussion of ends
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that are at the same time duties that appears in the Metaphysics of Morals. It is there that
the true defense of how it is possible that we can have ends that are duties is given. In the
Groundwork this is left un-argued for.
Kant reaffirms his view that a discussion of ends cannot take us to a concept of
duty, while insisting that the concept of duty will take us to a discussion of ends. He
explains: “For since there are free actions there must also be ends to which, as their
objects, these actions are directed” (MM 385). But, Kant quickly adds that these ends
must include among them ends that are at the same time duties. He tells us: “For were
there no such ends, then all ends would hold for practical reason only as a means to other
ends; and since there can be no action without an end, a categorical imperative would be
impossible” (MM 385). This is of course because the categorical imperative tells us that
we must perform certain actions simply because it is our duty to do so, so there must be
ends that we are commanded to value for their own sake. Otherwise, all ends would be
contingent and all commands only hypothetical.
So far, Kant has not stepped beyond his discussion of humanity as an end in itself,
since humanity is an end that is objectively necessary. However, Kant goes further at this
point and begins to discuss more specific ends that he claims duty commands us to
promote. The two chief ends he mentions are our own perfection and the happiness of
others, which have already been embodied in the last two examples of duties that were
depicted in the Groundwork. Once Kant claims that there are ends we have a duty to
promote he again risks the criticism that such ends are by definition subjective ends, and
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not objective ends commanded by duty. Earlier, we noted that the existence of these two
sets of ends (self-perfection and beneficence) did not entail the notion that humanity was
itself an end to be promoted, but this does not necessarily mean that they are themselves
not such ends. But here again, John Atwell takes the view that the happiness of others
and our own perfection are not to be seen as ends to be promoted.
Atwell suggests that all ends of action are by definition subjective ends. He asks:
“Is everything a person attempts to bring about, by the very fact that he tries to effect it, a
subjective end, i.e., something having only a relative value, thus something serving only
in hypothetical imperatives?” (Atwell 90). He then goes on to answer his own question:
“To answer affirmatively, as my criticism suggests we should, would seem to make a
categorical imperative impossible” (Atwell 90). Atwell goes on to offer a solution to this
difficulty, arguing that ends that are at the same time duties should not be thought of as
ends of action at all. He writes that “no objective end (not even „an end which is a duty‟)
is ever an end of action- understanding „an end of action‟ as that which the action is
devised to bring about” (Atwell 90). To support his claim Atwell turns to Kant‟s
distinction between objective ends and subjective ends. He notes that, “Whatever anyone
intends to effect by means of an action is always a subjective end and never an objective
end…” (Atwell 90). In support, he cites Kant‟s claim that “the value of all objects to be
produced by our action is always conditioned” (Gr 428). By contrast, “The value of an
objective end, on the other hand, is absolute and unconditioned, hence no objective end
can be the end of an action, i.e., an „object‟ that can „be produced‟ by our action” (Atwell
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90-91). The question then is whether one‟s own perfection and the happiness of others
can be seen as ends to be effected by action and thus, according to Atwell, subjective
ends.
It is safe to say that our own perfection is not an end of action. Kant presents us
with two different kinds of self-perfection: natural perfection and moral perfection. Kant
describes the former this way: “Natural perfection is the cultivation of any capacities
whatever for furthering ends set forth by reason” (MM 392). This kind of perfection
seems to go hand in hand with a respect for our own humanity as the capacity to set ends.
Kant clarifies this point when he continues to say:
The capacity to set oneself an end – any end whatsoever – is what characterizes
humanity (as distinguished from animality)….In other words, the human being
has a duty to cultivate the crude predisposition of his nature, by which the animal
is first raised into the human being. It is therefore a duty in itself. (MM 392)
This first kind of perfection thus involves simply acting in ways that do not interfere with
our ability to set ends, as well as acting in ways that enhance our ability to set ends, but
there are no set ends established as ones we ought to effect. The second kind of selfperfection Kant presents as a duty is the duty of moral self-perfection. Kant tells us that,
“The greatest perfection of a human being is to do his duty from duty (for the law to be
not only the rule but also the incentive of his actions)” (MM 392). As Atwell suggests,
“Moral self perfection is not an „extrinsic‟ end that one can attempt to produce by means
of action…” (Atwell 97). This is because such moral perfection consists in acting from a
certain disposition, namely the good will, and the good will is not something external to
us that we bring about but rather is an element of our willing itself. Thus, this end is the
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kind of self-existing end that Kant espoused as his notion of humanity. The happiness of
others, however, seems more likely to be an end we can bring about by our action, and so
seems more likely to appear to be a subjective end.
There are really two ways to argue that happiness is not a subjective end of action.
The first is to suggest that we cannot possibly be the causal agent of someone else‟s
happiness, since Kant understands happiness to be the fulfillment of all of one‟s aims.
The happiness of others would then be at best an end we can contribute to via our actions,
not an end of those actions themselves. The second avenue is to argue, as Atwell does,
that when Kant tells us that we have a duty of beneficence that he is not arguing that we
have a duty to create happiness in others but rather that we cannot possibly will a maxim
of refusal to provide aid to others (Atwell 98). Atwell‟s reasoning does seem to be in
keeping with Kant‟s own articulation of the reason why beneficence is an end that is also
a duty. Kant presents the following argument:
The reason that it is a duty to be beneficent is this: since our self-love cannot be
separated from our need to be loved (helped in the case of need) by others as well,
we therefore make ourselves an end for others; and the only way this maxim can
be binding is through its qualification as a universal law, hence through our will
to make others our ends as well. The happiness of others is therefore an end that
is also a duty. (MM 393)
Kant‟s statement points back to the analysis we made earlier. The duty of beneficence
stems from the fact that a rational, dependent being cannot coherently will the deprivation
of means necessary to the attainment of one‟s various ends, so we cannot deny this same
resource to others. Kant‟s discussion of ends that are also duties therefore seems in
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keeping with our earlier analyses; he establishes these ends on grounds that are not
separate from the formulations of the categorical imperative.
Now that we can say with confidence that Kant is on firm ground when he argues
for the validity of the existence of ends that are at the same time duties, it may be
worthwhile to look more in depth at one such kind of duty. I have in mind the duties to
oneself in terms of the duties regarding our own perfection, especially our moral
perfection. This is important because I want to argue that Kant‟s commitment to the
rational elements of his ethics, namely universality, humanity as an end in itself, and a
self-legislating or autonomous will, translate to a commitment to moral perfection of
ourselves and a striving toward the moral perfection of the world as a whole. I will treat
the former here and the latter in the next chapter.
The issue of duties to oneself is an interesting one in Kant‟s ethics. In a utilitarian
approach to morality, any moral obligation or moral responsibility to one‟s self only
exists because of its larger utilitarian benefit. In an Aristotelian kind of virtue ethic, by
contrast, the concern is on the development of one‟s self with the implication being that a
moral concern for others will be the natural result of a sufficiently virtuous character, but
the idea of obligation to others is absent. Kant‟s approach is to show that the ground of
our obligations, both to our selves and to others, in fact stems from the ability to put our
selves under obligation. So, in a sense, all obligations for Kant are obligations to our
selves. This is because the ground of morality in Kant‟s approach is the autonomy of
practical reason. Kant makes this point when he writes that “I can recognize that I am
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under obligation to others only insofar as I at the same time put myself under obligation,
since the law by virtue of which I regard myself as being under obligation proceeds in
every case from my own practical reason; and in being constrained by my own reason, I
am also the one constraining myself” (MM 418). This view, that obligation or duty can
only make sense as seen as emanating from an autonomous will takes us back to the
Groundwork and to the link Kant makes there between the categorical imperative and
autonomy.
In the Groundwork Kant makes it clear that “all practical lawgiving” (Gr 431) can
be seen in the form of universality and the end of humanity as an end in itself (Gr 431).
But he goes on to say that “from this there follows now the third practical principle of the
will, as supreme condition of its harmony with practical reason, the idea of the will of
every rational being as a will giving universal law” (Gr 431). Our humanity in our own
person is that which enables us to give this moral law, and, in order for it to be a binding
law, it must take the form of universality. Together we get the notion of a legislating or
autonomous will. Kant makes it clear that his discussion of imperatives, both from the
perspective of their form and from the perspective of their ends, had been so far “only
assumed to be categorical because we had to make such an assumption if we wanted to
explain the concept of duty” (Gr 431). The concept of autonomy is necessary in order to
show that commands can in fact be categorical. This is “just because of the idea of
giving universal law it is based on no interest and therefore, among all possible
imperatives, can alone be unconditional…” (Gr 432). The ability to hold oneself under
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obligation is thus the ultimate ground of moral obligation; without it, the universality of
the categorical imperative becomes a mere assumption. Likewise humanity as an end in
itself, according to Kant, only makes sense if reason is autonomous. He writes that “the
will of a rational being must always be regarded as at the same time lawgiving, since
otherwise it could not be thought of as an end in itself” (Gr 434). The important thing to
stress here is that one‟s ability to act as a lawgiver stands as the ultimate condition for the
categorical imperative while also allowing us to see a bridge, together with the notion of
humanity as an end in itself, to the more teleological elements of Kant‟s ethics.
In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant reminds us that freedom consists, oddly enough, in
being under obligation, specifically obligation to ourselves. He writes that “the …
human being thought in terms of his personality, that is, as a being endowed with inner
freedom…is regarded as a being that can be put under obligation, and indeed under
obligation to himself (to the humanity in his own person)” (MM 418).10 He goes even
further than this, saying that the duties to our selves are the ground of all our duties,
saying: “For suppose there were no such duties [to our selves]: then there would be no
duties whatsoever, and no external duties either” (MM 418).
Kant divides duties to our selves into negative and positive duties. “Negative
duties forbid a human being to act contrary to the end of his nature and so have merely to
do with his moral self-preservation…” (MM 419). In contrast, “positive duties, which
10

Kant seems here to be using „humanity‟ in a way that is different from the way he uses it when he goes
through his four examples under the Formula of Humanity of the categorical imperative. There „humanity‟
seems to be the capacity to set ends. Here however, this capacity seems to be referred to as „personality,‟
while „humanity‟ is reserved for the aspect of ourselves that is law giving; it represents our autonomous
will.
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command him to make a certain object of choice his end, concern the perfecting of
himself” (MM 419). So, while Atwell may be right that one‟s perfection is not itself an
end to be promoted, this does not mean that it does not entail that we “make a certain
object of choice our end.” Atwell‟s approach of claiming that the ends that are duties are
not ends to be promoted is a helpful one. However, the more important issue is whether
any end that is a duty can ultimately be grounded in appeal to Kant‟s understanding of
rational nature as an end in itself that can both give and be obligated by universal laws.
Kant ultimately does claim that there are positive duties to ourselves that go
beyond duties to refrain from depriving ourselves of the ability to set ends. We must also
actively cultivate our ability to set these ends. Kant tells us that, “A human being has a
duty to himself to cultivate his natural powers…as means to all sorts of possible ends. –
He owes it to himself (as a rational being) not to leave idle and, as it were, rusting away
the natural predispositions and capacities that his reason can someday use…”(MM 445).
This claim indicates that we are, so to speak, works in progress. Humanity, the ability to
set ends, is a capacity that can be dampened or heightened, and it is our duty to develop
this capacity as far as it is in our power to do so. Kant makes it clear that we cannot
necessarily attain moral perfection, but that we nonetheless have a duty to strive toward
it. He writes that, “It is a human being‟s duty to strive for this [moral] perfection, but not
to reach it (in this life), and his compliance with this duty can, accordingly consist only in
continual progress” (MM 446). This claim will become important in Kant‟s discussion of
the highest good, and I will take it up in more depth in the next chapter. For now, it is
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sufficient that we are able to see that Kant‟s notion of a rational being, which can both
give and follow the universal law, and which has itself, as the ability to set ends, as its
own end, implies positive duties to one‟s self. (Kant will also go on to discuss duties to
others, but I will take these up in the next chapter.)
The purpose of this chapter was to defend Kant‟s discussion of ends by showing
the legitimacy of his account of objective ends and to show how such ends can be linked
to Kant‟s notion of rationality. There are three important elements to Kant‟s notion of
rationality: rational willing as taking the form of universality, and rational nature both as
an end in itself and as consisting in the capacity to be obligated to one‟s self as a
lawgiver. I have tried to show how all three of these elements are present in Kant‟s
discussions of duties, both as they appear in the Groundwork and as they reappear in the
Metaphysics of Morals. There is more that can be said on this subject, but my goal here
has simply been to provide an argument for the legitimacy of Kant‟s discussion of ends.
This discussion is a sort of „bridge‟ to the discussion that is upcoming in the next
chapters.
If Kant‟s ethics is to demand so much of us, prohibiting us from even lying to the
murderer at the door, then we need to be able to show that this rigorism is indeed worth
the price, and I believe it is possible to defend Kant‟s view that it is indeed worthwhile.
But this defense is only possible if Kant‟s view of morality can be seen as being
concerned with how it is that we can bring about a more perfect world. And of course,
this means that we must first show that Kant can be shown to be on solid grounds in his
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discussion of ends in general, which has been the goal of the present chapter. In the next
chapter I will turn to Kant‟s discussion of our duty to bring about a more perfect world,
which includes his discussions of the Kingdom of Ends and the Highest Good. This
discussion will also consider the place Kant‟s views of nature, God, and hope play in
Kant‟s vision. Then, in the last chapter, I will argue that Kant‟s approach is the only
approach that at least entitles us to hope for and believe in the possibility of a morally
perfect world.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE MORAL WORLD, MORAL PROGRESS, AND THE MORAL LAW
This dissertation is ultimately guided by two questions. First, is Kant‟s rigorous
formalism really as rigorous as it seems? In other words, is it really the case that Kant
should be taken at his word when he claims, for example, that we cannot lie, even to a
murderer at the door? In the first chapter I argued that, despite possible wishes to the
contrary, we must indeed answer this first question in the affirmative. Kant‟s conception
of the categorical imperative indeed involves a sort of inflexibility that is either the
greatest strength or greatest weakness of his ethics. I tried to show this by arguing,
against Christine Korsgaard, that the various formulations of the categorical imperative
should be read as leading to the same conclusions in moral decision making. This
discussion inevitably leads to the second question: Can the strict dictates of Kant‟s ethics
be defended when they seem to require us to allow great harms to occur?
In Chapter Two I argued that the beginning of the answer to this question rests
with understanding that Kant‟s ethics, while quite strict, is not entirely formalistic. I
argued that we can see a strong element of teleology present even in the way Kant
understands the categorical imperative. Further, I argued that the teleological elements of
the categorical imperative lead to a better understanding of Kant‟s discussion of ends that
are also duties. These ends that are also duties chiefly surround the duty to cultivate our
talents and the duty to promote the happiness of others, and I have argued that these ends
94
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that are also duties can be derived from both the Formula of Humanity and the
Formula of Universal Law. I attempted to demonstrate this by offering an explanation
and defense of Kant‟s claim that one cannot rationally will either a maxim of refusing to
give aid to others or a maxim of refusing to cultivate one‟s talents. In short, a rational
being cannot coherently deprive one‟s self or another person the means necessary for
realizing various ends, nor can one refuse to develop the capacity for setting and realizing
ends. This also helped to show the connection between the Formula of Universal Law
and the Formula of Humanity, since „humanity‟ is this very capacity to set and realize
ends.
In the ends that are also duties, we have the view that we have a duty to promote,
or at the very least to refrain from interfering with, the ability to set and realize ends, both
in our selves and others. This discussion leads to Kant‟s discussion of the kingdom of
ends, since, as we will soon see, such a kingdom is one in which all citizens are able to
freely set and realize their various ends. It also takes us to the heart of the argument in
this dissertation: adherence to the moral law is valuable not just because rationality is
valuable for its own sake, but because it can be seen as helping to lead to a more moral
world. Kant makes this point when he says, “Morality consists, then, in the reference of
all action to the lawgiving by which alone a kingdom of ends is possible” (Gr 434).
Morality is thus, on Kant‟s account, bound up with the project of creating a „kingdom of
ends.‟ If this is true, then the commands of duty can be seen as helping to make a
kingdom of ends possible. Thus, if it is only through such adherence to the moral law that
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the kingdom of ends is possible, then adherence to the dictates of morality also paves the
path for a better world. This is the next part of the answer to those who would criticize
Kant for his allegiance to the strict dictates of the moral law when such allegiance seems
to make it difficult to confront evils such as that depicted in the case of the murderer at
the door. Those who use the murderer at the door as an example of what is wrong with
Kant‟s ethics portray it as an example of a choice between a Kantian morality and the
desire to prevent evil or to promote a better world. However, if adherence to the moral
law in fact is seen by Kant himself as bound up with creating a „kingdom of ends,‟ which
is one term Kant uses for a moral world1, then this choice may be a false one, and
following the moral law and promoting a moral world can be seen as two equally
important parts of Kant‟s ethical project.
In order to better see how Kant connects the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends to
the other formulations of the categorical imperative, it is helpful to consider the way he
connects these formulations through the concept of autonomy. Kant begins by linking

1

In the Groundwork Kant notes that “a world of rational beings (mundus intelligibilis) as a kingdom of
ends is possible, through the giving of their own laws by all persons as members” (Gr 438). In the first
Critique we see a link between the kingdom of ends and the highest good when Kant writes: “Now in an
intelligible world, that is, in the moral world…such a system, in which happiness is bound up with and
proportioned to morality, can be conceived as necessary…, since rational beings, under the guidance of
such principles, would themselves be the authors both of their own enduring well-being and that of others”
(CR A 810/B 838). The connection between happiness and morality runs through most of Kant‟s
discussions of the highest good, which I will examine in depth within this chapter. We see the connection
to the kingdom of ends when we note the recurrence of Kant‟s phrase „intelligible world‟ or „mundus
intelligibis‟. But Kant‟s discussion of the moral world is not confined to the concepts of the kingdom of
ends and the highest good in the world. For example, he also uses terms such as the „ethical community‟ in
the Religion (Rel 99). This chapter will largely be devoted to tracing the links between these concepts while
arguing that they share the common feature of a world of rational beings living under common freedom and
that Kant understood this condition to be possible in the world of sense.
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both the Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of Humanity to autonomy. He
writes:
[T]he ground of all practical lawgiving lies…objectively in the rule and the form
of universality which makes it fit to be a law…; subjectively, however, it lies in
the end; but the subject of all ends is every rational being as an end in itself…;
from this there follows now the third practical principle of the will…the idea of
the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law. (Gr 431)
The idea of every rational being giving the law to itself is important because it, like the
other two conditions of a command of practical reason, the form of universality and an
objective end, is a necessary condition in order for the law to be unconditional. Kant
makes this point when he says that “the principle of every human will as a will giving
universal law through all its maxims…would be very well suited to be the categorical
imperative by this: that just because of the idea of giving universal law it is based on no
interest and therefore, among all possible imperatives, can alone be unconditional…” (Gr
432). Having connected the principle of autonomy to the previous two formulations of
the categorical imperative, Kant then goes on to connect it to the Formula of the
Kingdom of Ends.
Kant claims that “the concept of every rational being as one who must regard
himself as giving universal law through all the maxims of his will…leads to a very
fruitful concept dependent upon it, namely that of a kingdom of ends” (Gr 433). Kant
then continues on to say, “[b]y a kingdom I understand a systematic union of various
rational beings through common laws” (Gr 433). These laws are laws rational beings
give to themselves and follow, and so we see the connection between the kingdom of
ends and the principle of autonomy and the Formula of Universal Law. But these laws
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also present an objective end to practical reason, so Kant also connects the kingdom of
ends to the Formula of Humanity when he writes:
For, all rational beings stand under the law that each of them is to treat himself
and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as ends in
themselves. But from this there arises a systematic union of rational beings
through common objective laws, that is, a kingdom, which can be called a
kingdom of ends (admittedly only an ideal) because what these laws have as their
purpose is just the relation of these beings to one another as ends and means. (Gr
433)
A kingdom of ends is thus an ideal world in which every member of the kingdom treats
him or her self and others as ends in themselves. And further, we are also to serve in part
as means to the ends of others, wherein each member of the kingdom of ends has a duty
to help promote the free ends of others. Thus, it seems Allen Wood is correct when he
notes, in Kant’s Ethical Thought, that the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends “is derived by
combining ideas drawn from all the previous formulas of the moral law” (Wood 166).
We see this in the element of adhering to the law, which we also give to ourselves, as
well as the command to treat others as ends in themselves. Another way to put this is to
say that the kingdom of ends is thus the condition that would result if we were to treat
humanity as an end in itself or if we were to adopt only those maxims that can be willed
to hold universally without contradiction. It is this claim, that there is a state of affairs
that will result if everyone were to follow the categorical imperative, which is the
essential addition that comes with the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends.
Kant tells us that each formulation of the categorical imperative represents a
progression from the formulations that have preceded it. This point is made most clearly
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when Kant discusses the various formulations of the categorical imperative as a way of
explaining the various components of maxims. Kant writes:
All maxims have, namely, 1) a form, which consists in universality…. 2) a
matter, namely an end…. 3) a complete determination of all maxims by means of
that formula, namely that all maxims from one‟s own lawgiving are to harmonize
with a possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of nature…. A progression
takes place here, as through the categories of the unity of the form of the will (its
universality), the plurality of the matter (of objects, i.e., of ends), and the allness
or totality of the system of these. (Gr 437)
This is important because I wish to show that Kant‟s system is not just compatible with
ends, but ultimately is fundamentally concerned with ends in the sense that our moral
action ultimately must be seen as helping to promote a more moral world. Many
commentators over the last few decades have made compelling cases that Kant‟s ethical
thought is ultimately concerned with ends, especially the end of a more moral world2, but
what I hope to show in this chapter is not only the extent to which Kant was concerned
with promoting a moral world, but also that he sees such promotion as inseparable from
adherence to the moral law.
Kant alludes to both of these concerns when he writes that “such a kingdom of
ends would actually come into existence through maxims whose rule the categorical
imperative prescribes to all rational beings if they were universally followed” (Gr 438).
Here he seems to indicate not only that the kingdom of ends could be thought of as a
moral world possible in the world of sense but also that it is only possible on the
condition that everyone were to work in accordance with moral laws. Kant goes on to
2

See for example, Keith Ward‟s “Kant‟s Teleological Ethics”. He makes the case that Kant saw his ethical
project as tied to both moral perfection and the promotion of a “harmonious community” (Ward 247-8).
Jennifer Moore also makes the case that Kant‟s objective ends are almost entirely “interpersonal or social
in character” (Moore 54).
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further connect these two dimensions of the kingdom of ends. First he writes that
“[m]orality consists, then, in the reference of all action to the lawgiving by which alone a
kingdom of ends is possible” (Gr 434). Second, Kant makes it clear that we must
however always regard ourselves as lawgiving members of such a kingdom (Gr 434).
Taken together, these two claims are extremely significant: we must act as though we are
already in the kingdom of ends, acting as lawgivers in such a kingdom, and further, it is
only through such actions that a kingdom of ends can be possible at all. Our duty is thus
to make the kingdom of ends possible, but we can only do this by acting as law makers in
such a kingdom. The connection between these two claims is absolutely essential for any
understanding of how it is that Kant thinks about the relationship between the moral law
and moral progress. Any attempt to bring about the kingdom of ends by means that
conflict with the moral law would be obviously anathema to Kant‟s approach to ethics.
The two notions, of moral progress and adherence to the moral law, are inseparable from
one another. It is this claim that allows us to better understand and defend Kant‟s strict
adherence to duty, even in the face of apparent injustices: it is only through such an
adherence to morality that a kingdom of ends is possible.
Allen Wood shows us how this would look in practice by looking at Kant‟s
example of the duty of beneficence. He writes, “if I make another‟s happiness my end, I
thereby bring about a harmony or coincidence of ends, and to this extent contribute to a
realm of ends, whereas to the extent that I refuse to make the happiness of others my end
I prevent a realm of ends” (Wood 168). Wood then goes on to summarize the basic tone
of the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends well when he writes that the formula “seems to
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require…the exclusion of ends that in principle cannot be shared between rational beings
(such as those requiring deception or coercion) and the furthering of ends that unite
people (such as those involving mutual respect and mutual aid)” (Wood 169). What the
concept of the kingdom of ends thus introduces is an element of cosmopolitanism that is
not present in the earlier conceptions of the categorical imperative.3 However, in order to
understand Kant‟s conception of the moral world more fully and to see how it is
connected to the moral law, much still needs to be done. First, we must examine what
such a world looks like. Second, we must look at the extent to which Kant thought such a
world was possible, and at the question of what is necessary in order for it to be brought
about.
Kant‟s Conception of a Moral World and its Possibility in the World of Sense
Kant‟s discussions of a moral world extend through many of his writings and the
notion of a moral world can be seen both in his discussions of the kingdom of ends and
his discussions of the highest good. Kant remarks in the First Critique: “I entitle the
world a moral world, in so far as it may be in accordance with all moral laws…” (A
808/B 836). Thus, for Jennifer Moore the moral world is, “at a minimum … virtually
indistinguishable from the kingdom of ends…” (Moore 55). Such a world, according to
Kant, is one in which “we leave out of account all the hindrances to morality” (A 810 / B
838). Kant then goes on to describe the moral world further, linking it to happiness and
3

Works such as Jennifer Moore‟s “Kant‟s Ethical Community”, Robert Louden‟s “Kant‟s Impure Ethics”
and Victoria Wike‟s “Kant on Happiness in Ethics” explore this issue in some depth, emphasizing the fact
that the moral world is one in which not only is the goal a social one but that additionally, it is one that
rational agents must work together to bring about. While I discuss this to some extent later in the chapter,
it is not the main focus of my argument here. I am primarily concerned with the claim that such a world is
made possible only through adherence to the moral law.
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morality, when he says “freedom, partly inspired by and partly restricted by moral laws,
would itself be the cause of general happiness, since rational beings, under the guidance
of such principles, would themselves be the authors both of their own enduring wellbeing and of that of others” (A 810/B 838).4 In the Third Critique Kant clearly thinks of
the highest good in terms of this moral world as happiness conditioned by morality.5 For
example, Kant writes that “the highest physical good that is possible in the world and
which can be promoted, as far as it is up to us, as a final end, is happiness – under the
objective condition of the concordance of humans with the law of morality, as the
worthiness to be happy” (CJ 450). For Kant then, the moral world can be seen as a world
in which there is general happiness as conditioned by general morality, as a product of
unfettered free action.
Defining the moral world in this way allows us to see the ways that Kant connects
his notion of the moral world to his discussions of autonomy and to his discussions of
objective ends, or ends that are at the same time duties. Our analysis in Chapter Two

4

What complicates things here is that, in Kant‟s descriptions of this moral world, which he comes to
associate with the highest good, he frequently makes use of the notion of happiness proportioned to
morality. In the Critique of Pure Reason, between A 810/ B 838 and A 815 / B 843 Kant uses phrasing that
indicates either happiness proportional to morality or in exact proportion to worthiness to be happy several
times. Several authors, most notably Pauline Kleingeld, Andrews Reath, and Victoria Wike, have made the
case that there are indeed separate yet related concepts of the highest good present within Kant‟s thought.
See Kleingeld‟s “What Can the Virtuous Hope For? Re-reading Kant‟s Doctrine of the Highest Good,”
Reath‟s “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant,” and Wike‟s Kant on Happiness in Ethics,
especially chapters 5 and 6. The interpretation of the exact relationship between these two notions varies
from author to author. While Reath draws the distinction as one between a secular notion and a theological
notion, Wike articulates the distinction more in terms of an individual goal and a social goal (see especially
p. 128 of Wike). Wike, Kleingeld and Reath also each make the point that the highest good as a social
goal is a more important dimension of Kant‟s conception of the highest good than his „theological‟ notion
or notion of the highest good as an individual goal. I am in agreement with these thinkers on this point and
take this point up later in the chapter.
5

As I will discuss later, this should not be confused with happiness proportional to virtue.
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showed that Kant is on firm footing when he claims that we have a duty to cultivate our
talents and we have at least the minimal duty towards others of beneficence. Now, we
can see the link between these two duties and the moral world. The duty to cultivate
talents and the inability to will a maxim of non-beneficence both point to the idea that a
rational being must will, both for one‟s self and for others, the maximal possibility of
realizing one‟s freely chosen ends. The moral world is the world in which all freely
chosen ends (that are compatible with morality) are able to be realized.
In the Religion we see a similar conception of the moral world, which Kant refers
to in terms of an “ethical community” or “church visible”. Kant writes:
An ethical community under divine legislation is a church which, inasmuch as it
is not the object of a possible experience, is called the church invisible (the mere
idea of the union of all upright human beings under direct yet moral divine worldgovernance, as serves for the archetype of any such governance to be founded by
human beings). The church visible is the actual union of human beings into a
whole that accords with this ideal….The true (visible) church is one that displays
the (moral) kingdom of God on earth inasmuch as the latter can be realized
through human beings. (Rel 101)
Two features of the above passage are important to note. First, the kingdom of God on
earth involves a „union of human beings into a whole‟ and so involves a notion of ethical
community6 or moral world, and second, Kant notes here that this moral world is „on

6

Kant uses this phrase frequently within Part III of the Religion. For example, Kant writes that “since the
duties of virtue concern the entire human race, the concept of an ethical community always refers to the
ideal of a totality of human beings…”(Rel 96). Kant goes on to say that “an ethical community is
conceivable only as a people under divine commands …, and indeed in accordance with the laws of virtue
(Rel 99). He also links this concept to the highest good when he says that “this highest moral good will not
be brought about solely through the striving of one individual for his own moral perfection but requires
rather a union of such persons into a whole toward that very end…” (Rel 98). He does not use the phrase
„ethical community‟ in the passage, but it is clearly implied, as the title of the sections is “The Human
Being Ought to Leave the Ethical State of Nature in Order to Become a Member of an Ethical
Community”.
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earth‟ and is a state of affairs that „can be realized through human beings.‟ This second
point suggests that Kant saw the moral world as one possible in the world of sense.
Kant, however, gives some contradictory indicators when it comes to the question
of whether or not the moral world is a world possible in the world of sense or whether it
is simply an ideal. For example, he says that such a world is “only an idea, the carrying
out of which rests on the condition that everyone does what he ought…” (A 810 / B 838),
yet he also says “we must assume that moral world to be a consequence of our conduct in
the world of sense…” (A 811 / B 839). I would argue that Kant did in fact see the moral
world as a possibility in the world of sense. To see that this is true, we must look at the
extent to which Kant emphasized the possibility of the moral world in his writings. Then
we will examine the grounds we have for assuming that such a world can be seen as
being able to be possibly brought into existence in the world of sense.
It must be noted that a discussion of the possibility of the moral world can be
taken to mean two very different things. On the one hand, we could simply be referring
to the theoretical possibility of the moral world, such that the moral world can be shown
to be a valid idea of reason. On the other hand, we can also discuss the practical
possibility of the existence of a moral world, in which the moral world can in fact be
brought into existence in the world of sense. In what follows, it will be important for us
to see that Kant sees the moral world, as the highest good in the world, as possible in both
these senses.
One way that we can think of the moral world is as the final end of reason. This
is, of course, one of the roles Kant ascribes to the highest good. Kant makes it clear that
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the highest good, as the final end of reason, must be at least theoretically possible. He
writes that pure practical reason “seeks the unconditioned totality of the object of pure
practical reason, under the name the highest good” (CPR 108). He then reminds us of the
connection between the moral law and the highest good by emphasizing the fact that the
highest good is not the determining ground of morality; the moral law is. “Hence, though
the highest good may be the whole object of a pure practical reason … it is not on that
account to be taken as its determining ground, and the moral law alone must be viewed as
the ground for making the highest good and its realization or promotion the object” (CPR
109). Moral action thus aims at the objective end of the highest good, but the desire to
create the highest good cannot and should not be the way we determine what is in fact
moral.7 Further, this end, the highest good, is only possible as an object of action through
the moral law. But, Kant reminds us that the fact that the moral law is the determining
ground of morality does not mean that the highest good is therefore an inessential
concept. He tells us that the:
highest good is not merely object: the concept of it and the representation of its
existence as possible by our practical reason are at the same time the determining
ground of the pure will because in that case the moral law, already included and
thought in this concept, and no other object, in fact determines the will in
accordance with the principle of autonomy. (CPR 110)
What Kant is saying here is that the highest good, as the unconditioned end of practical
reason, contains the concept of the moral law within it, and so is a determining ground of
7

Klaus Dusing echoes the claim that the highest good is the ultimate end or moral action when he writes
that “das höchste Gut entspringt erst auf der Anwendung der reinen Moral auf die Teleologie eines
endlichen Willens; es ist nicht schon vorgegebene,sondern allerest zu entwerfende höchste Zweck unseres
sittlichen Tuns in der Welt” (Dusing 33). The claim that highest good is critical as an end of action stems
from the fact that a finite and free will must set ends, and these ends must have a highest end. Thus,
according to Dusing, “Ein endlicher und zugleich freier Wille muss sich ja Zwecke setzen, wenn er
uberhaupt in seiner Welt wirken will” (Dusing 33).
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the will in that it determines the will, along with the moral law, since it provides the
necessary end of the moral law. Kant goes even further in drawing the connection
between the moral law and the highest good when he says: “If the highest good is
impossible in accordance with practical rules, then the moral law, which commands us to
promote it, must be fantastic and directed toward empty imaginary ends and must
therefore in itself be false” (CPR 114). We thus have an interesting relationship between
the moral law and the highest good. The possibility of the highest good is conceptually
necessary in order to provide the moral law with its necessary end, without which the
entire validity of the moral law would be drawn into question.
However, all that the above argument has shown is that the highest good, as the
final end of reason, must be conceived of as possible, and not necessarily that is possible
in the actual world. Kant must do more than this if he is going to talk about a moral
world that can in fact be brought about by human agency. Andrews Reath makes the
point that “it would make no sense to talk about willing an action directed at an
object…unless it were something that we could imagine as a result of human agency.
The …point, then, is that Kant‟s definition of the good is that it should apply to possible
human ends” (Reath 597). The fact that Kant makes it clear that we do in fact have a
duty to promote the highest good also seems to lead us to the conclusion that the highest
good must be possible through our actions, since we cannot have a duty to the
impossible.8 In order to better appreciate the fact that Kant took the view that the moral

8

One of the places in which Kant makes this point is in the Dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason,
during his discussions of the postulate of the immortality of the soul and the postulate of the existence of
God. In his discussion of the postulate of the immortality of the soul Kant notes that “complete conformity
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world was indeed a human possibility, we must look more closely at his discussion of
promoting such a world.
In the Religion Kant notes that, “every species of rational beings is objectively –
in the idea of reason – destined to a common end, namely the promotion of the highest
good as a good common to all” (Rel 97-98). We also see Kant‟s articulation of the
highest good as a social goal in the Third Critique when he talks of the “highest good to
be achieved in the world through freedom … commanded by practical pure reason for the
best possible realization of that end, and which thus must be assumed to be possible” (CJ
469). Here the key phrases are “in the world” and “through freedom”. These phrases
remind us that the highest good being envisioned here is one that exists in the world of
sense and is brought about through human agency. This description appears multiple
times within the Third Critique. For example, Kant writes: “We are determined a priori
by reason to promote with all our powers what is best in the world, which consists in the
combination of the greatest good for rational beings in the world with the highest
condition of the good for them, i.e., the combination of universal happiness with the most
lawful morality” (CPJ 453). The duty Kant is speaking of here is a duty to bring about a
world in which both happiness and morality are able to be realized in all people to the
fullest extent possible. Evidence of this can be seen in the phrase “universal happiness”.

of dispositions with the moral law as the supreme condition of the highest good. This conformity must
therefore be just as possible as its object is, since it is contained in the same command to promote the
object” (CPR 122). Then, in the postulate of the existence of God, he writes that “it was a duty for us to
promote the highest good; hence there is in us not merely the warrant but also the necessity…to presuppose
the possibility of this highest good…” (CPR 125). In both places, it is implicit that we cannot have a duty
to the impossible, since he claims that the fact that we have a duty forces us to presuppose the possibility of
the object of that duty.
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In the Second Critique we also see a description of the highest good as a state of
affairs to be brought about by human agency and as one in which all rational beings are
to share. We can see this, for example, when Kant discusses the ectypal world (CPR 44).
Kant notes that “the moral law in fact transfers us, in idea, into a nature in which pure
reason, if it were accompanied with suitable physical power, would produce the highest
good, and it determines our will to confer on the sensible world the form of a whole of
rational beings” (CPR 44). The phrase “if it were accompanied by suitable physical
power” is important because it seems to point to the limits of human agency in bringing
about the highest good conceived of as a moral world.
Kant has argued that we have a duty to bring a moral world into existence. And,
if there is such a duty, it must be possible to bring such a world into existence. It is clear
that one person cannot create a moral world on one‟s own, and Kant frequently reminds
us that our duty is to promote, not to attain the highest good.9 While we can say that any
individual only has a duty to promote the highest good, this would still mean that the
human race as a whole would have a duty to bring it about.10 Kant indicates this when he

9

John Silber and Gerald Barnes both make strong cases that our duty is to promote the highest good. See
Barnes‟ “A Defense of Kant‟s Conception of the Highest Good” and Silber‟s “Kant‟s Conception of the
Highest Good as Immanent and Transcendent” in which he argues that the highest good is a regulative
obligation in that its attainment is a goal to strive towards, while its promotion is a constitutive obligation,
which informs our actual duties.
10

In fact, as Klaus Dusing points out, the very fact that one individual cannot bring about the highest good
gives us reason to think of the highest good as a social goal brought about through mutual effort. Dusing
makes the point when he writes, “Das höchste Gut eines Einzelnen ist nur innerhalb des höchsten Gutes
aller vernünftigen und freien Wesen möglich.” (Dusing 18). This passage also points to the claim that the
highest good of an individual and the highest good as a social goal are indeed different, but related
concepts, as the highest good of one, according to Dusing, cannot be achieved without the highest good of
all.
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notes that we have a special sort of duty to create the highest good in the form of an
ethical community. He writes,
Now here we have a duty sui generis, not of human beings toward human beings
but of the human race toward itself. For every species of rational beings is
objectively – in the idea of reason – destined to a common end, namely the
promotion of the highest good as a good common to all. (Rel 97)
However, even as an entire human race, it seems that human powers alone can only
promote a moral world; we also need to assume that nature can be conceived in a way so
that human efforts to bring about the moral world will not be in vain.11 Kant‟s writings
on history all indicate an awareness of this issue as they take up the issue of progress
toward a moral world while emphasizing the aspects of this moral progress that are out of
human hands.
Nature and History - Progress toward the Highest Good
Kant‟s view that nature, particularly through its role in history, can be seen as
working toward moral progress is important because it helps us see that Kant sees the
highest good as more than a conceptual „placeholder‟ for the final end of reason and that
it is actually a state of affairs that can be made possible. This is important for two
reasons. First, it underscores the degree to which Kant is concerned with the concept of
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As will become clear later in the chapter, the conformity of nature to making the world hospitable to
moral action depends on the belief in a moral author of nature, God. In the final section of this chapter I
argue that the highest good as a moral world possible in the world of sense exists along side another notion
of the highest good, which focuses on proportioning happiness to virtue within the individual. This latter
notion of the highest good dominates the Dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason. While immortality
is a necessary postulate for the realization of that conception of the highest good, it is not necessary for the
possibility of the highest good as a moral world possible in a world of sense. In fact, I would suggest that
moral progress through history serves an analogous role to the role provided by the postulate of the
immortality of the soul. In both cases, full virtue is unlikely (if not impossible) in an individual life, so an
indefinite progress is postulated. In the case of a moral world, the progress takes places in history; in the
case of the individual, the afterlife is a necessary postulate.

110
progress toward a more moral world throughout his ethical writings. Second, it helps to
refute arguments that would suggest that we can have no duty to promote the highest
good, since it is not possible to realize it.
Keith Ward, referring to works such as the third Critique and Kant‟s writings on
history, notes that in these works, “teleology is clearly subordinated to a higher purpose,
without which there is no value in nature whatsoever” (Ward 248). Ward notes the
connection between this trend and the issue of the possibility of the highest good. He
writes:
[T]he paradox of Kant‟s ethics is that, though moral action is thus essentially
concerned with the fulfillment of natural and moral perfection, such fulfillment is
impossible in this world….For such a paradoxical view of morality to be
intelligible at all, one must postulate that, somehow nature can be determined that
moral effort will not finally be in vain. (Ward 258)
David Lindstedt also argues that a careful look at Kant‟s works on history will provide us
with sufficient reason to believe that “Kant seems desperately concerned that the world
not be dismissed as purposeless, and the possibility of the highest good on earth be
secured” (Lindstedt 129). Keith Ward goes further, noting not only that Kant wishes to
see nature as serving the purpose of helping to make the highest good possible, but that
indeed Kant sees it as working this way. He notes that the “historical destiny of nature is
thus to form a being which must be fashioned through discord and strife to transcend its
animal condition and realize its essential superiority to nature, through its moral
freedom” (Ward 248). In order to see if these claims are true, we turn now to our own
look at some of Kant‟s works on history.
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Even a cursory examination of Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan
Point of View shows us at once that Kant thought of nature as unfolding through history
an unseen path toward moral progress. Take for example the following passage from the
beginning of the treatise:
[H]istory, which is concerned with narrating these appearances [human actions],
permits us to hope that if we attend to the play of freedom of the human will in
the large, we may be able to discern a regular movement in it, and that what
seems complex and chaotic in the single individual may be seen from the
standpoint of the human race as a whole to be a steady and progressive though
slow evolution of its original endowment. (History 17)
The key word above is „hope.‟ As Lindstedt claims, the purposiveness of nature and a
teleological view of history are both necessary “postulates” for the possibility of the
realization of the highest good and they should be seen as analogous to the postulates of
practical reason (Lindstedt 143). He refers to the idea of nature working “providentially”
as the first postulate (Lindstedt 143) and then goes on to say that “a second postulate…is
needed so that one may hope for the achievement of a perfect morality…. [I]t may be
possible for the human species as a whole, and it is this assumption which practical
reason adopts” (Lindstedt 143). Lindstedt‟s point here is that Kant sees nature as
unfolding in a way so as to make progress toward a perfectly moral world possible, and
that this achievement is indeed possible for the species as a whole.12 Indeed it becomes
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What will be important however is to realize that this postulate is not a Hegelian claim that history
unfolds in a way that creates moral progress, indifferent to human actions. If this were so, then any
discussion of the duty to bring about the highest good on earth would be absurd. This is true for an odd
reason. Earlier it seemed that a duty to promote the highest good would be illegitimate if the highest good
was impossible. Here we have the opposite situation. If moral progress toward the highest good on earth
occurred without human intervention, then the idea of a duty to bring it about seems redundant, as if
someone were to say to us that we have a duty to make sure Saturday comes after Friday.
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clear reading the Idea for Universal History, as well as other of Kant‟s works on history,
that this is exactly what Kant believed.
The Idea for Universal History is composed of several theses. The first of these is
reminiscent of Kant‟s discussion of the teleology of nature that takes place in the Third
Critique. The thesis is: “All natural capacities of a creature are destined to evolve
completely to their natural end” (History 18). Kant goes on to make it clear that he
means both that the internal arrangement of an organism is purposive and that any given
organism has a purpose within nature (History 18). This thesis, he notes, is necessary
because it is essential to have any understanding of nature at all. Otherwise, according to
Kant, “we [would] no longer have a lawful but an aimless course of nature, and blind
chance takes the place of the guiding thread of reason” (History 18). If it is assumed that
all of a creature‟s natural capacities are destined to evolve to their natural end, and since
it is also clear that an individual human being‟s natural capacities cannot fully reach their
natural end in one lifetime (as Kant himself claims in his second thesis), then the natural
capacities of human beings must be taken as evolving as a species rather than as an
individual. Kant claims that the means for this development is provided to us by nature
via antagonism, or as Kant calls it, our “unsocial sociability” (History 21).13 I omit here
a thorough discussion of how it is that Kant sees this “unsocial sociability” as
functioning; I wish to instead focus attention on the goal to which he says it aims.
Kant notes that the goal to which nature directs and aids us is the achievement of
a “universal civic society which administers law among men” (History 21). Kant then
13

For a good discussion of this issue, see Sharon Anderson-Gold‟s Unnecessary Evil.
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makes the link between historical progress and nature when he says, “The highest
purpose of Nature, which is the development of all the capacities which can be achieved
by [hu]mankind is attainable only in society and more specifically in the society with the
greatest freedom” (History 22). Here Kant reminds us of his earlier claim that nature
aims at a final purpose, the development of the rational capacities of humankind, but he
also claims here that such a development can only occur in a society that had made
human freedom a realized ideal. This should remind us at once of the connection
between Kant‟s discussion of humanity as an end in itself and his discussion of the
kingdom of ends. We must realize our true humanity, and we can only do so in a
kingdom of ends.
Kant then argues that we are entitled to assume that nature indeed plays a role in
helping to bring about this kingdom of ends. In a statement that should remind us of his
discussion of natural teleology in the Third Critique, Kant asks in his seventh thesis: “Is it
reasonable to assume a purposiveness in all parts of nature and to deny it to the whole?”
(History 27). The claim here is that, just as any organism can be thought of, indeed only
understood as, an organized and thus purposive being, so nature itself must be conceived
of as a purposive whole (the final end of which is the development of human morality).
So, Kant is arguing here that a purposiveness of nature is a reasonable supposition, and
that this supposition undergirds another, that nature works to help us to bring about a
condition of perfect freedom on earth.
Pauline Kleingeld picks up on this discussion of the teleological purposiveness of
nature and sees in it an argument that it is God that serves the role of author of nature,
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noting that, since we can regard nature as teleologically ordered (which Kant argues in
the Critique of Teleological Judgment), we are led to the idea of God as the author of
nature (Kleingeld 102). She then concludes:
Thus, if we regard nature and history as teleologically ordered, we must also
regard this order as the product of a highest intelligence. This assumption makes
it possible to interpret the role of God as follows: as the ground of the „purposive
connection‟ between the realm of nature and the realm of morals, God is thought
to have created a world that is hospitable to moral agency…. (Kleingeld 103)
Indeed Kant himself notes that without the possibility of God as an author of nature what
“would have to be surrendered in that case would be the aim of realizing the final end in
the world (a happiness of rational beings harmoniously coinciding with conformity to the
moral law, as the highest and best thing in the world) by conformity to the moral law”
(CJ 451). This point is also made in the Second Critique where Kant is discussing the
postulate of the existence of God. There he notes again that God is conceived of as a
“cause of all nature, distinct from nature, which contains the grounds of this connection,
namely of the exact correspondence of happiness with morality….Consequently, the
postulate of the possibility of the highest derived good (the best world) is likewise the
postulate of the reality of a highest original good, namely of the existence of God” (CPR
125). So, a picture begins to emerge that Kant sees the highest good in the world, as a
moral world wherein there is happiness coextensive with morality, as indeed possible, but
made possible not only through human agency but through nature guided by God.
However, it is important to remember that this progress toward the moral world still
requires the efforts of human beings. We can see this theme when we consider another
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work on history, The Conjectural Beginning of Human History, as well as Perpetual
Peace.
In The Conjectural Beginning of Human History Kant hypothesizes that human
beings became aware early on that they stand out over and above the rest of nature, and
so realized that “[human beings are] the true end of nature…” (Beginning 114). He
writes that these conjectural beginnings of human history (which include a coming into
awareness of moral imperatives) show us that history is “not a decline from good to evil,
but rather a gradual development from the worse to the better; and nature itself has given
the vocation to everyone to contribute as much to this progress as may be within his
power” (Beginning 123). It is the last piece of the above quote that is important to notice.
Kant claims here that, not only does nature contrive to help bring about a more moral
world, but that we must contribute to this goal as well. What is interesting is that these
works, purporting to look backwards, are really driven by a look forwards by the idea that
everything is driven toward a world that resembles the highest good on earth or a
kingdom of ends. This theme becomes clearer when we look at an additional work which
is more overtly forward-looking.
In Perpetual Peace Kant lays out the conditions necessary for an un-ending peace
between nations (which he is careful to distinguish from a simple absence of conflict).
Kant‟s individual prescriptions for perpetual peace are worth a look in their own right,
however I will only mention two, and those only briefly, as it is in his supplements and
his appendices that we best see connections between nature on one hand, and the highest
good on earth on the other. Kant claims that states must meet two conditions (among
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others) if they are to be able to contribute to a perpetual peace. First, he discusses a state
of equality among citizens, which he describes as follows: “external (juridical) equality in
a state is that relationship among the citizens in which no one can lawfully bind another
without at the same time subjecting himself to the law by which he also can be bound”
(Perpetual Peace 350n). The idea here is that all subjects must also be citizens.
Important for our purposes however is the similarity of this condition to Kant‟s
explanation of the kingdom of ends. Indeed the two precepts are almost identical.14 The
second condition Kant lays down as giving “a favorable prospect for the desired
consequence, i.e., perpetual peace” is a republican constitution (Perpetual Peace 351).
Kant goes on to explain that this has less to do with who is in power than with how that
power is administered. He talks of a division of powers between the legislative and the
executive, but the motivating force behind his discussion is again the concern for
protecting against tyranny and for guaranteeing that any law treats all those under the law
also as legislators of the law. So, the society Kant envisions can here be seen as one that
echoes the conditions necessary for a kingdom of ends. However, it is important that
here (as well as in Kant‟s Formula of the Kingdom of Ends itself in the Groundwork) the
focus is not just on what the kingdom of ends will look like but on what is necessary to
bring it about.
The fact that Kant talks about what it is that is necessary to bring about the
kingdom of ends, or highest good on earth, is essential because it shows us that Kant does
not conceive of nature as acting unaided in bringing about such a world, and indeed it is
14

See Kant‟s statement that “a rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when he gives
universal laws in it but is also himself subject to these laws” (Gr 434).
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only by acting in conformity with the moral law (which is equivalent to acting as a
legislator in the kingdom of ends) that we can bring such a world about. We must
remember this, because Kant at first makes it seem like this is not true, again
emphasizing the role of nature over our own role. In the First Supplement Kant writes
that: “The guarantee of perpetual peace is nothing less than the great artist, nature…. In
her mechanical course we see that her aim is to produce a harmony among men, against
their will and indeed through their discord” (Perpetual Peace 361). Here Kant is echoing
some of the claims we saw in his Idea for a Universal History. Here though, he spells
some of these claims out in more detail. He makes three claims about the working of
nature, intended to support his claim that nature works through discord to produce
harmony:
1) In every region of the world, she has made it possible for men to live.
2) By war she has driven them even into the most inhospitable regions in order to
populate them.
3) By these same means, she has forced them into more or less lawful relations
with one another. (Perpetual Peace 362)
Kant goes on to flesh out these principles in a bit more depth, but the point is clear
enough already. Kant‟s claim, for what it‟s worth, is that nature forces human beings to
resolve conflicts with one another. In creating the circumstances for such conflicts to
arise, nature also provides the opportunity for resolution to arise. This claim is important
not for what it says about nature, but for what it says about our role in making moral

118
progress possible. Nature only provides the opportunity for moral progress, but only
human agency can make it a reality. Kant makes this clear in the first Appendix.
In the first appendix to Perpetual Peace Kant takes pains to remind the reader of
the role of moral duty in the promotion of such a state of peace. He begins by saying that
“[i]t would obviously be absurd, after granting authority to the concept of duty, to pretend
that we cannot do our duty, for in that case this concept would itself drop out of
morality…” (Perpetual Peace 370). Here Kant is speaking to the idea that a state of
perpetual peace must indeed be possible, and indeed that human agency must be able to
bring it about, or else any discussion of a duty to do so would cease to make sense. Kant
writes that “the practical man, to whom morality is mere theory even though he concedes
that it can and should be followed, ruthlessly renounces our fond hope [that it will be
followed].15 He does so because he pretends to have seen in advance that man, by his
nature will never will what is required for perpetual peace” (Perpetual Peace 371).
Kant‟s argument seems to be simply that we cannot know in advance that human beings
are or are not capable of willing perpetual peace. One might object that therefore Kant
has equally no right to claim confidence in progress toward perpetual peace. At this
point, the objection can only be countered by the claim that reason drives us to believe in
such a state, such as the highest good in the world, since reason seeks an ultimate end of
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action, and in the absence of proof of the impossibility of such a state of affairs, we are
entitled to believe in it.16
Crucially, Kant‟s next step is to remind us that the duty to promote perpetual
peace must ultimately be rooted in a discussion of the moral law. In his words, “if this
end (in this case perpetual peace) is a duty, it must be derived from the formal principle
of external actions” (Perpetual Peace 377). The formal principle here is of course the
categorical imperative, and I have already tried to demonstrate that Kant‟s discussion of a
kingdom of ends is indeed connected to his other formulations of the categorical
imperative and that his discussion of the conditions for perpetual peace echoes important
aspects of his discussion of the kingdom of ends (also conceived as the highest good on
earth). But Kant does not just say that our duty to promote perpetual peace is connected
to the categorical imperative. In an absolutely critical passage, he goes further than this,
saying that it is only by such an adherence to the dictates of the moral law that such a
state of affairs is possible at all. I quote the following passage at length to underline its
importance:
Then it may be said, „Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its
righteousness, and your end (the blessing of perpetual peace) will necessarily
follow.‟ For it is the peculiarity of morals, especially with respect to politics
known a priori, that the less it makes conduct depend on the proposed end, i.e.,
the intended material or moral advantage, the more it agrees with it in general.
This is because it is the universal will given a priori (in a nation or in the relations
among different nations) which determines the law among men, and if practice
consistently follows it, this will can also, by the mechanism of nature, cause the
desired result and make the concept of law effective. (Perpetual Peace 378)
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In the next section I argue that this is insufficient grounds for belief in the possibility of the highest good,
which is why Kant must develop his view of the highest good as happiness in proportion to virtue and
introduce the postulates of practical reason.
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This passage is integral in reinforcing the claim that it is not by seeking such a state by
whatever means we deem most efficient that we create it, but rather, by following the
moral law that the attainment of conditions such as perpetual peace or the highest good
become more likely.
Kant suggests that moral progress is not impossible and that it is legitimate to see
humankind as progressing, with the aid of nature guided by God as an author of nature,
toward the eventual possible realization of a moral world, which is a state of mutual
freedom in which human beings act as autonomous agents. We have a duty thus to help
bring this state of affairs about by working to advance the freedom of others and to not
interfere with their free aims. This, as I argued at the beginning of the chapter, shows the
connection between Kant‟s conceptions of the highest good or kingdom of ends and his
discussion of other formulations of the categorical imperative. We have a duty of
beneficence, and of cultivating our talents, which can be traced to a respect for humanity.
Yet these same duties also contribute to a realm of ends, since they involve our duty to
refrain from interfering in the ends of others and of helping others to realize their freely
chosen ends. However, it is important to now look in more depth at the relationship
between Kant‟s conception of the moral world, or highest good in the world, and the
moral law. This is true at least in part because, as Kleingeld reminds us:
The only way to bring the sensible world into conformity with the moral world is
through obeying the moral law. The idea of the moral world is not presented here
as an attractive goal independent of the moral law, for which we subsequently
have to figure out the most expedient means to attain it. Rather, the idea of the
moral world is constructed on the basis of the question what a world would look
like in which everyone always obeys the moral law from duty. (Kleingeld 93)
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Although it is crucial for an understanding of Kant‟s ethics that we see it as concerned
with ends, especially the end of the moral world, we must avoid the trap of going too far
in the other direction. It is equally important to remember that the moral world is not
independent of the moral law. And, as we will see in the final section of the chapter,
Kleingeld‟s remark about the link between the moral law and the highest good will give
us reason to reject the equation of the highest good as a moral world to be produced in the
world of sense with the highest good as individual happiness proportioned to individual
morality.
The Moral Will and the Moral Law
The claim that adherence to the dictates of the moral law is necessary to make a
moral world a real possibility, and even that we have a duty to promote such a moral
world, raises an interesting problem. The risk is that a reference to discussion of the
highest good as an end of action either threatens to undermine the place of the moral law
in Kant‟s ethics or that it is, as some commentators have suggested, simply a concept
with no practical utility at all.17 It is important to show that Kant can avoid both of these
potential pitfalls if we maintain the importance of the link between the moral law and the
role human agency can play in bringing about a moral world.
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Lewis White Beck is probably the chief proponent of this latter view. See his Commentary on Kant’s
Critique of Practical Reason, especially pp. 242-245 and particularly the comment: “The truth of the matter
is that the concept of the highest good is not a practical concept at all…” (Beck 245). Thomas Auxter
appears to make the same point, but later makes the case that there are two conceptions of the highest good
in Kant and only one is definitively ruled out as a practical concept. Thus, when he says that “we do not use
the highest good of the “Dialectic” as the model or idea that regulates our conduct…” (Auxter 127), we
must remember that he does not take this to mean that there is no conception of the highest good that can
not serve as a practical guide for conduct. I take up this issue of different conceptions of the highest good
in the final section of this chapter.
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The first issue we must confront is whether for Kant the highest good can be
thought of as a determining ground of the will without undermining the moral law.
Victoria Wike argues in Kant on Happiness in Ethics that indeed objective ends can be
determining grounds of the will if the end works “in conjunction with or follow[s] from
the moral law” (Wike 135). So, she argues, humanity as an end in itself, for example, is a
determining ground of the will. This is because it works “in conjunction with, because it
follows from, the moral law” (Wike 135). She then adds that the same could in fact be
said to be true of the highest good (Wike 135). She goes on to make the case that indeed
the highest good is inseparable from the moral law, since it “contains the moral law in
that one of its elements, virtue or morality, refers to acting for the sake of duty, for the
sake of the moral law” (Wike 136). This is reinforced by Kant‟s frequent use of
„worthiness to be happy‟ as a substitute for virtue. In the Groundwork it is made clear
that virtue, or worthiness to be happy, is synonymous with acting for the sake of the
moral law. So Wike shows us that there is nothing problematic with the view that the
highest good is the determining ground of the will, as long as we realize that it is so
“together with the moral law, because it contains the moral law and is an object dictated
by the moral law…” (Wike 136). The highest good, or any objective end, the promotion
of which is commanded by the moral law does not undermine the moral law as long as
we realize that such ends must follow from and be prescribed by the law. This may seem
like a small point, but it is important to remember that we cannot say that duties, such as
one to promote the highest good or the kingdom of ends, or any other end such as the
happiness of others or the cultivation of our talents, are duties because of the goodness of
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the end pursued, independent of the commands of the moral law. However, if the highest
good does not undermine the commands of the moral law, there is still the risk that it is
an unnecessary and practically useless concept, for the very reason that it follows from
the moral law.
Lewis White Beck perhaps puts the point most poignantly when he asserts that,
when we are confronted with the question of what we are to do to promote the highest
good we “simply act out of respect for the law, which I already knew” (Beck 244-5). In
some sense, Beck must be right when he makes this point. In fact it is crucial to my view
that acting to promote the highest good is not separated from acting as legislators in a
kingdom of ends, or from treating humanity as an end in itself, or from acting so that our
maxims can conform to universal law. However, what I wish to argue here is that this
fact does not in fact lead to Beck‟s conclusion, that “the concept of the highest good is
not a practical concept at all” (Beck 245). The concept of the highest good may not give
us any new duties, but this does not necessarily mean that it cannot be practically useful
as a concept.
Kant‟s explication of the categorical imperative itself gives us good reason to
believe that there is frequently something to be gained from recasting a concept in a new
way, even if the concept remains logically the same. Kant makes this point when he
discusses the various formulations of the categorical imperative. He notes that there is in
fact an important difference between the various formulations of the categorical
imperative, but that this difference “is indeed subjectively, rather than objectively
practical, intended namely to bring an idea of reason closer to intuition.” (Gr 436) He
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then goes on to emphasize this point, writing that if “one wants to provide access for the
moral law, it is very useful to bring one and the same action under the three concepts
mentioned above and thereby, as a far as possible, bring it closer to intuition” (Gr 437).
Clearly then, there is a great deal to be gained from recasting the moral law in different
ways, so that we are better able to apprehend what is indeed entailed by the categorical
imperative.
This point impacts the relationship between the highest good and the categorical
imperative in an important way. Just as the various formulations of the categorical
imperative are given expressly for the purpose of helping us access the moral law, and
thus our duties, the highest good can be seen as serving a similar purpose. The various
formulations of the categorical imperative offer no duties that were not entailed by the
version Kant first puts forth. Nonetheless, the various formulations help make it possible
for us to see how to think about the moral law in ways that may have been closed to us if
we only had access to one formulation. Similarly, the highest good can help us to see the
full breadth of our duties in a way that might be obscured by relying exclusively on a
conceptual analysis of the categorical imperative.
Several authors have noted the fact that indeed a focus on the promotion of a
moral world or highest good in the world changes the way we might think about our
duties. For example, Pauline Kleingeld notes that:
With the determination of the highest good as the final end or object of all moral
agency, the horizon of a moral agent shifts. The will extends…itself from the
narrow perspective of the immediate duty to act on maxims that one can at the
same time will to become universal law, to a broader perspective, from which all
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moral actions are seen in the light of the one final end to which they contribute”
(Kleingeld 95).
The idea of a shifting of one‟s moral horizon is helpful, because it serves to show us that,
although we may still test our maxims by reference to universality, we can also use a
different lens that allows us to see our moral actions as contributing to a final end and
thus as leading somewhere.
Victoria Wike takes a similar approach to the one Kleingeld mentions and which I
am advocating when she notes that “the duty to seek the highest good certainly
commands something different but probably does not command something more [than is
commanded by the moral law]” (Wike 142). This is because, as Kleingeld suggests in
the passage above, the moral world is a world in which there is cooperation among moral
agents; it is, in Wike‟s words, “a social object or end” (Wike 143). Thus any
understanding of the highest good helps us to realize that adherence to the moral law does
two important things: it helps make a moral world possible, and it reminds us that we
have a moral obligation to bring it about. 18 These are both features of our moral lives
that would be much harder to see if not for the concept of a highest good in the world.
Authors such as Jennifer Moore, Sharon Anderson-Gold and Pauline Kleingeld
take up the issue of what sorts of duties are revealed to us when we make use of the
concept of the highest good in the world, though I mention them here only to emphasize
the point that these descriptions of the duties entailed in a duty to promote the moral
world would perhaps not occur to us if we thought of our moral responsibilities solely in
18

Silber‟s discussion of the highest good as a regulative obligation in “Kant‟s Conception of the Highest
Good as Immanent and Transcendent” is useful here, since Silber argues that it is the goal of attaining the
highest good that provides us with something to strive toward.
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terms of the categorical imperative. Moore notes, for example, that an ethical community
would consist of the features of unity, harmony, a commonly held valuing of the
community itself, value for fellow members of the community that includes affective or
moral bonds, reciprocity, and a source of the identity of the individual members with the
community, and she goes on to argue that Kant‟s notion of an ethical community includes
all of these features (Moore 59-60).

Anderson-Gold speaks specifically about our duties

in what she calls the ethical commonwealth, writing that duties “of virtue go beyond
viewing others as limits to our claims and directs us to treat others as „ends‟ supporting
and promoting their legitimate objectives….It entails minimally the abandonment of
aggressive and competitive attitudes toward others, and maximally the adoption of
cooperative and supportive networks” (Anderson-Gold 30). Finally, Kleingeld takes care
to distinguish Kant‟s conception of a moral world from any sort of political community,
an issue which Kant takes up in some depth in the Religion as well as in Perpetual
Peace.19
The idea of the moral world, like that of the kingdom of ends and humanity as an
end in itself, helps provide a lens which can offer accessibility to the abstract command to
follow the moral law or to will only those maxims that can serve as universal law.
However, such notions, especially that of the moral world, offer us something else that is
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My brief use of examples from Moore, Anderson-Gold, and Kleingeld does not do justice to the depth of
their discussions of what an examination of the moral world can tell us about our duties. I recommend
Moore‟s article “Kant‟s Ethical Community”, Anderson-Gold‟s article “Kant‟s Ethical Commonwealth:
The Highest Good as Social Goal,” and Kleingeld‟s “What do the Virtuous Hope For? Re-reading Kant‟s
Doctrine of the Highest Good” if the reader is interested in these issues. My point here is more basic, that
an appreciation of Kant‟s discussion of the moral world helps us to see that adherence to the moral law can
be seen as contributing to such a world.
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equally important. By seeing that adherence to the moral law is at the same time a duty
to, for example, promote the moral world, we are able to provide a further answer to the
question: Why must I refrain from lying, even to a murderer at the door? The fact that
the moral world is connected to the moral law allows us to hope, if not to assume, that
adhering to the dictates of the moral law is connected to making a moral world possible.
In the final chapter I defend this as a possible answer to those who think Kant must lower
his moral standards in the face of extreme circumstances. However, before concluding
our discussion of the highest good as a moral world, something should be said about its
relationship to Kant‟s discussion of a related notion of the highest good that is present in
Kant‟s thought, namely as happiness proportioned to morality, possible only in the
afterlife. This discussion is necessary because of two possible problems presented by
what Andrews Reath calls the „theological conception‟ of the highest good20: first, many
critics have dismissed Kant‟s notion of the highest good because of problems with this
theological notion, and second, unlike the idea of a moral world, the idea of a duty to
apportion individual happiness to individual virtue in this world is not in keeping with
Kant‟s understanding of our moral obligations, so we should be careful not to see the
connection between the moral law and the highest good as being tied primarily to this
theological conception.21
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Dusing attributes much of the confusion over the various roles the concept of the highest good plays in
Kant‟s thinking to a failure to appreciate the fact that the questions with which Kant is dealing, regarding
the highest good, change throughout his work. While this seems obvious, many commentators have tried to
find a unified view of the highest good and Dusing correctly suggests that this is misguided. Dusing points
out that the discussion of the highest good as personal happiness proportioned to personal virtue can be
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Problems with the Proportionality of Happiness and Virtue
As discussed above, Kant often associates happiness conditioned by morality with
the moral world, which he also calls the highest good in the world. However this
association of happiness and morality is given various articulations by Kant in his
writings, and, while I have so far only focused on descriptions of the highest good that
emphasize the role of the highest good as the social ideal of a moral world, many of
Kant‟s other expressions of his notion of the highest good are more ambiguous and seem
to suggest that Kant employed more than one notion of the highest good, or at least that
the highest good serves multiple roles within his thinking. One particularly interesting
passage occurs in the Dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason. There Kant writes
that “virtue and happiness together constitute possession of the highest good in a person,
and happiness distributed in exact proportion to morality (as the worth of a person and his
worthiness to be happy) constitutes the highest good of a possible world…” (CPR 111).22
The passage thus seems to suggest two related notions of the highest good, or that Kant is
placing it simultaneously in two different roles.23 On the one hand, we see Kant refer to

traced to the fact that Kant is taking up a question that ancient philosophers had discussed: whether
happiness was the condition for virtue or vice versa. He discusses this issue at length in part one of his
article, “Das Problem des Höchsten Gutes in Kants Praktischer Philosophie.” But, Dusing goes on to
suggest that Kant comes to see the highest good much more in terms of a moral world. For example, he
points out that “Kant bestimmt in der Aufnahme der christlichen Tradition das höchste Gut als intelligible
Welt, als Reich Gottes oder als „moralische Welt‟. Im Unterschied zu den Idealen der Alten, in denen die
Vollendung das einzelnen Menschen vorgestellt wird, ist damit das höchste Gut ein ethischer Weltbegriff.
Es wird als ein Ganzes vernünftiger Wesen gedacht, in dem Sittlichkeit und Glückseligkeit harmonisch
zusammenstimmen” (Dusing 17). What Dusing does not make clear here is whether the moral world is one
possible in the world of sense.
22

This passage lends support to the view that Kant did not abandon one conception of the highest good for
another at some point within his writing, but rather that he saw these roles or conceptions of the highest
good as existing at the same time.
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“the highest good of a possible world.” This reminds us of other passages in which the
highest good is conceived of solely in these terms24. Yet, in the very same passage, we
see mention made of the “highest good in a person” and we also see the addition of the
requirement of “proportionality” between happiness and virtue, which is largely absent
from many of Kant‟s other passages about the highest good in the world.
It seems clear that Kant does in fact see the highest good as happiness
proportioned to morality within a person as something that is possible only in the after
life. This is made clear when Kant postulates the immortality of the soul as a necessary
condition for the possible attainment of such a highest good. He does so because he
notes that “the complete conformity of dispositions with the moral law is the supreme
condition of the highest good” (CPR 122). But of course such a complete conformity
with virtue seems like it cannot be expected (though this does not mean it is impossible)
within one individual‟s lifetime, so we require the possibility of “an endless progress
toward that complete conformity…” (CPR 122), and thus “the highest good is practically
possible only on the presupposition of the immortality of the soul….” (CPR122). It is
interesting to note here that this „endless progress‟ only requires the postulate of the
immortality of the soul if it pertains to the highest good within an individual. As we have
already seen, such progress can take place through history if the progress is toward the

23
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Victoria Wike makes this point on p. 128 of Kant on Happiness in Ethics.

For example, as we saw earlier, in the Third Critique Kant describes the highest good in the world as
“happiness – under the objective condition of the concordance of humans with the law of morality, as the
worthiness to be happy” (CJ 450). Additionally, in the First Critique Kant describes the highest good as a
world in which “freedom, partly inspired by and partly restricted by moral laws, would itself be the cause
of general happiness, since rational beings, under the guidance of such principles, would themselves be the
authors both of their own enduring well-being and of that of others” (A 810/B 838).
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social goal of the highest good as a moral world. It seems reasonable then to assume that,
to the extent that Kant is dealing with different notions of the highest good, it is the
difference between the highest good within a person and the highest good within the
world that is being worked out.25 This seems true despite the fact that Kant also seems to
largely associate the „theological‟ conception of the highest good with proportionality,
while he uses this phrasing less often to describe the highest good as a moral world.
It is tempting to suggest that the addition of the requirement of proportionality is
what distinguishes the two notions of the highest good, and this at first seems likely. For
example, Reath makes the point that the union of happiness and morality or general
happiness and general virtue is not the same as proportioning happiness and virtue, since
the latter implies a necessary connection, or causal relationship, between the two and the
former does not (Reath 604-5). This point seems to be born out by the fact that Kant‟s
only extended discussion of any causal relationship between happiness and virtue takes
place within the Dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason and it is there that he is
discussing the question of proportionality. However, this issue is not without
controversy. The passage that makes such a view troublesome occurs when Kant alludes,
in the First Critique, to “the moral world…in which happiness as bound up with and
proportioned to morality….” (A 109/ B 837). Here Kant makes explicit reference to a
moral world, yet refers to proportionality. This leaves open the possibility that Kant sees
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I would suggest this is true even though Kant‟s language seems less clear. For example, in the passage in
which Kant argues for the postulate of the immortality of the soul he uses the phrase “the highest good in
the world” (CPR 122). However, it is clear from the rest of the passage that he is clearly referring to the
highest good within an individual. It is not clear from Kant‟s own writing whether he saw a clear divide
between the issue of the highest good within a person and the highest good in the world.
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proportionality of happiness to virtue as a possibility even within the world of sense.26
Since the question is open, I would suggest that we are better off thinking of the
difference between the two notions in terms of the fact that the „theological notion‟ is one
in which happiness is proportioned to virtue within the individual person.
This distinction is important because, even if we grant that Kant thought of the
relationship between happiness and virtue in a moral world as one that involved
proportionality, we would not be committed to the view that this means the moral world
is one in which each person was happy to the degree that they were virtuous. As we will
see in a moment, this is an important point because, as Kleingeld points out, “Kant‟s
teleological account of history may indicate how a moral world may be approached, but it
does not account for a possible proportional allotment of happiness according to
individual worthiness to be happy” (Kelingeld 105). So, if Kant was espousing a moral
world that is possible in the world of sense, he either could not have intended that it
contain the requirement of proportioning individual happiness to individual morality or, if
he did intend this, he failed to establish the possibility of such a world.
We seem then to have two views of, or roles for, the highest good: one is social
and is conceived of as possible in the world of sense, and one is personal and is
conceived of primarily as possible only in the afterlife. At a minimum then, this helps us
to see that in fact Kant accepted the view of the highest good as a moral world in addition
to one of individual happiness in proportion with individual morality, and the earlier part
26

Reath considers this point in “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant” but doesn‟t pursue it. He
notes: “Proportionality could be the basis of a secular ideal, and Kant may occasionally adopt such a view.
To simplify, I will ignore this possibility and will treat proportionality as the description associated with the
theological interpretation” (Reath 603).
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of the chapter set out to make this case. But more than this, it is important to see that the
conception of the highest good as a moral world is not necessarily subject to some of the
problems associated with the highest good as happiness proportional to morality within
the individual. Andrews Reath puts the point this way: “The critics have thought that by
pointing to …[the] flaws [in the conception of the highest good as happiness
proportionate to virtue], one could dismiss the entire doctrine” (Reath 594). I have tried
to argue that it is important that the highest good not be dismissed as an important part of
Kant‟s ethical thought, primarily because understanding a connection between the highest
good understood as moral world and the moral law helps us to see that our adherence to
the moral law can be seen by us as helping contribute to progress towards a more moral
world. My goal here is then not to defend the highest good as happiness proportioned to
virtue from criticism, but rather to make it clear that any criticisms of such a notion of the
highest good need not undermine the highest good understood in the sense I have been
discussing it, as a moral world. I would in fact suggest, in keeping with critics such as
Thomas Auxter and in opposition to John Silber, that the highest good conceived of
happiness in proportion to virtue should not be seen as a guide for our conduct.
The title of Thomas Auxter‟s article “The Unimportance of Kant‟s Highest Good”
suggests a far more thorough rejection of the notion of the highest good than he actually
offers. Auxter‟s argument is in fact only that the notion of the highest good as happiness
proportioned to virtue ought to be rejected as a guide for our moral conduct. Auxter in
fact acknowledges the existence of two notions of the highest good within Kant,
differentiating the moral world, which he refers to as the highest good as ectypal world,
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from the highest good as happiness in proportion to virtue, which he refers to as an
“otherworldly condition for which a virtuous person might hope” (Auxter 127).27 Auxter
notes that there is a “prima facie case for identifying the ectypal world (the ideal world of
sense) with the highest good of the „Dialectic‟ and thus for holding that this highest good
is suitable as a standard for guiding conduct” (Auxter 125), but he goes on to reject this
notion. The basis for his rejection is quite clear. Any duty to bring about the highest
good must assume that it can indeed be brought about by human agency in this world of
sense, and thus a description of the highest good “cannot refer to powers human beings
would have if they were not subject to the constraints imposed by living in an empirically
conditioned world….It might be that one who had divine powers could create a world in
which happiness is proportionate to virtue. But this is not a choice open to human
beings” (Auxter 125).28 Auxter is clearly correct here. In order to bring about the moral
world, we need only try to promote conditions such that agents can maximally realize
their autonomy and their freely chosen ends. Such a world requires virtue from us and
gives us reason to believe general happiness will result. Even here, we need to assume
the existence of a moral author to help guarantee the actual production of happiness,
nature must be „hospitable‟ to moral action, though far more is asked in any attempt to
proportion happiness to virtue within the individual. For one, we cannot know any
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Auxter leaves open the possibility that the highest good as ectypal world is in fact a valid practical
concept and even links it to the categorical imperative, saying “When we universalize our maxims, we are
testing them to see whether they are fit to become part of the content of this model [of the ectypal world]”
(Auxter 126).
28

Lewis White Beck makes this same point in his Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason
when he writes that the task of apportioning happiness to virtue is the task of “a moral governor of the
universe” (Beck 245).
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agent‟s worthiness to be happy (virtue), and so any duty to proportion happiness based on
this worthiness is beyond the possibility of human agents.
The issue of the inability to proportion happiness to virtue leads to a practical
reason for thinking that the highest good as happiness proportional to virtue is not to be
taken as a practical principle in the way that the highest good as moral world is. We can
see this when we note exactly what it is that Auxter and Beck are responding to when
they take issue with the highest good, as happiness in proportion to virtue. Both authors‟
treatments of the highest good come in large response to a series of articles by John
Silber on the highest good. In “The Importance of the Highest Good in Kant‟s Ethics,”
for example, Silber makes brief mention of the fact that we do, in many situations attempt
to promote happiness in proportion to virtue. He notes, “in rearing children, serving on
juries, and grading papers one tries to do and actually can do something „about
apportioning happiness in accordance with desert‟” (Importance 183). Silber‟s approach
seems promising at first, and it seems that indeed his approach can be used in other
examples as well. It seems that we can conceive of a way of conducting business that
rewards employees for ethical conduct rather than, or in addition to, rewarding them for
their ability to maximize profits. We can also imagine a political structure that rewards
ethical behavior in the private sector. To an extent, we could even see the fact that
charitable contributions result in tax deductions as a step in this direction. In
international politics too, we often see governments and international bodies such as the
UN imposing sanctions on governments that violate human rights. However, when we
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examine this issue further, we see that it raises several concerns about the concept of
merit.
Whenever we try to use the appearance of merit for the condition for allocating a
reward we run several risks. First, we run the risk of creating the reward as the incentive
for action. However, there is nothing in any of the above examples that necessarily
implies that the moral conduct that is being rewarded was undertaken for the sake of the
reward. People give to charities for any number of reasons, and all of these possible
motives are hidden from the outside observer. It is clearly possible that people who give
to charities act on the maxim of beneficence and not from any desire for a reward. Yet,
this leads to a second problem, that of presuming that we have insight into an individual‟s
actual motivation for action. If we were responsible for apportioning individual
happiness to individual virtue, the duty would be to reward virtuous dispositions, not just
actions that seem to indicate the presence of such virtue.29
It is clear that we cannot possibly have a duty to apportion happiness to virtue in a
given agent if we can never have a sense of the agent‟s actual worthiness to be happy.
Such a duty would push us back in the mire of having a duty to do the impossible. It
would be impossible to apportion happiness to virtue because it is impossible to ever
truly assess virtue. But, even if we could assess virtue, allocating happiness on this basis
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Stephen Engstrom makes note of this problem in his article, “The Concept of the Highest Good in
Kant‟s Moral Theory”, especially in section III. His solution is one I have already alluded to: we
„apportion‟ happiness to virtue by promoting each of these independently of an agent‟s actual worthiness to
be happy at any given time. Engstrom‟s argument is that we cannot know their overall worthiness to be
happy, since we cannot know their motives or their futures (and often even their past). Yet, since virtue is
the necessary end of a rational being, I can still „proportion‟ happiness to virtue by acting so as to promote
an agent‟s happiness, since they are already responsible for promoting their own virtue.
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seems to lead to absurd conclusions. Consider, for example, any occasion when we
decided to contribute to a person‟s misery simply because we thought them to be lacking
in virtue. This seems clearly contrary to the spirit of Kant‟s ethics. Equally contrary to
the spirit of Kant‟s thinking is the idea of trying to make someone happy simply because
we think they seem like a moral person. Doing so would place us in a position of being
motivated by a person‟s worthiness to be happy rather than by duty. These
considerations thus give us good reason to reject the notion of the highest good as
happiness in proportion to virtue within an individual as one that is to serve as a practical
principle guiding our action and providing us with duties.
We thus have two reasons to reject the notion of individual happiness
proportioned to individual virtue as a practical principle we use to govern our actions and
understand our duties. In the first place such a view would undercut any duty to bring
about the highest good, since a highest good conceived in this way would be beyond
human powers, not just of any individual person, but of the species as a whole.30 Second,
there are problematic practical implications regarding what would follow from any
alleged duty to promote individual happiness proportionate to individual morality. Most
troubling is the fact that such a duty seems to undercut the purity of the moral law by
making our moral motivation bound up with another person‟s moral merit rather than
being based on a respect for the unconditional commands of the moral law. However, the
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Although Silber, in “Kant‟s Conception of the Highest Good as Immanent and Transcendent,” suggests
that we can have the duty to promote the highest good while using the ideal of the actual attainment of the
highest good as a regulative idea that helps promote continual striving, this argument does not seem to
work if the attainment of the highest good is not ever possible within the world of sense.
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highest good conceived of as a moral world, in which freedom allows for people to set
and realize ends, does not suffer from these same problems.
Conclusion
I have attempted to show that the promotion of a moral world holds an important
place in Kant‟s ethical thought and further. I have tried to show both that Kant was
deeply concerned throughout his writings about the idea of progress towards this moral
world and that such a world can indeed be conceived of as possible in a world of sense.
But most importantly, I have tried to point out the fact that, to the extent that human
agency helps create this moral world, it is through adherence to the moral law that we do
so.
There are two dangers that we must avoid in thinking about the role of the moral
world in Kant‟s thought. The first is that we dismiss it as a minor or irrelevant aspect of
Kant‟s thought. The second is that we over emphasize its importance to the degree that
we come to see the promotion of a moral world as an end to be achieved but we lose sight
of Kant‟s guidance as to how it is to be brought about. Those who emphasize the
Groundwork and the categorical imperative as the keystones of Kant‟s ethics run the risk
of falling into the first trap, and this chapter and the preceding chapter are both aimed at
preventing this. On the other side of things, however are those who see in Kant‟s
descriptions of a moral world an ideal state of affairs that ought to be brought about, but
who would suggest that we cannot bring such a world about while holding ourselves
bound to the strict commands that seem to be generated by the categorical imperative. It
is to this latter set of thinkers that we will turn our attentions in the final chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE PLAUSIBILITY OF KANT’S APPROACH
This dissertation ends where it began, by looking at Christine Korsgaard‟s
treatment of Kant‟s views regarding whether or not it is permissible to lie to a murderer at
the door. In chapter one of this dissertation I examined Korsgaard‟s claim that, while the
categorical imperative forbids lying to the murderer at the door under the Formula of
Humanity, the lie could be justified under the Formula of Universal Law. I argued there
that this was not the case, arguing Kant‟s understanding of what is entailed in willing or
thinking a maxim that would contradict itself when applied universally was not as
Korsgaard depicted it to be, and thus that the various formulations of the categorical
imperative yield the same results in cases such as the murderer at the door. But there is a
second part of Korsgaard‟s thinking about the case of the murderer at the door, and in
general what she refers to as dealing with evil, that motivates the current chapter.
Korsgaard‟s argument is really motivated by the view that we ought to separate the
formulations of the categorical imperative since the standard of the Formula of Humanity
and the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends are unrealistically stringent when it comes to
dealing with evil. She writes that:
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The Formula of Humanity and the Kingdom of Ends will provide the ideal which
governs our daily conduct. When dealing with evil circumstances, we can depart
from this ideal. In such cases we can see that the Formula of Humanity is
inapplicable because it is not designed for use when dealing with evil. But it can
still guide our conduct. It defines the goal toward which we are working, and if
we can generate priority rules we will know which features of it are most
important. (Korsgaard 151)
Korsgaard thus represents a sort of „middle ground‟ between Kant‟s ethics and nonKantian approaches to ethics, such as that taken by utilitarianism or feminist ethics.
While these other approaches might reject Kant‟s own line of thinking from the outset,
Korsgaard represents the view that we ought normally make use of Kant‟s approach to
morality, but that we need to make room within that approach for dealing with situations
wherein adherence to the moral law seems like it asks too much of us.
Thus there are two main goals of this chapter: first, I wish to offer some possible
lines of defense against the general charge that his rigorism is implausible, especially
when it comes to situations in which we feel a tension between a desire to prevent tragic
outcomes and an adherence to the moral law. I will explore two different types of
criticism of Kant‟s approach here. The first is concerned with what we can call cases of
„special circumstance,‟ where the basic claim is that Kant‟s rigorism simply cannot deal
appropriately with a certain kind of scenario; in this type of scenario we can see Kant‟s
approach to morality as facing a challenge from consequentialism. The second type of
challenge to Kant deals with the view that it is the specialness of individual relationships
that causes a conflict with Kantian morality. Here the challenge to Kant can be seen as
coming from a feminist perspective on ethics. Then, after dealing with these challenges
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to Kant‟s approach to morality, I turn my attention to Korsgaard‟s specific approach. I
wish to argue that her approach, which employs a „double-level theory‟, amounts to an
adherence to a Kantian morality except when the „going gets tough‟ and is untenable.
It may be helpful then to begin by contrasting Kant‟s approach with a few other
approaches, focusing simply on the issue of what we are to do when our desire to prevent
a tragic outcome comes up against a desire to adhere to rules, laws or principles. My
goal here is not to offer a general critique of non Kantian approaches to morality, nor is it
to engage in a full debate with those who would reject a Kantian approach out of hand.
My aim here is more modest in that I simply wish to challenge Korsgaard‟s specific
reasons for uneasiness with Kant‟s approach. Korsgaard notes that the “trouble is that in
cases such as that of the murderer at the door it seems grotesque simply to say that I have
done my part by telling the truth and the bad results are not my responsibility”
(Korsgaard 150). I would argue that the characterization of such an attitude as
“grotesque” dismisses it prematurely and presumes that Kant‟s reasoning is simply
indefensible. I therefore wish to begin the discussion by offering some considerations
that might prevent us from dismissing his approach, even in situations such as the
murderer at the door, too easily.
It will be helpful then to begin by examining a few scenarios in which the
tensions between a desire to prevent a tragic outcome and the desire to adhere to the
moral law (or laws or rules more generally) is pronounced. I would like to offer three
such scenarios, each intended to bring out a different issue that might help us better
appreciate the plausibility of a Kantian approach. The first issue I will examine is the
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question of whether we should torture to prevent a „ticking bomb‟ from going off. Next,
I examine the fictional case of Melville‟s Billy Budd, where we see a scenario in which
adherence to the rules seems to lead to a particularly tragic event. Finally, I consider the
question of whether physicians should lie on an insurance form to help ensure that a
patient receives coverage and thus treatment. While all of these cases pit a respect for
lawfulness against a concern for consequences, each is intended to bring out a different
sort of concern about Kant‟s approach to ethics, and thus each case will offer us a slightly
different line of defense against the critics of Kant, who take the view that such a moral
rigorism simply cannot be defended.
Torture and the Contingency of Empirical Conditions vs. the Certainty of the Moral Law
In his article “Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb,” David Luban walks
through the five general reasons people or societies have engaged in torture: torture as the
indulgence of a victor over a defeated enemy, torture performed in order to terrorize a
people into submission, torture used as a form of criminal punishment, torture as a means
of extracting confessions, and, finally, torture used as a method of intelligence gathering1.
He goes on to note that a society with respect for rights inevitably finds torture abhorrent
especially because of the way it degrades and terrorizes the individual. Yet Luban notes
with alarm that our culture, living in a post 9/11 world, is far more at ease with torture for
the purposes of intelligence gathering than it is with the other possible motives for
torture.

1

See Luban, pages 1432 and following.
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Luban notes that the reason torture for intelligence gathering purposes has not
been met with the same kind of disdain as have the other motives for torture is because
the torture is used “to prevent a catastrophe…[and] that those who inflict torture are
motivated solely by the looming catastrophe, with no tincture of cruelty; that torture in
such circumstances is little more than self defense…” (Luban 1439). He goes on to point
out that the debate over torture as a part of the „war on terror‟ has focused almost solely
on the scenario of the „ticking bomb,‟ which he describes the following way:
Suppose the bomb is planted somewhere in the crowded heart of an American
city, and you have custody of the man who planted it. He won‟t talk. Surely…we
shouldn‟t be too squeamish to torture the information out of him and save
hundreds of lives. Consequences count, and abstract moral principles must yield
to the calculus of consequences.2 (Luban 1440)
We can see at once that we have here an example of a modern version of the murderer at
the door. Arguments in favor of using torture for intelligence gathering trade on the idea
that unbending allegiance to moral principles is indefensible when such an allegiance
may prevent us from saving hundreds, maybe even thousands of lives. However, the
question we must ask, following Luban, is whether this is an accurate portrayal of the
case at hand. Luban does well to portray the argument for torture for what it is: an
argument based on the belief that consequences of actions are within our control, when
the reality is that this is clearly not true. This is perhaps the first principal line of defense
we can offer for Kant against those who criticize his rigorism in favor of a concern for
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To prevent misunderstanding of Luban‟s argument, I should point out that he is not endorsing this view.
The passage is intended to simply portray the basic argument that those who favor torture in such
circumstances employ.
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bringing about or avoiding certain consequences: these consequences are far less within
our control than we might imagine.
Luban notes that the ticking bomb scenario is in fact highly unrealistic (Luban
1442), and a little reflection suffices to show that his assessment is obviously correct. It
would be extremely rare that we could be sure the following conditions were met before
engaging in torture: 1.The person we have in custody in fact has the information we need.
2. The person will give us the information we need if we torture him. 3. The person will
not give us the information under any other circumstances. 4. The information could
generally not be gathered by other means (such as following other leads). 5. The
information will be obtained in time to save the lives we intend to save. In fact, the point
should be put even more strongly: we cannot know the above five things for sure. As
Luban points out, this is true even if torture in hindsight proves to have helped in
preventing an attack3. Luban thus arrives at the inevitable conclusion that “in a world of
uncertainty and imperfect knowledge, the ticking-bomb scenario should not form the
point of reference” (Luban 1444). In cases such as the ticking-bomb scenario we act as if
we are able to have knowledge we simply cannot have, and we act as if we have powers
we simply do not. For, even if we could meet all the above conditions before deciding to
engage in an act so contrary to the moral law as torture is, there is still the chance that we
would get the bomb not a minute before it goes off, but a minute after. This recognition
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Luban recounts a story in which Philippine police torture a Pakistani bomb maker in order to thwart an
attempt to bomb airliners and to assassinate the Pope. The plot was indeed uncovered in time, and the
information gathered from the torture was important in uncovering the plot, but, as Luban points out, the
case is misleading because the torture uncovered the plot; the plot was not known at the time of the
decision to torture. (Luban 1441-1442)
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of the limits of the control we have over consequences is one of the important dimensions
of Kant‟s approach to such problems.
In the introduction to this dissertation I mentioned the case of a police officer who
engaged in torture to save a young girl trapped in an abandoned car. The case seems at
first to be a powerful one in arguing for the claim that the ends justify the means, and as
such it has a rhetorical force similar to the ticking bomb scenario. However, the problem
in the case is similar to the issues Luban points out in the ticking bomb scenario. There
are factors beyond our control, and it is absurd to argue that the morality of our actions
depends on these factors. So, one must be able to show that the torture in either case is
justified or unjustified, regardless of whether or not the bomb goes off or whether or not
the girl is saved. Those who argue in favor of torture in extreme situations always
presuppose that the torture in fact results in „saving the day‟. But what if it did not?
Would it still be justified? If the answer is „no,‟ then the plausibility of the argument to
torture collapses, because then the morality of an agent‟s actions, the decision to torture,
rests on factors such as how much air is in a car or whether traffic is such that I can get to
a bomb in time, which are both conditions about which the torturer has no control and for
which he or she deserves no moral praise or blame. If, on the other hand, the answer is
„yes,‟ then those who would argue in favor of torture are placed again in a precarious
position, of having to argue that clear violations of morality would be justified in the
mere attempt to prevent serious harms from occurring. Given this, it seems more
plausible to argue that, rather than torture being justified regardless of results, it is
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unjustified regardless of results. And part of what helps us to see the power of this claim
is the acknowledgement of just how out of our control results truly are.
The above consideration of the issue of torture is intended to bring out the
important practical ethical concerns that emerge when we realize that consequences and
other empirical concerns are largely out of our control. I take it as well established that
Kant has metaphysical grounds for rejecting a morality based on empirical conditions; he
tries to ground his notion of duty in reason and lawfulness because only then can duty
really carry with it a notion of obligation and thus necessity. But, it is important to see
that Kant seems to be also aware that there are practical problems with a morality based
on a calculation of consequences. We can see such an awareness of this issue, for
example, in the Supposed Right to Lie.
In the Supposed Right to Lie, Kant, in addition to his other arguments against
lying to the murderer at the door, also addresses the concern for the possible results that
would follow from truthfulness. There he notes: “It is still possible that, after you have
honestly answered „yes‟ to the murderer‟s question as to whether his enemy is at home,
the latter has nevertheless gone out unnoticed, so that he would not meet the murderer
and the deed would not be done…” (Supposed Right 427).4 Kant is here pointing to the
fact that in reality, all we can control is our own choices, and we portray the picture
falsely when we depict it as one in which we choose between a moral principle and a
certain tragic outcome we wish to avoid.
4

It should be noted that Kant goes on to argue that the person who told the lie would be liable in a court of
law for the consequences of the act. I omit the end of the passage here simply because my purpose is not to
give an account of Kant‟s discussion of „juridical right‟ in such cases, but only to illustrate his awareness of
the fact that, whether we tell the truth or not, there are other variables that are beyond our control.
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Kant is able to show us that we put the equation backwards when we try to derive
what is right from a concern for consequences. Consequences are beyond our control and
cannot offer us a stable guide to what is right. The moral law, by contrast, gives us a
consistent guide to deciding whether or not an action is morally acceptable. But, equally
important is the idea that acting from the moral motive, or the good will, helps us to
ensure that the morally correct actions are indeed performed. Ironically then, it is not
concern for consequences that helps us determine what is right, but rather it is the
motivation of acting out of respect for what is right that helps bring about moral actions.
We can see this idea in Kant‟s discussions of the instability of inclinations, as contrasted
with the stability of acting from duty. Two such passages occur in the Groundwork
during Kant‟s discussion of the examples of duties stemming from the Formula of
Universal Law of the categorical imperative.
Kant, in speaking about the duty to preserve our life, notes that people will, for
the most part preserve their lives regardless of any duty to do so. He writes:
[T]o preserve one‟s life is a duty, and besides which everyone has an immediate
inclination to do so….They look after their lives in conformity with duty and not
from duty. On the other hand, if adversity and hopeless grief have quite taken
away the thirst for life, if an unfortunate man, strong of soul and more indignant
about his fate than despondent or dejected, wishes for death and yet preserves his
life without loving it, not from inclination or fear but from duty, then his maxim
has moral content. (Gr 398)
What is of interest to me here is not the point Kant is trying to make, that actions must be
done from duty to have moral worth, but rather the practical benefit of having acted from
duty. If we act based on inclinations, then we are at risk of taking our own lives
whenever we feel that life has gotten the better of us. However, if we act on the basis of
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our duty, we will preserve our lives in the face of this difficulty. So, our respect for duty
provides us with a guide that is more stable than the whims of our inclinations. This
point is more important when we see how it affects the way that we treat one another, in
the duty of beneficence.
To help further make his point about the difference between acting from duty and
merely acting according to duty, Kant then makes use of an example of a philanthropist
who no longer feels any desire to be beneficent. He writes:
Suppose then, that the mind of this philanthropist were overclouded by his own
grief, which extinguished all sympathy with the fate of others…; and suppose
now, when no longer incited to it by any inclination, [he] nevertheless tears
himself out of this deadly insensibility and does the action without any
inclination, simply from duty; then the action first has its genuine moral worth.
(Gr 398)
Here again, Kant is not himself arguing that the good will is important because it helps
guarantee that we act morally. His point is simply to show us the difference between
actions that reflect the good will and are thus done from duty and those that are done
merely according to duty. Nonetheless, implicit in his example is the recognition that the
instability of our inclinations tempts us away from our duties, and the moral disposition is
the best way to guarantee moral behavior.

Kant then passes on to a consideration of a

case in which “nature had put little sympathy in the heart of this or that man…; he is by
temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others” (Gr 399). Here again, the
fact that such a man nevertheless acts in a beneficent way, simply out of respect for the
law is presented by Kant simply as a way to demonstrate the esteem with which we
should hold such a motive. Yet again, the example invites us to ask a question: If not for
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the motive of acting from duty, what would become of a person who is “by temperament
cold and indifferent to the suffering of others”? The answer is clear. Without a stable
motive for doing one‟s duty, we run the risk that the duty itself will not be performed.
So, while Kant is not here talking about how it is that we decide what our duty in fact is,
he does give us reason to conclude that one benefit of his approach is that, assuming we
know what our duty is, the moral disposition provides a constant reason for performing it.
This awareness of the practical consequences of a lack of a stable source of moral
motivation appears elsewhere in the Groundwork as well. One could read the example of
the shopkeeper who does not cheat his or her customers in a similar fashion. If the
shopkeeper does not cheat his or her customers because of a natural feeling of affection
for them, they are treated as they should be. If, however, the shopkeeper is robbed by
one of the customers and consequently develops an antipathy toward the customers as a
group, the motive for refraining from cheating them has been taken away. If, on the other
hand, the shopkeeper is motivated by the good will, then the reason to refrain from
cheating the customers cannot be taken away5. Still further support of the claim that Kant
is aware of the issue of the relationship between moral motivation and moral action
comes when we consider yet another passage, in which Kant contrasts his approach with
a “mixed doctrine of morals” (Gr 411). There he says that such a „mixed doctrine‟ which
is “put together from incentives of feeling and inclination and also of rational concepts,
5

I would contend that the often used example of two people who go to visit a friend in the hospital, one
from inclination and one from duty, is more favorable to Kant if we are to emphasize the fact that Kant
takes the view that our sentiments are not in our control. If we notice this view in Kant, then we cannot
praise or blame the people in the room for their natural sentiments, but simply admire the one who has the
natural inclinations toward generosity, and this would be in keeping with passages such as the one in which
Kant refers to a natural feeling of sympathy as one that “deserves praise and encouragement but not
esteem” (Gr 398).
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must make the mind waver between motives that cannot be brought under any principle,
that can lead only contingently to good and can very often lead to what is evil” (Gr 411).
The issue of whether or not Kant himself was explicitly concerned with the
practical importance of the stability of the guidance of the good will is not my concern
here, (though I have tried to offer several passages that would lend plausibility to the
view that he was aware of this issue). What I wish to suggest is simply that the concern
argues in favor of a Kantian approach to moral decision making; the moral law, and
respect for the law as seen in acting from duty or according to a good will has the
practical advantage of providing us with a stable motive for action that is not present if
we rely on features such as sentiment. Further, all of Kant‟s metaphysical objections to
relying on consequences and other contingent concerns as a ground of our moral
obligations could also provide us with practical reasons for rejecting such a ground of
morality as well.
There is an additional difficulty with attempts to use the consequences of actions
as the means of determining the rightness of those actions. Often, we are unable to see
the relationship between any given action (and even any given rule or policy whose
purpose is to try to bring about a greater balance of positive outcomes) and the effect this
action will have on the future. Consider an example from history. We support Iraq in
opposition to Iran, and years later we are confronted with Saddam Hussein. Then, in
toppling the regime in Iraq we once again see a rise in the power of Iran. So, even if we
remove one danger, we may create another, and there is simply no way to know whether
this will happen or not. Of course, utilitarianism would attempt to make calculations
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based on long term effects of our actions, and not just the short term results of our
decisions. However, two points can be made here. The first point is simply an extension
of the general point about the unpredictability of the effects of actions. The further out in
time we attempt to calculate the effects of our actions, the less likely we are to be
accurate in these predictions. We can perform an action in the name of Democracy only
to see that very action decreasing the chances of realizing the sought after goal.
What we must remember is that we are in a position of balancing an unknown -the results of our actions, against a known – whether our actions would be acceptable
when considered from the perspective of the categorical imperative. Consider the
decision to assassinate a world leader for the purpose of overthrowing a government that
is viewed as corrupt, even evil. It seems clear that assassination would be considered
clearly wrong from a Kantian perspective. It no doubt treats the person who is
assassinated as a means to some other end, and we could not will a universal maxim of
assassinating leaders who were viewed by others as being corrupt. Any attempt to justify
the assassination would thus have to rest on a concern for consequences. But, the
calculation of consequences is no more than a gamble, and we are back in the position of
arguing that the ends justify the means, even if the ends are not realized, a view that I
consider to be untenable.
This issue leads to the second problem with our inability to know the long term
consequences of our actions, which stems from the irony inherent in acting in order to
bring about a moral world. I would argue that implicit in Kant is the view that we cannot
make progress towards a moral world by attempting to calculate the actions that are
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mostly likely to contribute to this goal. Quite to the contrary, Kant argues that it is only
by always acting in a way that respects the inherent dignity of rational agents and
maximizes the freedom of these agents that we can make progress toward a more moral
world. Whenever we engage in actions that undermine freedom and dignity for the
purposes of „making the world a better place,‟ we not only have no guarantee that our
actions in fact will make the world a better place, we also knowingly undermine the
constituent features of our goal: the moral world.
This point is only important if we take the goal of moral action to be progress
toward a more moral state of affairs in the world. If our only concern is preventing
tragedies from occurring, then it may be that, from a practical point of view, a
consequentialist approach is just as good as a Kantian one. However, if we instead take
the view that our actions should contribute to a more moral world neither
consequentialism nor a Kantian approach can guarantee such a moral progress. Thus, in
the absence of the ability to guarantee that our actions will result in progress toward a
more moral world, we must find another criterion for what it is that makes our actions
morally correct. Consequentialism cannot, by definition, do this, since its very measure of
success is in terms of the outcomes of our actions, but Kant does offer a separate standard
for the morality of our actions: conformity with the moral law. And, as I have tried to
show, Kant‟s view is that if we act out of respect for the moral law and also work to bring
about conditions under which others may do the same and under which the freedom of all
can be more fully realized, then we can make progress toward a more moral world.
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Herein is the beauty of Kant‟s concerns about the felicity of sentiments and
inclinations. Kant emphasizes the problems that are created if an inclination to perform a
duty is taken away from us. This is different than the concern that our inclinations often
guide us wrongly (though Kant does suggest that this can happen as well). Rather, any
practical concern about inclinations that we can ascribe to Kant is founded on the concern
that these inclinations will fail to guide us in the future. So, the practical benefit of the
good will is that it implies a constant respect for duty, and such a view speaks to the idea
that morality is a project, and not a matter of individual or isolated actions. This same
theme can be seen another way, when we consider temptations we often feel to make
exceptions to moral rules. While exceptions may bring about beneficial short term
results, they impede rather than improve our prospects for moral progress. This issue of
how we are best to ensure progress toward a more moral world becomes clearer when we
consider the issue of making exceptions to existing rules or laws, which may serve as an
analogy to cases in which a person wishes to make an exception to the moral law, such as
the case of Captain Vere in Melville‟s Billy Budd, Sailor.
Billy Budd and the Importance of Lawfulness
Melville‟s Billy Budd, Sailor is sometimes used as a fictional example that
highlights some of the possible problems with a Kantian approach to ethics6. In the story,
the character Billy Budd is the embodiment of virtue, who is put to death for striking and
causing the death of his commanding officer, Master at Arms Claggart, who is as evil as
Billy is good. There are many mitigating circumstances, such as the fact that Budd‟s
6

I am thinking in particular of Michael Brannigan‟s use of the story in his textbook Ethics Across Cultures:
An Introductory Text with Readings. McGraw Hill, 2004.
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outburst was caused in part by Claggart‟s false accusations that Billy was the leader of a
plot to mutiny the ship on which he was impressed. Further, Billy was physically unable
to reply with words due to a stutter that rendered him mute when under great stress.
However, the ship‟s captain, Captain Vere, argues to the collection of officers he has
convened to decide Budd‟s fate that “irrespective of the provocation to the blow, a
martial court must needs in the present case confine its attention to the blow‟s
consequence, which consequence justly is to be deemed not otherwise than the striker‟s
deed” (Melville 107). The penalty is thus proscribed by martial law, and Vere argues to
his officers that they have an absolute duty to follow this law despite the fact that both
Vere and the officers feel that Budd is “innocent before God” (Melville 110). The
depiction is thus one in which allegiance to the law, albeit formal military law and not the
moral law, is given precedence over the pangs of one‟s conscience and the result is that
an innocent is sacrificed before the altar of duty7. The question that inevitably is raised
by such a depiction is whether Vere‟s allegiance to duty, while leading to a tragic result,
was nonetheless justifiable.
I set aside here all considerations about what Vere‟s maxim may have been or
about the difference between the moral law and martial law. Doing so allows us to see
the criticism of Kant that might lay behind any criticism of Vere: adherence to the
dictates of the law blinds us to compassion. However, for now I would like to simply

7

The novel is actually somewhat ambiguous as to Vere‟s actual motivation. While he frequently alludes to
being motivated by his duty, he also argues that they cannot mitigate the penalty in part because the crew,
knowing the proscribed penalty is death, might mutiny at the appearance arbitrariness (Melville 112-113).
For the sake of the argument, however, I will assume his motives were indeed governed by a desire to
adhere to the prescriptions of the law.
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suggest a defense of Vere‟s actions. While the novella follows Billy Budd‟s death with
an account of Captian Vere years later, haunted by his decision and, on his death bed,
muttering “Billy Budd, Billy Budd” (Melville 129), a movie based on the book, Billy
Budd8, ends differently. The very last lines of the movie are the following: “Men are
perishable things, but justice will live as long as the human heart, and the law as long as
the human mind.” These lines suggest a possible reason to be sympathetic to Vere‟s
decision. Making exceptions to the law undercuts the force of the law as such. So, while
tragedies may occur when we refuse to make exceptions to the law, we must weigh these
against the harm we risk doing to the law itself if we make such exceptions.
The example of Billy Budd is imperfect, since it refers to actual law, and not to a
command of the moral law, but Kant clearly employs an analogous line of reasoning
when he discusses our duty of truthfulness in his essay, On a Supposed Right to Lie from
Philanthropy. There he says that “truthfulness is a duty that must be regarded as the
basis of all duties to be grounded on contract, the law of which is made uncertain and
useless if even the least exception to it is admitted” (Supposed Right 427). The force of
law indeed is dependent on the fact that it be followed without exception. In fact, making
such exceptions creates a situation of arbitrariness, and justice itself is undermined.
This is not to say that Kant is basing his reason for rejecting a maxim of lying on
the basis of its consequences. Kant‟s concern in this particular treatise is about the law,

8

Billy Budd. Dir. Peter Ustinov. Perf. Robert Ryan, Peter Ustinov, Terence Stamp. 1962, Warner Brothers.
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as he is discussing the „right‟ to lie in terms of a juridical right9. Kant of course gives
several rationales for rejecting untruthfulness in his work,10 so, it should not surprise us
that Kant does not discuss the moral law in this essay. However, there is nothing
inconsistent in holding that a lie is forbidden because it runs contrary to the dictates of the
categorical imperative and also holding that this same lie would also have the result of
undermining the force of law. It is important to remember that, just because Kant does
not base the morality of actions on a concern for their consequences, this does not mean
that the effects of our actions are irrelevant.
The general point here is clear: when faced with a choice between adhering to the
law and allowing a tragedy to result, or violating the law so as to prevent the tragedy,
there is reason to defend Kant‟s allegiance to the law on the grounds that the alternative
would be harmful as well, though it would be the law rather than an individual that is
harmed. This is not merely a logical point either. When we make exceptions to a law we
create a situation in which the law is not a law at all. This point is perhaps most
famously made in Plato‟s Crito. There Socrates adopts the perspective of the laws and
the state and speaks for them, saying:
9

This fact also seems to make sense of Kant‟s claim that we are accountable for the results of our lie, but
not for the results of having told the truth. This claim makes much more sense in the legal sense than it
would in a broader ethical context.
10

In addition to the example of the lying promise in the Groundwork and the passage quoted above from
the Supposed Right to Lie, Kant also considers lying as a violation of a duty to one‟s self in the Doctrine of
Virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals. There the argument is that by lying “a human being throws away, and
as it were, annihilates his dignity as a human being” (MM429). This is based on Kant‟s claim that lying is
“directly opposed to the natural purposiveness of the speaker‟s capacity to communicate his thoughts, and
thus is a renunciation by the speaker of his personality…” (MM 429). It should be noted that, while this
passage seems to support a reading of the categorical imperative that emphasizes teleology in terms of
purposiveness, as Paton suggests, I would suggest that such a passage is perfectly consistent with the view
of rationality I laid out in chapter two.
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Tell me Socrates, what are you intending to do? Do you not by this action you are
attempting intend to destroy us, the laws, and indeed the whole city, as far as you
are concerned? Or do you think it is possible for a city not to be destroyed if the
verdicts of its courts have no force but are nullified and set at naught by private
individuals?
(Crito 50b)11
The point being made in this passage is that in making a decision that a law should not be
binding in a particular instance, we render the law impotent, as it can no longer be law
but only a general guide for actions. This occurs whether we attempt to escape the force
of law, as Socrates argues an escape from prison would do, or when we simply make an
exception to the law. And the foundation of civil society is, at least in part, in its
lawfulness. Kant himself recognizes this point as well.
Although Kant does not claim that this is the ground for the rejection of maxims
such as a maxim of lying to aid a friend, Kant does recognize the line of reasoning I am
advancing here as an important consideration. Kant says that lying “always harms
another, even if not another individual, nevertheless humanity generally, inasmuch as it
makes the source of right unusable” (Supposed Right 427). Lying, according to Kant,
„makes the source of right unusable‟ because “truthfulness is a duty that must be regarded
as the basis for all duties to be grounded on contract, the law of which is made uncertain
and useless if even the least exception to it is admitted” (Supposed Right 427). Here Kant
makes the point that the practice of verbal commitments rests on the supposition of the

11

Although it is an issue beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is worth clarifying that this is not an
argument that civil disobedience is never justified. Socrates is in the position of wondering, along with
Crito, whether it would be just to escape the punishment for his practice of philosophy, so the issue is not
whether one is justified in breaking the law but whether one is justified in trying to escape punishment for
having broken it. Thinkers such as Thoreau and Martin Luther King Jr. do well to show the difference
between these two aims when they willingly embrace jail sentences as a consequence of having broken the
law.
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truthfulness of those verbal commitments. When we sanction an exception to this
assumption of veracity, we undermine the very practice of promises or contracts.
Thus, the situation is falsely depicted when Korsgaard suggests that, in the
example of lying to the murderer at the door that Kant claims that “I have done my part
by telling the truth and the bad results are not my responsibility” (Korsgaard 150). A
defense of a Kantian allegiance to the law, whether legal, martial, or moral, is not
synonymous to an indifference to the results of following the law. In fact, it is often
because we may come to see a given law or practice as resulting in a tragedy, but
nonetheless we also recognize the importance of respecting the forcefulness of law as
such, that we seek reform.
It seems then that it is often that we are placed in positions in which we feel torn
between allowing a harm to occur to a person with whom we are sympathetic and a desire
to adhere to policies, rules, or laws so that their force is not undermined. And, when we
fall on the side of refusing to make exceptions, it is possible to feel that the preservation
of lawfulness is an unsatisfying consolation when we feel that a person has been harmed.
However, it is important to note something else that occurs when we feel that adherence
to existing policies, rules, or laws results in tragic consequences. When we see such
tragedies occur, we are moved to change the conditions that gave rise to them. It may be
that we wind up revising a policy or law so that it yields results that are less problematic.
So, by staying true to the spirit of lawfulness, we are thus moved to make improvements
that we would perhaps otherwise not have made if we simply made exceptions. In a
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recent conversation, a colleague, Robert Ladenson, of the Illinois Institute of Technology
suggested that such cases can actually be solved another way as well.
As an adjudicator of special education claims for many years, Professor Ladenson
commented on having increasingly felt the tension between following the prescription of
a law and wishing he could set the law‟s commands aside, when he thought they would
yield a result that he believed to be harmful and even unjust. Ladenson commented that
he recognized the fact that one can not place one‟s own judgment above the law for
various reasons, including the practical concern that any judgment contrary to the law
simply would not stand up upon review. But he also felt the full weight, like Vere, of
allowing the law to produce consequences that were harmful and seemed unjust.
Ladenson suggested that the only true avenue left open in such cases is to recuse oneself
from the case, or even retire from a position that constantly put you in a position of
having to make such choices. Then, no longer bound by the law by position, one could
advocate for changes in it.
Of course, we are not always able to remove ourselves from situations when we
feel such a tension between a respect for lawfulness and a concern for avoiding tragic
results. One thing that makes Vere‟s situation compelling is that he cannot relinquish his
command, or delay the trial and sentence of Budd, since they are out at sea, in war time,
with battle looming close by. And, even when we can remove ourselves from situations
in which we feel that a respect for lawfulness would lead to a tragic result one could
argue that we take the „easy way out‟ if we simply decide to leave that decision to
another. There are indeed cases when we cannot help but choose between adherence to
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lawfulness and making an exception to the law to prevent an outcome we deem tragic. It
seems difficult to suggest that we ought to let the tragedy occur if we feel that a simple
compromise of our adherence to lawfulness would be all that was required to avert the
tragedy12. However, this claim does in fact become more plausible when we think in
terms of moral progress. When adherence to the law in fact leads to a tragic result, our
only solace is that it is this very tragedy that pushes us to find ways to remove such
conflicts in the future, while leaving the force of law intact. To see this point more
clearly, we turn next to the issue of health care.
Health Care, Lying for Patients, and Reform
A study done in 1999 reported that many “physicians sanction the use of
deception to secure third-party payers‟ approval of medically indicated care” (Freeman
et. al.). One of the many tragedies of the current health care system is that many
physicians “have experienced pressure from managed care organizations (MCOs) to
reduce utilization and curtail costs” (Freeman et. al.). So, doctors often find themselves
in a position of feeling as if they need to choose between allowing their patients to suffer
and using deception to help make sure their patients receive care. I should make it clear
here that in what follows it may sound as if such deception is clearly wrong, however, for
now, I wish to make the slightly milder claim and simply suggest some of considerations
that would act in favor of a Kantian view, in opposition to such deception. There are two

12

What makes the situation of Billy Budd compelling and different from the situation of torture, is that in
the example of torture, the morally questionable act – engaging in torture – clearly robs one human being
of dignity in the attempt to save others. But it is incorrect to say that the decision as to whether or not to
torture is not the only factor that impacts the chance that the lives of others are indeed saved. The case of
Billy Budd is more difficult because there is no way to say that the tragic outcome was beyond our control.

160
considerations we should keep in mind that might argue in favor of a Kantian approach to
such circumstances. First, it is worth noting that deception may actually make true
reform of a broken system more difficult. Second, the choice between allowing a patient
to suffer and engaging in deception may be a false dichotomy, and other options may be
open to us that would not entail a violation of any duty akin to Kant‟s claim that we have
a duty to be truthful.
When physicians use deception to help their patients receive treatment, the
individual patient is benefited.13 However, such actions create the false impression that
the system works as it is and is not in need of reform. If, on the other hand, medical
professionals did not engage in such deception and patients suffered as a result, this
suffering would provide a significant motivation for reform. Now, I do not want to go so
far as to suggest that physicians and other medical professionals should have health care
reform as a higher priority than care for their individual patients. I am simply offering
the view that it is this systematic reform that reflects true moral progress and that an „ad
hoc‟ approach to injustices may prevent individual harms from occurring, but they offer
less hope of true moral progress. The choice between these two alternatives is admittedly
a difficult one, and again, I want to stress that I am simply trying to suggest some
plausible defenses for a Kantian kind of rigorism in the face of tragedies. However, it
may be that such difficult choices are some times more apparent than real.
13

However the benefit may be one in need of some qualification. As Werner et. al. point out, such
deception can lead to problematic unintended consequences. For example, they point out that when
“physicians fabricate medical information for insurers, the information becomes part of their patient‟s
medical records. Not only can this mistakenly impact the decisions future physicians make about patients;
it can directly impact patients if they are unaware of the misrepresentation and believe that the chart lore is
the truth about their condition” (Werner et. al., 57)
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Another study that measured physician willingness to use deception of insurance
companies to help procure care for patients added the variable of asking about the option
of appealing the insurance company‟s decision not to provide care for a given patient. 14
In addition to asking physicians to choose between misrepresenting symptoms and
accepting the insurance company‟s decision to deny treatment, the study asked physicians
if they felt that they had enough time to appeal the insurance company‟s decision to deny
treatment. The study found that “it is clear that at times some physicians will choose the
option that is less hassle: deceiving the insurer” (Werner et. al.). So, the physicians were
not always condoning deception in the belief that it was the only way to insure patient
care, but in some cases the physicians opted for deception instead because they felt it was
the more expedient way of procuring payments on behalf of their patients. These
findings suggest that, at least in some cases, the choice is not truly between deception and
allowing a tragedy to occur. There are other options open to us, such as, in the case of
physicians dealing with insurers, filing an appeal of a given decision. Such an option
may allow a person to avoid deception while also using other, less morally objectionable,
methods of helping their patient. This is an important point: often it is tempting to
assume that it is only by violating a dictate of the moral law that we can prevent a tragedy
from occurring. But this assumption is a dangerous one as it can lead us to abandon
moral rules too easily. In fact, I would suggest that there is something to be said for the
view that adherence to the moral law forces us to become creative in finding ways to

14

The study (Werner et. al.) actually measured both the general public‟s willingness to sanction deception
and that of physicians.
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make a more moral world possible. Further, I want to suggest that Kant himself hints at
this point in a few places.
In Chapter Three I made the point that Kant understands nature, guided by a
divine author, to be operating in a way that helps to make a moral world possible.
However, it is important to look more closely at the way he sees nature as working
toward a more moral world. In doing so we will see that Kant in fact claims that it is
crisis and tragedy that is largely responsible for forcing us to ourselves act to build this
moral world. We see this point emerge most clearly in Toward Perpetual Peace,
particularly, and ironically, in the role Kant assigns to the importance of war.
It is interesting to note that the section of Perpetual Peace that Kant entitles “On
the Guarantee of Perpetual Peace” is largely devoted to the subject of war. Referring to
the providence of nature, Kant tells us that one of the chief ways in which nature operates
so as to make perpetual peace possible is that “by war it has driven them [the peoples of
the earth] everywhere…[and]by war has compelled them to enter into more or less lawful
relations” (Perpetual Peace 363). He later goes on to discuss the ways that war and
discord in general help force people into peaceable relations with one another. He says,
for example, that even “if people were not forced by internal discord to submit to the
constraint of public laws, war would still force them from without to do so” (Perpetual
Peace 366). This occurs, according to Kant, because the need to protect oneself from an
outside threat forces people to “form internally into a state in order to be armed as a
power against it” (Perpetual Peace 366). The interesting point here is that nature does
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not itself bring about peace. Instead it brings about conflict and war, and these conditions
force human beings to work to overcome these threats to their own survival.
Kant also extends this argument to make the point that even the basest of human
inclinations, such as the tendency toward war, which he says “seems to be engrafted onto
human nature” (Perpetual Peace 365), help serve the end of making moral progress
possible. He notes, when talking about the possibility of the forming of a republican
constitution, that it is in fact because of the self-seeking inclinations within human beings
that such a constitution becomes possible. He tells us that the founding of such a
constitution is a matter of “arranging those forces of nature in opposition to one another
in such a way that one checks the destructive effect of the other or cancels it, so that the
…human being is constrained to become a good citizen even if not a morally good
human being” (Perpetual Peace 366). According to Kant then, “nature guarantees
perpetual peace through the mechanism of human inclination itself” (Perpetual Peace
368). So, whether an obstacle to moral progress occurs as a result of our own inclinations
or for another reason, we see that these very obstacles provide opportunities for progress
toward a state of „perpetual peace‟.
While this perpetual peace is a political state of affairs and not yet a moral world,
we can see that the two share much in common. We can see above that progress toward
perpetual peace includes assembling into states, obeying the law, and becoming good
citizens. Here we have the essential elements of one piece of the moral world. In the
moral world we are all maximally free agents, existing within a community that not only
does limit but also works to increase our freedom. It is also a world in which all
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members are treated as ends in themselves. Obedience to law and „good citizenship‟
require at least a respect for the freedom of others. While this is not yet a fully moral
world (for which we need to act on moral motives), we can see an argument here as to
how progress toward that world can take place, if only by way of analogy.
The discussion Kant gives in Perpetual Peace can be seen as offering the view
that discord, and by extension obstacles in general, force us to find ways to work together
to alleviate these obstacles. I would suggest that we can extend this line of reasoning to
cases in which we feel like an existing system or rule leads to a tragic result. Rather than
violating the moral law by, for example, engaging in an act of deception as in the case of
the physicians lying to benefit their patients, the very experience of feeling the temptation
to violate the moral law out of a desire to avoid a particular result can force us to find
ways to improve the system. This is not to suggest that violating the moral law can lead
to moral progress. I want to suggest the opposite conclusion here. It is in feeling the
desire to violate the moral law that we are presented with a choice. We may either
violate the law because we feel that adherence to its dictates will allow a tragedy to
occur, or we can force ourselves to ask: How can we avoid a tragic result without
violating the moral law?
One mistake we often make in choosing to engage in behavior we would normally
think of as unethical is that we take the view that there is no other option. But, I would
suggest that it is the very act of positing a violation of the moral law as an option that
inhibits us from seeing or from taking seriously other possible options. For example, we
saw in the case of physicians willing to lie on an insurance form, that such deception was
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often chosen out of regard for expediency not necessity. Similarly, in creating an ad-hoc
„solution‟ to a situation felt to be unjust, we build deception into the system rather than
working for reform. In taking the idea of engaging in deception „off the table‟ we are
thus more likely to experience reform as the only viable path, and thus work toward it.
This is the value of Perpetual Peace for our present discussion: the experience of
apparent obstacles toward moral progress may also provide us with the very means of
making such progress. However, the means to this progress can be impeded, rather than
furthered by, violations of the moral law.
The three above examples, of refraining from torture, of following the law and
executing Billy Budd, and of refraining from lying to help patients receive medical care,
are designed to each offer a „line of defense‟ for an approach such as Kant‟s, where we
follow the law or a moral principle, even though a concern for consequences tempts us
away from doing so. In the case of torture we see the argument that we are far less in
control of consequences than is often depicted, while the moral law gives us a stable
guide to our moral duties. In the case of Billy Budd we see an argument that exceptions
to the law put the law itself in jeopardy. In the case of lying on behalf of patients, we see
the argument that „ad hoc‟ solutions to tragic situations may be less helpful toward the
end of promoting a more moral world than are solutions in which our concern for
preventing tragic outcomes prompts more systematic reform.
The above considerations all apply to cases in which we see what I would call a
specialness of circumstance. In the case of the ticking bomb scenario, the argument is
often made that an injunction against torture simply cannot deal with the situation of a
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ticking bomb. In Billy Budd we see the argument that a given law simply was not
intended to cover a case such as Budd‟s. And, in the example of lying for patients, the
argument might be that the system simply fails when it is applied to certain cases, and so
accommodations should be made, even if the making of such accommodations would
result in action that would otherwise be clearly wrong. The case of the murderer at the
door is also an example of a situation in which we may feel a specialness of
circumstance. Critics of Kant‟s insistence that we may not lie do not base their
objections on a claim that the person hiding in our home is a friend, but on the basis of
the fact that the lie will cause someone presumably innocent to be harmed. So, this type
of situation turns into the question about whether we ought to let concern for
consequences trump adherence to the moral law.15 However, the example of Budd also
points to the other kind of particularity that would cause us to resist following a universal
rule or law. Rather than a specialness of circumstance, we can also see what a claim that
Budd himself is special might entail. Budd is the embodiment of virtue, and further, in
the novel it is clear that Captain Vere takes on a role very close to that of a father to
Budd. So, we have a case where our feelings for an individual or our particular
relationship to him or her cause in us a desire to make an exception to a rule or law on his
or her behalf. This example can be associated with an approach that is often associated
with feminist ethics, or an ethics of care, where a contrast is drawn between impartial
15

There is also another common approach to the murderer at the door example, which is to try to find room
for a lie within Kant, by formulating maxims a certain way, etc. Korsgaard, as I have already discussed at
length, takes this approach, as does John Atwell, in Ends and Principles in Kant. The difference between
Atwell and Korsgaard is that Atwell‟s approach focuses on a particular view of maxim formulation and
Korsgaard‟s approach depends on a particular reading of what it is that causes a contradictory maxim in the
first place.
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rules and an ethic that emphasizes the particularity of relationships.16 It is important for
us then to investigate the nature of this contrast, and to determine exactly when it is that
feminist ethics and Kantian ethics stand in opposition to one another.
The Challenge from Feminist Ethics: Partiality vs. Impartiality
Virginia Held portrays both utilitarianism and Kantian thinking as opposed to the
approach she characterizes as an ethics of care. Generally speaking, Held‟s criticism is of
the view that universal moral principles should always guide our moral decision making.
For example, she writes that when “universal principles endanger relationships, the
feminist challenge disputes that the principles should always have priority” (Held 91).
Held then goes on to suggest that Kant‟s thought causes just such a disregard for
relationships. Referring to his approach, of taking persons as all equally deserving of
respect, she writes that “turning everyone into a liberal individual leaves no one
adequately attentive to relationships between persons…” (Held 95). But, this criticism
seems to me to be unfounded. Just because Kant takes the view that we are to treat all
persons as equally worthy of respect, this does not mean that he is committed to the view
that we must treat people equally in every respect.
In Kant‟s ethics beneficence is a wide duty, and so it is left open how we are to
exercise that duty. We do not have a duty to be equally beneficent to all, but simply a
duty of beneficence in general. Kant makes it clear that, when it comes to the wide duties
“the different situations in which human beings may find themselves” (MM 392) may
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Virginia Held is one author who best epitomizes this view. For example, see Held‟s Ethics of Care:
Personal, Political, and Global, especially pages 91-98.
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have a large influence on the extent to which we exercise our duties and to whom we
direct them. Of course, this is likely not enough to satisfy the nature of a criticism such
as Held‟s, since Held is not suggesting merely that we may treat others differently based
on the quality or character of a particular relationship, but that we ought to do so.
According to Held then, “when a relationship has moral worth, as a caring relationship
between parents and children, or a relation of trust between friends and lovers clearly
have, the question of the priority or not of impartiality can arise” (Held 95). And for
Held, it is partiality that should win out in such instances. This is because Held takes the
view that the recognition of the particular nature of a given relationship is itself morally
significant.
Held advocates for the view that we ought to be motivated by a recognition of the
particular nature of relationships, rather than by a recognition of some quality that all
humans share, such as an inherent worth that is bound up with our rationality. She
writes, for example: “What a parent may value in her child may well not be what makes
this child like every other, but the very particularity of the child and of the relationships
between them, such as that she is the mother of this child and this particular person is her
child” (Held 93). Her critique of an approach like Kant‟s is thus that it places the moral
motive in the wrong place, requiring us to be motivated, for example, by the recognition
that human beings are all ends in themselves. But, it should be clear that the recognition
that human beings are all ends in themselves, and thus all deserving of equal respect,
does not commit Kant to the view that people should thus be treated in identical fashions.
For example, Held depicts a situation in which a father is struggling between spending
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time with his students and with his own child. Her argument is that the father should
recognize that the particularity of his relationship with his child should give him reason to
prioritize it over a responsibility to his students (in terms of amount of time). She then
suggests that Kant would arrive at the opposite conclusion. She writes that “the father
concludes in this example that with respect to the time he spends fulfilling both duties,
his duty to avoid neglecting his students outweighs his duty to avoid neglecting his child”
(Held 98). But what is troubling about Held‟s example is that she offers no reason why
the father makes this decision. She simply asserts that this is the decision he reaches.
But there is nothing in Kant that tells us that this is the decision that a person in such a
situation would or should reach. (While it may be possible to argue that this lack of
definitive guidance as to which choice the father should make is a weakness in Kant‟s
ethics, it is certainly not the weakness Held is attributing to him.)
It is important to see that there are different senses of „treating persons equally‟
that can be easily confused. In one sense, the injunction to treat all persons equally can
be taken to mean that we cannot make an exception on their behalf. In the other sense it
can mean that we are to be completely blind to individual differences when we think
about the exercise of our moral obligations. It seems to me that Held wrongly blurs these
two together. For example, she writes that moral rules, including Kant‟s treatment of the
categorical imperative, “recommend that we treat all persons equally, including our
children …and that when we have special skills we should use them for the benefit of all
persons equally” (Held 99). This view is perfectly compatible with a Kantian approach
so long as the special nature of a relationship is only taken into account when we are
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deciding to whom we should direct ourselves when fulfilling our wide duties, such as
beneficence. Kant‟s emphasis on treating people equally is directed instead at two
concerns: that we ought to treat all human beings as deserving of respect since they are
ends in themselves, and that duty, to be deserving of the name, cannot admit of
exceptions. So, the question we should be asking is: What are we to do in situations
when the special nature of a relationship is being weighed directly against an injunction
that we ought to be able to universalize a maxim, an injunction which takes the making of
exceptions as the surest sign of a violation of duty?
The assertion in feminist ethics that we ought to give special weight to the
particular nature of a given relationship is less appealing when this would amount to
violating a moral rule for the sake of a particular individual. In the examples of Billy
Budd and of lying to procure medicine for a patient in need, earlier in the chapter, we saw
that the decision to make an exception to help someone in need could cause several
problems. I suggested there that violating moral rules has the consequence of weakening
respect for lawfulness as such. Further, I suggested that a decision to violate a moral rule
often falsely supposes that our only choices are violating a moral rule and allowing a
tragedy to occur. This point led to the additional point that it may be the case that
progress toward a more moral world is made more, not less, possible if we are forced to
change rules rather than violate them. When we add the consideration that the reason we
seek to make an exception to a moral rule is due to the specific nature of our relationship
to a specific person, further complications are added. Most importantly, we need to be
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wary of the ways in which special relationships may unwittingly turn into unjustified
biases.
Held tells us that special consideration based on sympathies with a white
supremacist would not be justified while considerations based on relationships such as
family affiliation or friendship are more acceptable (Held 95). But this of course forces
us to ask about many instances in which we are unaware of the reasons why we favor one
person over another out of a feeling of kinship. One argument in favor of affirmative
action is that it compensates not for past instances of racism but for unintentional biases
on the part of employers. Setting the affirmative action debate aside, one could see that it
is reasonable to suggest that employers and coworkers might unknowingly favor those
who look like they do. This reminds us of the problems, pointed out in Chapter Three, of
attempting to apportion individual happiness to individual virtue or worthiness to be
happy. There I suggested that we should not think of the highest good possible in the
world in this way because doing so would suggest that we had a duty to evaluate a
person‟s worthiness to be happy and attempt to promote their happiness accordingly. The
first of these requirements is likely impossible, and even if possible, the idea of only
promoting the happiness of those we think „deserve it‟ is morally problematic.
This issue is exacerbated when we introduce the element of special relationships.
Then, our attempt to promote a person‟s happiness would become based not even on their
apparent virtue, but on our fondness for them. There are two obvious problems with this.
First, as was pointed out earlier, fondness for a given person is not something that can be
commanded, so even if making moral decisions based on the specialness of a relationship
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was laudable, there is no guarantee that people would themselves recognize the
specialness of a relationship that an author like Held would suggest is obviously special
(such as that between parent and child). Second, if the objective nature of a relationship,
such as the fact that it is one between friends or one between a parent and child, is not
enough to ensure that we subjectively experience the relationship as special, then our
basis for experiencing a relationship as special becomes purely subjective and thus
arbitrary.
In defense of Held, her position, at least in Ethics of Care, is not that we should be
partial to particular others in cases when this partiality comes in direct conflict with a
moral rule. Instead, she argues for a broader claim, that an acknowledgement of the
specialness of particular relationships is an important aspect of our moral lives. I am
sympathetic to this view, and I have tried to show that there is nothing in Kant that would
prohibit it. I have attempted to show that it is for this reason that we must distinguish
between two notions of treating people equally. I have tried to show that it is a
mischaracterization of Kant to portray him as advocating a view that we should be blind
to individual differences and the special nature of relationships. In this sense, it may be
appropriate, even for Kant, to treat people differently. Kant would reject only the more
drastic claim, that partiality should take precedence over the moral law when the two
come into direct conflict. And, I would suggest that he would have good reasons for
rejecting such a claim.
I offer the above considerations not as decisive arguments in favor of Kant‟s
approach to tragic circumstances, but simply as an argument that Kant‟s approach should
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not be dismissed too easily, as Korsgaard‟s remark that it is “grotesque” would have us
do. I have argued that, if moral progress is our goal, then the approaches I have
contrasted Kant‟s with are themselves problematic, and this makes his own approach
more plausible. Korsgaard‟s own approach is however unique in that it recommends that
we use multiple standards by which we can evaluate the morality of actions. For
Korsgaard, we should use one standard in “everyday life,” while a different standard may
be necessary for extreme circumstances (Korsgaard 150). With this in mind, we turn now
to examine her argument for a „double level‟ theory.
Korsgaard‟s Double-Level Approach
The way that Korsgaard differs from Kant stems from the way each sees the role
of the Kingdom of Ends. For Kant, the Kingdom of Ends is both a social goal and a
normative principle. This is because we are to try to make the Kingdom of Ends
possible, but we are also to act as if we are legislators in such a kingdom already. By
contrast, Korsgaard takes the view that in some cases “the Kingdom of Ends can become
a goal to seek rather than an ideal to live up to…” (Korsgaard 153). These cases are what
she refers to as “evil circumstances” (Korsgaard 153), and she uses the example of the
murderer at the door as an example of such a circumstance. For Korsgaard, the reason
we may abandon the Formula of Humanity and the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends in
such evil circumstances is that they give “implausible answers when we are dealing with
the misconduct of others and recalcitrance of nature” (Korsgaard 151). For example, on
Korsgaard‟s reading (with which I have no objection) the Formula of Humanity would
clearly prohibit lying to the murderer at the door. For her, this is an example of an
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„implausible answer.‟ I have already tried to argue for the view that Kant‟s answer may
not be as implausible as Korsgaard suggests, and I will return to this issue later.
However, what is important to focus on now is not Korsgaard‟s differences with Kant but
her differences from others who would reject Kant‟s strict adherence to moral principles
in “evil circumstances”. While others might take the view that Kant‟s „implausibility‟ in
such cases is an argument for the implausibility of his ethics as a whole, this is not
Korsgaard‟s view.
It is important to remember that Korsgaard argues that the Formula of Universal
Law is not equivalent to the other formulations, which is an issue I took up in Chapter
One. In particular, her view is that the Formula of Universal Law is less stringent than
the Formula of Humanity17 and thus “provides the point at which morality becomes
uncompromising” (Korsgaard 154). So, to summarize Korsgaard‟s position, she takes the
view that we should guide our conduct by the Formula of Humanity in most situations,
but in certain situations we should abandon it and follow what she takes to be the less
stringent formula, the Formula of Universal Law. Thus she offers what she calls a
double-level theory, in which we are given two sets of moral principles, one for „normal‟
situations and one for „extreme‟ situations. What I wish to investigate here is the
plausibility of this double-level approach as applied to Kant‟s categorical imperative.
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She describes the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends as a “corollary” to the Formula of Humanity, and
thus the two are either supposedly equivalent or much more closely related than either of the formulations
is to the Formula of Universal Law. I have offered my own argument in Chapter Three regarding the
relationship between the Formula of Humanity and the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends, but I do not reject
her claim that the two are equivalent.
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However, in order to do this it will be important to first clarify Korsgaard‟s discussion of
double-level theory, which will include a brief discussion of its roots in Rawls.
A discussion of Rawls‟ Theory of Justice, which is the inspiration for Korsgaard‟s
use of a double-level theory, is beyond the scope of this project. However, Korsgaard
makes use of several terms introduced by Rawls, so it is necessary to clarify a few of
these terms at the outset. The first important distinction Rawls draws, which Korsgaard
makes use of, is the division between ideal theory and nonideal theory. Ideal theory deals
with the question of “what a perfectly just society would look like” (Rawls 8). In such a
society each person is “presumed to act justly and to do his part in upholding just
institutions” (Rawls 8). This is contrasted with nonideal theory, which is used to deal
with “the principles that govern how we are to deal with injustice” (Rawls 8). These two
terms are related to, but should not be confused with, two other terms, what Rawls calls
the “general conception” of justice and the “special conception.”
Rawls lays out two basic principles that are intended to govern an ideal society:
that all persons have equal rights to “the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a
similar liberty for others” (Rawls 62), and that any inequalities in society are arranged so
that they benefit all and are “attached to positions and offices open to all” (Rawls 62).
He also tells us that these principles are ordered in terms of priority, so that it is
impermissible to trade away liberties or equalities of opportunity to allow for their
uneven distribution, for example, for the sake of universal economic benefit. Rawls
refers to these two principles as a “special case of a more general conception of justice”
(Rawls 62). So, the serial ordering of these principles is associated with the “special
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conception” of justice. Rawls then contrasts this with the “general conception,” which he
expresses the following way: “All social values – liberty and opportunity, income and
wealth, and the bases of self-respect – are to be distributed equally unless the unequal
distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone‟s advantage” (Rawls 62). Thus
the “special conception” is more restrictive than the “general conception,” since the
general conception would allow for trade offs of, for example, equality of opportunity, if
they were to benefit all, while the special conception would not allow this. We then have
two sets of principles, one more stringent and one less so. This is important because of
the question of when we are to use each, which is the question Korsgaard wants to
address in dealing with Kant.
According to Rawls, the two principles that comprise the “special conception” of
justice “define then a perfectly just scheme; they belong to ideal theory and set an aim to
guide the course of social reform” (Rawls 245). But he makes it clear that this
conception was not intended to deal with situations of injustice, “so it is possible that [in
such cases] they no longer hold” (Rawls 245). So, the suggestion is that this conception
may be abandoned in favor of the less stringent general conception as long as in so doing
“social conditions are eventually brought about under which a lesser than equal liberty
would no longer be accepted” (Rawls 247). This is what Korsgaard refers to as a doublelevel theory. Korsgaard then argues for the view that we should treat the various
formulations of the categorical imperative in the same way Rawls treats the two
conceptions of justice. However, in order to see if this suggestion is plausible, it is

177
important to look at whether we can appropriately draw an analogy between Kant‟s
approach and the sort of ideal theory laid out by Rawls.
Korsgaard suggests that the “standard of conduct he [Kant] sets for us is designed
for living in an ideal state of affairs” (Korsgaard 149). It may be helpful then to begin by
considering whether this is an accurate depiction of Kant‟s view. Korsgaard associates
Kant‟s commands with an ideal state of affairs because she notes that, for Kant, “we are
always to act as if we were living in a Kingdom of Ends, regardless of possible disastrous
results” (Korsgaard 149). However, this depiction of Kant‟s view is perhaps misleading.
Stated this way, the impression could be given that Kant is asking us to suppose that all
people already act out of respect for the law and treat other as ends in themselves. But of
course, this is not at all what Kant has in mind when he says that “every rational being
must act as if he were by his maxims at all times a law giving member of a kingdom of
ends” (Gr 438). Just because we must follow the moral law, this does not mean that we
have no obligation to try to bring about the Kingdom of Ends. If we are to „act as if we
were [already] living in a Kingdom of Ends,‟ we would lose sight of any command to
help bring about such a kingdom. It is our very awareness that we do not yet live in a
Kingdom of Ends, or a moral world, that helps us to see our duties to bring it about.
Nigel Harris makes an argument that touches on this point in “Kantian Duties and
Immoral Agents.” There he suggests that our decisions about what our duties are in a
given situation take place in a two stage process. In the first stage, we must include our
awareness of the possible irrational motives of persons with whom we are dealing, such
as the fact that a person at our door may in fact be intending murder. This awareness
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helps us to consider our options. Harris, for example, makes the point that we would
never consider lying to a person at our door who was looking for our friend unless we
had reason to believe they had nefarious intentions. In the second stage of the decision
making process, according to Harris, we bring in the categorical imperative, which bids
us to consider the persons with whom we are dealing as rational agents. So, even though
we are aware of their immoral intentions, we still must consider the fact that they expect
us to tell the truth. Thus Harris concludes that even in this two stage process we still
have, according to Kant, a duty not to lie to the murderer. He does little in the article to
wrestle with such cases, but his general point is that we would not take into account the
fact that a person was irrational if we took Kant‟s formulation of the kingdom of ends as
calling on us to assume that we currently live in a world where all agents are wholly
rational18. Thus, it makes more sense to take Kant‟s claims that we are to always act as if
we were members of a Kingdom of Ends as indicative of Kant‟s view of how we are to
bring such a kingdom about and not as a sign of indifference to the fact that the Kingdom
of Ends is not yet a reality. This distinction is important, because some criticisms of
Kant‟s approach, such as one offered by Michael Phillips in his article “Reflections on
the Transition from Ideal to Non-Ideal Theory,” seem to rest on this misinterpretation.
Phillips refers to Kant‟s approach as one of “Moral Purism” (Phillips 552), and he
levels several criticisms against such a view. But Phillips‟ criticism of “moral purism”
has two distinct sources, and these two sources come from the two ways in which we can
understand Phillips‟ comment that “Moral Purism becomes the view that the principles of
18
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Ideal Theory ought to govern behavior in the actual world” (Phillips 555). In one sense
this comment means simply that Kant, as a “moral purist” would have us act on the same
principles we would act on if the world were morally ideal, even though it is not. This is,
I think, true of Kant. The other sense of this comment can be taken as meaning that Kant
would have us act as if this world existed already. I have suggested that this is however
not an accurate portrayal of Kant‟s view. With this in mind, it becomes easier to respond
to some of the criticisms made by Phillips.
One criticism Phillips brings up against Kant‟s “moral purism” is an issue of
logical possibility rather than practical implausibility. Since, on Phillips‟ reading, Kant
“would have us act on a morality that is appropriate to an ideally structured society”
(Phillips 556), some of the duties that would exist in such a society may be impossible to
perform in a society that is less than ideal. He uses the example of a duty of loyalty to
friends, noting that in a society where everyone else is a devoted egoist, it would be
impossible to form friendships and thus impossible to carry out a duty to be loyal to them
(Phillips 557). But this criticism rests on the misreading of Kant that I mentioned above.
For Kant, I do not look at any society, real or imagined, and generate a list of duties
based on the image of that society. Rather, I look at the nature of rationality as such and
decide what a rational agent can and cannot will19. The mistake Phillips makes is to
confuse two related concepts: acting as if we were members of a kingdom of ends (even
though it does not exist), and acting as if the kingdom of ends already existed. The
19

As we saw in Chapter Two, this will lead to an appreciation for the empirical conditions we are in, since
there are duties, for example, that may apply to dependent beings such as human beings, but not selfsufficient beings, and so, given that we are dependent beings, we cannot rationally will, for example,
maxims of non beneficence.
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former command can be traced to the moral law, while the latter derives duties from a
conception of what the ideal state of affairs (the Kingdom of Ends) is like.
This same confusion can be found in another criticism Phillips makes of “moral
purism.” This time the claim is that such an approach can lead to morally repugnant
conclusions about how we should behave. Phillips notes that we could imagine a
morality that envisions as its goal “the creation of a world in which there is universal
respect for persons” (Phillips 559), which is a view I would associate with Kant.
Regarding this morality Phillips further asks us to imagine that it places a high premium
on respect and on truthfulness. So far, this is again in keeping with Kant. However, he
then makes a leap and suggests that we should imagine that this morality also “includes
candor – as a form of respect -- where we would now avoid it (in the Kingdom of Ends
we have far less to fear from our rivals, adversaries and enemies – if there be enemies
here)” (Phillips 559). After making this addition, he uses it to argue against the
plausibility of such an approach by noting that, if an enemy of my friend was to ask about
my friend‟s weaknesses and I were to respond candidly, I would have acted unjustly
(Phillips 559). While Phillips is right to say that we would act unjustly in being fully
candid, he is wrong to suggest that Kant‟s command to treat people as ends in themselves
or the duty not to lie are equivalent to offering up any sought after information. What
causes Phillips to make this leap, however, is the fact that he seems to read Kant as
suggesting that we are to act as if we were oblivious to the fact that our candor could be
used for immoral purposes. But, as I have tried to show already, this is a misreading of
Kant‟s approach.
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Phillips is on firmer ground when he returns to his more general point that acting
“on a principle that is part of one‟s moral ideal may impede a wider realization of that
ideal” (Phillips 559). Phillips‟ basic argument, like Korsgaard‟s and many other critics of
Kant‟s rigorism, is that his position leads to unfeasible and even immoral conclusions.
Phillips makes the point that the type of society Kant envisions, as the Kingdom of Ends
realized on earth, could not be achieved “without occasionally treating another as a
means only” (Phillips 560). He then goes further and suggests that to argue against this
claim is “absurd”. He writes as follows:
This is not to say that the end – a greater realization of one‟s Ideal – always
justifies the means. My point requires only a denial of the absurd claim that the
end never does so. If…by one small lie we could bring about a world in which
everyone acted as if he/she were members of the Kingdom of Ends, we should be
foolish and immoral to refuse (Kant notwithstanding)20. (Phillips 560)
There is not much left to say to critics like Phillips except to simply deny his premise.
This dissertation has been, in large part, an effort to do just that. As Phillips notes, Kant
would reject the claim Phillips makes, that the lie would be worth the end attained by it.
However, it is important to look again at some reasons why he would do so.
Imagine a person who took the view that he or she ought to tell lies to foster the
conditions for more truth21.

I find this approach to be chilling in part because of its

seeming appeal. It seems at first to be prima facie the case that an increase in honesty on
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Phillips seems to suggest that the lie to bring about the Kingdom of Ends would be justified because it is
helpful in attaining that goal, he does not claim that the goal is impossible without the lie. This distinction
is important because the argument is thus that actions that would be considered immoral in an ideal world
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Phillips himself uses the example of lying to a McCarthyist Committee about the activities of one‟s
university, in order to preserve the atmosphere of intellectual honesty present within the university.
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the whole is worth one small lie, especially when we feel we are lying to immoral people.
However, this rationale is indeed used to justify continual infractions, since the world can
always be brought closer to the ideal. Kant‟s insight is that there is only one plausible
place to draw the line when it comes to the question of when, if ever, the ends justify the
means, and that is to say they never do. While many argue, as Phillips does, that this is
simply absurd, the counter-claim, in my view is more troubling. This is the case because,
if we do not say that the end never justifies the means, we are put in the precarious
position of never having a clear unequivocal standard for when the end does justify the
means22.
A further response to the approach taken by Phillips also takes us back to the
argument in Chapters Two and Three. There we saw the connection between the
goodness of ends and the moral law. Rational nature is the only self-existing end, and the
command to treat humanity as an end in itself leads us to try to promote the autonomy
that is the defining feature of our rationality, and thus work towards a Kingdom of Ends
on earth. However the very thing that makes rational nature an end in itself is the ability
to give ourselves the moral law and act accordingly. So, to try to accomplish the creation
of a moral world by violating the commands of the moral law is, for Kant at least, selfcontradictory. The value of the moral world cannot be separated from the value of the
human being as a being acting from a respect for the moral law. And, Kant seems right
22

I would go so far as to suggest that Phillips himself begins to fall down this „slippery slope.‟ He goes so
far as to argue that “we have no obligation to act on a higher more restrictive moral standard in relation to
others than they act upon in relation to us” (Phillips 561). I find this claim deeply troubling. The
suggestion here is not that acting on strict moral standards permits immorality to occur, or even that acting
on such standards makes a moral world more difficult to attain. Rather, it suggests that it may be
permissible to deviate from strict moral standards whenever it disadvantages us. This claim also has the
absurd result, if taken literally, of justifying torture to those that would torture us.

183
on this point. The idea of willing the existence of truth by the means of untruth seems
like a perfect example of the type of contradiction that speaks to an attempt to separate
the morality of the end from the morality of the means to its attainment.
The above point leads to an important difference between Rawlsian ideal theory
and Kant‟s ethics. In ideal theory as depicted by Rawls, we ask what principles would
characterize an ideal society, and we use these principles to think backward and ask how
we can bring about a society that best embodies this ideal. But those principles are not
themselves guides to the realization of this ideal. In contrast, Kant is concerned with
principles that guide our conduct, and, while he argues that it is in fact possible that moral
action will bring about a more moral world, he takes the view that these principles hold
for us whether or not they lead to an ideal state of affairs. So, we should be careful not to
take Kant‟s “moral purism” as synonymous with a kind of ideal theory if we are to avoid
wrongly ascribing many implausible views to him23. This difference between Rawls and
Kant is significant, as it leads back to the question of the source of our moral principles.
Korsgaard‟s argument, that we ought to use the Formula of Humanity in most
circumstances, but employ the Formula of Universal Law in “evil circumstances,” rests
on her case that the two formulations are non-equivalent. In Chapter One I considered
Korsgaard‟s case for non-equivalence and argued against it. But even if I am correct that
the formulations are to be understood as equivalent (at least in the sense that the various
23

One of the examples Phillips uses is deserving of specific comment. Phillips suggests that codes of
ethics such as the American Bar Association‟s code of legal ethics are written on the assumption of a
situation of justice. He goes on to suggest that, in instances where a system such as the legal system
contain serious injustices, that we cannot look to these codes to guide our behavior. (See page 552 for this
view.) I strongly reject this claim and take the view that departing from such codes in these situations
would just as likely inject more immorality into a situation and into the system as a whole as it would to
help alleviate injustice.
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formulations would not yield results that contradicted one another), we could still
imagine someone, perhaps Korsgaard herself, recommending that we follow the
categorical imperative for most situations, but that we should develop a separate standard
for our conduct in “evil circumstances.” This leads to a second sense in which the issue
of the equivalence or non equivalence of the formulations is significant. If the
formulations are in fact equivalent and we cannot therefore look to a different
formulation of the categorical imperative to guide our conduct in these “evil
circumstances,” then whatever standard we would use for such situations would need its
own derivation. Otherwise, this second standard of conduct would seem to be an
arbitrary line in the sand. To my mind this is the single most important consideration in
favor of Kant‟s approach and against a double-level approach.
It would in some sense be better to abandon Kant altogether than to propose that
we are to follow Kant in trying to found our moral principles on universal and necessary
features of rationality…except in some cases. Approaches such as consequentialism or
feminist ethics begin by looking at the world, and look backward for principles that can
deal with the world effectively. Feminist ethics starts with an appreciation of the
particular relationships we have as individuals and asks us to make moral decisions with
these relationships in mind. Utilitarianism observes that all people seek well-being and
asks us to consider the world around us and to ask which actions will best contribute to
the well-being of all. Kant begins in the opposite direction. He begins by trying to find
the grounds for the concept of duty as such, and only then examines what our individual
duties are. A double-level approach, if both “levels” cannot be derived from the
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categorical imperative, splits the difference between these two approaches. It follows
Kant in the derivation of the principle that will guide most of our moral lives (the
categorical imperative), but it works backwards when it comes to “evil circumstances,”
moving from our concern about conditions we encounter in the world and asking us to
come up with moral principles that are best situated for dealing with these circumstances.
The result is a moral philosophy that has a „split-personality.‟
Taking an approach such as Korsgaard‟s gives the mistaken impression that the
reason Kant‟s categorical imperative is acceptable in most circumstances is because it
yields “acceptable results,” but such a calculation is of course anathema to Kant‟s entire
way of thinking about ethics24. Kant makes it clear that “the facility with which a
principle can be used and its apparent adequacy furnish no quite certain proof of its
correctness but, instead, awaken a certain bias against rigorously investigating and
weighing it in itself and without any regard for what follows from it” (Gr 392). One
might argue coherently that concerns for consequences, whether in general or to
particular individuals, should guide our conduct. And one could argue also that these
concerns must give deference to an independent standard of our moral conduct, derived
from an investigation of practical reason. But, what seems difficult to argue is that we
ought to do both, that is, that we should base our notion of moral obligation on practical
reason, except when it yields undesirable results, and then we should supplement it with a
24

Korsgaard argues that both of her standards for conduct are derived from the categorical imperative, and
thus she has not strayed from an approach that grounds our obligations in considerations of rationality.
However, the basis for her argument that we ought to use the less stringent formula in “evil circumstances”
is nonetheless based on a concern for the results of the formula‟s application. For example, she writes “we
can say that the Formula of Humanity is inapplicable because it is not designed for use when dealing with
evil” (Korsgaard 151). Also, she writes of the same formula that it “gives implausible answers…”
(Korsgaard 151).
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concern for dealing with those results. But even if this approach were plausible, I am
unconvinced that it would be particularly helpful in practice.
We should remember that Korsgaard offers us two standards for conduct: the
Formula of Humanity and the Formula of Universal Law, which she argues yield
different results in practice. To defend this view she applied both formulations to the
case of the murderer at the door, and derived different results of that case using the
different formulas. While I have already argued against her treatment of this case under
the Formula of Universal Law, we might still ask about other cases, and ask how often it
would actually be the case that, even on Korsgaard‟s interpretation of the Formula of
Universal Law, that the two formulations would yield different results. It is helpful to
remember that Korsgaard based her argument, that the Formula of Universal Law would
allow us to lie to the murderer at the door, on three important provisions: First, we are
aware of the murderer‟s intentions. Second, the murderer does not know that we are
aware of his intentions. So, third the murderer would have no reason to believe we are
lying to him. Thus, even if everyone were to lie in these situations, such lies would never
be uncovered and the practice would not undermine itself25. We could ask then if this
same way of thinking would, for example, allow us to lie to insurance companies to help
patients. It seems as if the answer is that it would not. On Korsgaard‟s examination of
the murderer at the door, our deception could be universalized because of the other two
provisions built into the case, but these provisions are not present in a case such as lying
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This further presupposes Korsgaard‟s use of what she called the “Practical Contradiction Interpretation”
of why it is that maxims cannot be universalized, which I argued against in Chapter One. However, for our
purposes here, I will simply make use of her interpretation.
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to deceive insurance companies. If physicians universally lied on insurance forms, this
practice would undoubtedly undermine itself, and the insurance companies might, for
example, adjust their policies so as to account for this deception26. So, either formulation
of the categorical imperative, even on Korsgaard‟s own treatment, would yield the same
result here. In fact, one regrettable omission from Korsgaard‟s analysis is a treatment of
this question: Of the circumstances we might call “evil,” how many would be handled
differently by the two different formulations of the categorical imperative, even if we
were to accept her arguments for their inequality?
One further concern about Korsgaard‟s argument that we should use a less
stringent moral principle in dealing with “evil circumstances” is that she does not give us
much sense of which sort of circumstances are to count as evil. Nor does she offer an
account of a process by which we can determine this. She does say that we must do
better than the “common-sense approach” (Korsgaard 150), which simply tells us to
“depart from our ordinary rules and standards of our conduct when the consequences of
our following them would be „very bad‟ (Korsgaard 150). She correctly points out that
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Korsgaard offers an analogous example in Chapter Three of Creating the Kingdom of Ends. There she
puts the issue the following way: “The method of dealing with natural acts which I have just suggested
focuses on the question of whether you could readily achieve your purpose … in a world where your action
was the universal method for achieving that purpose” (Korsgaard 99). She uses the example of murdering
one‟s competitors in order to get a job in order to illustrate this process. My goal of getting a job through
violence would be thwarted in either of two possible ways. First, “[t]he use of violent natural means for
achieving ends cannot be universalized because that would leave us insecure in the possession of these
goods, and without that security these goods are no good to us at all” (99). If that is the case, then a
universal practice of killing to get jobs puts our own job (and our life) in persistent danger and my maxim
undermines itself. The second way in which Korsgaard suggests that the universal practice of violence to
get jobs undermines itself is to “consider whether the social conditions that allow violence to work as a
method of achieving this purpose would exist if it were the universal method” (99). Her point here is fairly
straightforward: if everyone used violence to get jobs, employers would adjust the hiring process so as to
undermine the effectiveness of the tactic. Korsgaard suggests some possibilities: “Perhaps no one would be
told who the candidates were, or people would even keep it a secret what job they held” (100).
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such an approach leads down a “consequentialist slippery slope” (Korsgaard 150) where
the temptation is to justify incrementally greater violations of moral standards in favor of
incrementally increasing concerns for consequences. Her alternative is thus to turn back
to the analogy with Rawls‟ double-level approach. But this comparison is not quite
appropriate because Rawls does give us guidelines as to when his “general conception”
of justice should guide us and when the more restrictive “special conception” is adequate
for the task. This is because we are guided by an idea of the goal we are striving toward
rather than by a conception of the commands of the moral law. So for Rawls it makes
sense to argue that temporary inequality may be necessary (in the form, for instance of
affirmative action) to bring about greater equality27.
It seems to me then that Korsgaard‟s double-level approach has several problems.
In the first place, Korsgaard bases her argument for this approach on the claim that the
formulas of the categorical imperative are not equivalent, which is a claim I argued
against in Chapter One. If Korsgaard is incorrect about the issue of nonequivalence, we
are presented with a second question of whether we should simply posit another moral
principle to deal with situations in which we feel that our usual moral principle (the
categorical imperative) yields unacceptable results. But this causes two problems. First,
it causes us to ask about the source and justification of the principle we have developed
for use in these special circumstances. Second, it jars against the spirit of Kant‟s ethics in
that it puts the concern for the consequences of the application of a moral principle before
a concern for whether the principle rests on a legitimate foundation. In addition, we have
27

The example here is actually Korsgaard‟s. See page 148 of Creating the Kingdom of Ends.
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the practical concerns of whether a second principle would in fact yield results different
from the principle to which we normally appeal when making our moral decisions. And
finally, we would need criteria to know when to use which principle. For all these
reasons, while a double-level theory may be plausible in some respects, such as in Rawls‟
project, we ought to reject this approach if we are to retain the essence of Kant‟s thinking.
And this conclusion leads to a further conclusion, that Kant‟s approach to ethics, even in
the face of situations we may feel as tragic, can be plausibly defended against various
alternatives.

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION - THE PLACE OF HOPE IN AN IMPERFECT WORLD
This dissertation is an attempt to address two issues that are often associated with
Kant‟s ethics. The first is an interpretive concern, which I believe wrongly portrays Kant
as someone who is indifferent to teleological concerns and lets an allegiance to the
dictates of rationality blind him to all other concerns. The second issue is related to the
first, since it represents the view that, regardless of whether or not Kant allows for
teleological concerns in his thinking, his focus on strict adherence to the moral law
simply is implausible in situations in which this adherence may be seen to lead to
tragedies and even injustices. The first three chapters of this dissertation have attempted
to deal with the first concern, and the final chapter is intended to provide a response to
the latter.
In Chapter One I attempted to show that the avenue Christine Korsgaard attempts
to open for us, of separating the formulations of the categorical imperative so that Kant
can give us two guidelines for action instead of one, is not in fact in keeping with Kant‟s
own view. Korsgaard‟s ultimate motivation for making this divide was the worry that the
strictness of the Formula of Humanity restricts our own actions so much that it puts us in
the position of allowing tragedies and injustices to occur out of a misplaced overallegiance to a particular notion of rationality. In Chapter Two I argued that Kant‟s
notion of rationality has a legitimate teleological component, so that allegiance to the
190
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moral law can be seen as inseparable from a concern for certain ends. This is
important because it helps us to see that, when we refuse to violate the moral law, we do
so not simply because we value rationality for its own sake but because we value the
autonomy of ourselves and others. In Chapter Three I attempted to demonstrate that Kant
saw the Kingdom of Ends on earth as the ultimate end of moral action and as possible in
this world. This step in the argument helped us to further see that Kant is not indifferent
to the cause of moral progress. Indeed, Kant sees allegiance to the moral law as not only
compatible with moral progress but as the only legitimate means to it. In the final
chapter I attempted to defend this position, arguing against other approaches to dealing
with tragic circumstances, especially as it pertains to the goal of making a more moral
world possible. This chapter culminated in a return to a discussion of Christine
Korsgaard‟s treatment of Kant. However, the issue in Chapter One was interpretive, and
the question was whether Kant would accept the claim that the formulas of the
categorical imperative are non-equivalent. The issue in Chapter Four concerned
Korsgaard‟s other claim, that, regardless of what Kant himself might have said, we
should separate the formulas of the categorical imperative, allowing us to have one
standard of morality for ideal circumstances and one for non-ideal circumstances.
Korsgaard uses Rawls‟ double-level theory as analogous to her approach to Kant, and I
argued against the plausibility of such an analogy.
Ultimately, Kant‟s approach to morality, and my defense of it, cannot help but
feel unsatisfying to some. This is because Kant makes it clear that the commands of the
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moral law will not necessarily make a perfectly moral world a reality. All we are entitled
to do is to hope for such a state of affairs. Additionally, nothing in this dissertation
amounts to an outright denial of Korsgaard‟s claim that adherence to the moral law will
sometimes allow a tragedy to occur. However, what I have tried to suggest is that Kant
can still speak to this concern. First, Kant shows us that tragedy, even injustice, is an
undeniable feature of human life, one we are not entirely able to control. What we can
control is our own actions, and we must separate the question of whether our own actions
are moral from the question of what is accomplished through them, since these outcomes
are not as much in our control as we might like to believe. Further, Kant is able to show
a connection between the grounds of morality and the goal of a moral world in a way that
other approaches to morality cannot.
I have also tried to argue, primarily in the final chapter, that there are some
practical responses to the worry that allegiance to the moral law cannot be reconciled
with a desire to prevent tragedies from occurring. In many occasions this is a false
dichotomy. Frequently commentators make the mistake of making logical leaps in their
portrayal of Kant‟s depiction of such conflicts. For example, the command that we may
not lie to the murderer at the door does not imply that we must simply escort the
murderer to our friend. Similarly, many times we tend to portray situations in our lives as
containing this same sort of set of choices: either we do something we would normally
count as immoral, or a tragedy occurs. However, I have tried to show that this portrayal
is often misleading. The depiction of situations as only offering two alternatives in fact
often paves the path for a decreasing respect for the commands of the moral law. This is
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so because we can grasp the concreteness of a tragic outcome. A person dies. A person
does not get necessary medical treatment – these things are real to us. In contrast, the
reality of the moral law is much more difficult to grasp.1 Since the reality of the moral
law is less clear to us, the temptation will always be to prioritize the more concrete reality
of a given situation, and thus we are constantly at risk of diminishing the importance of
the moral law. This by itself is a danger, but portraying situations as having only two
choices also limits our moral imagination. We too easily depict the situation as between
a concrete harm and an abstract dictate of rationality, and conclude the latter simply
should give way. But, if we were to instead reason that this dictate of rationality must
never be sacrificed, we would be pushed to look for alternative ways to confront a given
situation.
I take the view that when we dismiss thinkers such as Kant, who will not allow us
to be flexible in our moral obligations in times like these, we run the serious risk of
allowing ourselves to behave increasingly immorally under the belief that we act so as to
bring about a state of greater morality in the future. So, my hope is that perhaps Kant can
act as a heuristic device against this tendency, if nothing else. And I think there are
several examples from history that show us how important it can be to respond to tragedy
and injustice by remaining true to moral ideals.
There are many examples from history of those who refused to practice injustice
or engage in immoral acts, on the belief that the injustice of the situation in which they

1

It is well beyond the scope of this project, but there is an analogy to Plato‟s discussion of the importance
of the belief in the reality of eternal ideas, especially of the good, as both difficult to grasp and essential to
valuing the just life, especially as it appears in the Republic.
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found themselves was enough to justify actions that they would ordinarily never find
permissible. Most often, these examples portray unique individuals, who we think of as
inspiring figures but as embodying a morality that is profound but unrealistic for ordinary
people. Examples of such people include Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., and Nelson
Mandela. But of course it should be remembered that, while these individuals were
prominent leaders, they each led movements in which many „ordinary‟ people acted in
extraordinary ways in the face of tragic and unjust situations. And there is one example
in particular that stands out to me as an example of what it is possible for people to
accomplish without engaging in actions that would otherwise clearly be wrong.
A year or so ago, a colleague of mine named Richard Middleton-Kaplan brought
the book We Only Know Men, by Patrick Henry, to my attention. This book tells the
story of the people living in and around the French Village of Le-Chambon-sur-Lignon
during the Holocaust2. The book recounts the fact that the inhabitants of this village are
credited with saving the lives of more than 3,500 Jewish refugees, but the truly
remarkable aspect of this is that the villagers performed their rescue mission through
entirely non-violent means. The book makes it clear that the people who were engaged in
this rescue were ordinary people, committed to non-violence and equally committed to
aiding those in need. As Henry notes, “[w]hereas others have spoken perceptively of the
„banality of evil‟ during the Holocaust, we can speak of the „ordinariness of
goodness‟…” (Henry 24).

2

This book in fact is the second book to be dedicated to the same subject. It is an attempt to build upon
Philip Hallie‟s book Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed.

195
It is hard to choose an aspect of the actions of these villagers and single it out as
particularly deserving of admiration. They performed their rescue mission in a situation
in which the “Vichy government created a climate of extensive collaboration and
accommodation with the Germans and where anti-Semitism and informing on Jews was
deemed not only acceptable but patriotic” (Henry 12), so their very act of standing
against such rampant anti-Semitism is deserving of awe. Add to this the fact that their
rescue attempt came at great personal risk to the villagers. But I cannot help but feel the
weight of the fact that this resistance came without sacrifice to their ideals of nonviolence3. I find this example to be a helpful reminder when people charge Kant with
being indifferent to tragic circumstances or take the view that his ethics is implausible in
the face of evil.
It is in fact with some irony that the example of the murderer at the door is often
modernized in its retelling so as to portray the image of a Nazi soldier coming to the
home of someone hiding a Jewish refugee. The implication of such a version of the
example is that moral standards must simply give way in the face of evil, and nothing
epitomizes evil more than the actions of the Nazi regime in the Holocaust. But the
example of the villagers of Le Chambon-sur-Lignon offers a different lesson: we can
fight evil without violating our moral ideals. It is unfortunately the case that the tension
between preventing a tragic outcome and adhering to the moral law often portrays the
situation as having only two options: adhering to the moral law at the risk of allowing
tragedy to occur, or using „common-sense‟ and rejecting the choice of a strict adherence
3

Henry makes the point that, while this ethic of non-violence was for many villagers rooted in their
Protestant faith, not all of the villagers were Protestant or even religious.
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to moral principles for their own sake. But examples such as this village in France show
us that this choice often is a false-dichotomy, and adherence to the moral law can in fact
be compatible with the creation of a more moral world.
This is not to say that it is always possible to respond to immoral agents or to act
so as to prevent a tragic outcome while still remaining true to the moral law. In our
world it is the case that sometimes this dichotomy is not a false one at all but instead a
very real one. And it is impossible, I believe, to suggest that Kant can resolve these
conflicts altogether. We will sometimes be in the position of having to choose between
an adherence to the dictates of the moral law and the desire to prevent a tragedy, and the
only comfort Kant can give us is to argue that an abandonment of the moral law in order
to prevent such tragedies is not worth the price (despite the obvious instinct that the
contrary is true). The power of Kant‟s approach to morality is that it makes a connection
between two elements of moral philosophy that are often portrayed as existing in conflict
with one another. On the one hand it provides us with a clear guide to our moral conduct,
which commands categorically. On the other, it provides us with a vision of a moral
world we can work toward and argues that we are entitled to believe that such a world is
possible. Kant connects these two because he argues that the one is the path to the other,
and that the two notions are in fact inseparable. I have argued in this dissertation that
commentators have often failed to recognize one or the other of these components to
Kant‟s ethical thought. Either Kant is portrayed as entirely formalistic, or we are
presented with a view of Kant that privileges the status of the Kingdom of Ends or the
Highest Good in such a way that we lose sight of the connection between those concepts
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and the moral law. Both of these mischaracterizations lead to views about how Kant
„should have handled‟ cases of “evil circumstances,” and in so doing fail to give proper
weight to the way he did handle them.
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